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**UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING SECURITY
SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY**

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

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**UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING SECURITY SITUATION IN
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND IM-
PLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 19, 2012.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, the House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Before I go any further, though, I want to acknowledge that this is our last hearing that we will hold this Congress, and we are losing several Members off of our committee. And I just want to mention their names: Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Akin, Mr. Platts, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Schilling, Mr. Griffin, Mr. West, and Mr. Young, on our side of the aisle; and Mr. Reyes, Mr. Heinrich, Ms. Pingree, Mr. Critz, Ms. Sutton, Ms. Hochul, Mr. Ryan, on the other side.

So we are losing a lot of Members. We want to let them know they will be missed, and I hate to see you leaving.

I guess you feel the same about them, too, right?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Mr. Chairman, yes.

I mean, this is a committee that, you know, the expertise is critical. And while we all replenish and restock and move forward, but as Members leave, we lose their expertise and their experience on this committee. And all of those Members have served this committee very, very well, and their expertise will be missed.

So we appreciate their service to this committee. They have been part of what, you know, has given us our success as a bipartisan and successful committee. So I appreciate your bringing attention to their service.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Some of them are freshmen that have been here one term. Some, like Mr. Bartlett, has been here, we came together 20 years ago, so a lot of memories.

I want to start this morning by thanking my colleague, the committee’s ranking member, Mr. Smith, for suggesting that we hold this hearing on the DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo]. I believe it will help the committee to understand the complexity of some of the issues within Central Africa. The situation in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve and is driven by a complex interplay of regional power dynamics as well as an intricate web of economic and social issues.

What is clear is that the situation in the DRC is tragic for the innocent people caught in the conflict; innocent people who are simply trying to raise their families, and live their lives. As I have followed the media coverage of the situation in the DRC, I can't help but reflect on the millions of innocent people around the world who are caught in fundamentally unjust and socially complex situations. These situations can make anyone's heart break and, naturally, leads one to consider the simple question, what can be done?

I know one thing, it sure makes me appreciate our country. You know, I have heard that less than 2 percent of the people that have ever lived here on the Earth have lived under the kind of freedoms that we enjoy. We are so blessed, and when we see how innocent lives are—how people are hurt so much by some of the things that are happening around the world, it just, again, really makes me appreciate home.

The question, and likewise, the answer, becomes more complex as we contemplate what can be done within the context of U.S. national security interests, constrained budgets, ongoing commitments in Afghanistan and around the globe, and potential future contingencies that the military has to be prepared to execute. Given the looming threat of sequestration, or further cuts to the military, I believe most of us on this committee have become ever more focused on ensuring our military's missions are both essential and appropriately tailored.

That said, there may also be options outside of the DOD [Department of Defense] to address the situation in the DRC. I understand that, in the recent past, the Department of State conducted important diplomatic efforts, such as the Tripartite Plus, which furthered stability in Central Africa and within the DRC, in particular.

Although the Administration is no longer pursuing this particular effort, perhaps there are other similar opportunities, given how the situation has negatively evolved in the DRC. Moreover, it seems the U.S. could pursue deeper diplomatic engagement with regional partners and our allies to leverage their knowledge, expertise, and resources to address this issue.

Indeed, the world remains a complex and dangerous place. We cannot neglect to consider the linkages between instability in Central Africa and the global terrorist threat. But from Afghanistan, to Syria, to Iran, to North Korea, we also must recognize the existence of nonstate actors and regimes that directly threaten the United States and our allies. Therefore, we must ensure that our military is sufficiently resourced and that our national leaders prioritize our defense resources toward efforts that are appropriate for the U.S. military and our national vital security interests.

I look forward to learning more about the situation on the ground, as well as what the U.S. Government is doing to address the situation in the DRC.

Mr. Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES**

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you very much for taking the time to hold this hearing.

This is a very important issue. As you described, the situation in eastern DRC is dire. It is the largest humanitarian crisis, I think, that too few people have heard of. By some estimates, in the wars that have gone on there over the course of the last 15 to 20 years now, nearly 5 million people have been killed; many more wounded, injured, raped, displaced. It is a place where a lot of people are suffering. And it is a place where I believe we can make a difference in helping to reduce that suffering.

Stability in the region is incredibly important to the United States. We have key partners in that area that we have worked with in Uganda and Rwanda, as we have dealt with situations in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, and the instability coming out of the DRC is a threat to all of that.

We have seen, you know, in recent months that Africa is increasingly important in our national security interests. The instability there is giving rise to the many Al Qaeda-inspired insurgencies and that instability threatens our security. So one of the biggest purposes of this hearing is to get a greater feel for what the Department of Defense can do in that region to help. The biggest problem in eastern DRC is a lack of governance, a lack of the rule of law, and just a rogues' gallery of warlords, revolutionaries, and violent groups and individuals have taken advantage of that ungoverned space and created no-ending problems. So building toward greater security and stability in that region, has to be our focus.

Now, I know the DOD has done some work in that region. We are currently working with the Ugandan army and dealing with the Lord's Resistance Army, one of those revolutionary groups that has helped to destabilize the DRC, but we have also in the past tried to work with the DRC's military, training one battalion a few years back, to very, you know, strong success. That battalion is considered to be able and capable, but it is too small to make the big difference that needs to be made in that region. So I believe there is a critical role that the DOD can play in building the security capacity in the eastern DRC and working with the surrounding nations, like Rwanda and Uganda and Burundi and others that are critical to bring stability to us. So we want to explore further how DOD can be helpful.

And obviously, there is a huge diplomatic element to this as well. I think it is critically important that the U.S. engage, that the U.N. [United Nations] engage a high level envoy to that region, either from the U.S. or the U.N., can make a critical difference in bringing the partners together. I know Ambassador Carson has been working—or, sorry, Secretary Carson has been working on those issues, and others have as well. And we are anxious to hear more about what we can do to help move forward those efforts and be successful in the region.

This is something that does matter to us. In addition to the security issues, there is incredible economic opportunity in this region of Africa, economic opportunity for trade, partnerships with U.S.

businesses. But we have to get the stability there in order to take advantage of those opportunities.

So, again, I thank the chairman for having this hearing. I look forward to the testimony. I look forward to learning what more we can do to help the situation in the eastern DRC.

Thank you, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 63.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We will have two panels today. The first panel we have the Honorable Derek Chollet, from the Department of Defense. He is Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The Honorable Johnnie Carson, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African Affairs.

Mr. Chollet.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEREK CHOLLET, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Secretary CHOLLET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Smith, and the Members of this committee. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the urgent crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the struggle to bring about long-term stability to the people of DRC and the Great Lakes region. I would like to submit my full statement for the record and offer some brief opening remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Both of your statements will be included in the record, with no objection.

Secretary CHOLLET. Mr. Chairman, this committee knows well that the U.S. has many competing security priorities in Africa, from Somalia to Sudan, to Libya, to Nigeria, to Mali, but the DRC also remains important, both because of the potential opportunity lasting stability would bring but also because of the imperative to prevent mass atrocities, which is a priority for this Administration.

One of the key threats facing Congolese civilians, particularly in the eastern DRC, is a wide array of violent armed groups, most notoriously including the M23 [March 23 Movement], the Lord's Resistance Army, and the remnants of the genocidal militias, now calling themselves the FDLR [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda]. But undisciplined state security forces have also proven to be a danger to civilians, particularly when the forces are not well supported, have absorbed armed groups without vetting for human rights abuses, operate under a separate chain of command, or have not been trained in their legal obligations.

The confluence of such security concerns is why the Defense Department is closely following the security developments in DRC and the Great Lakes Region and are actively involved, along with our State Department colleagues, to address them.

The unfolding crisis highlights the Congolese government's failure to provide effective security, governance, and services in the eastern provinces. It has also highlighted the continued political and economic tensions between the DRC and its eastern neighbors, especially Rwanda. Outside support, in particular from Rwanda, has enabled the M23 to be the threat it is today and poses a seri-

ous challenge to the efforts to stabilize eastern DRC and ensure the protection of civilians.

As President Obama made clear yesterday in a phone call with Rwandan President Kagame, any support to M23 is inconsistent with Rwanda's desire for stability and peace.

Although the Rwandan military remains a valuable and capable partner in peacekeeping operations outside the immediate region, based on their support for M23, the Administration has suspended Rwanda's foreign military financing. As a situation in eastern Congo develops, we will continue to monitor reports of external support closely and respond appropriately, including by reviewing our assistance.

Inside the DRC, the U.S. is prioritizing security sector reform. This means working with our partners and the DRC to develop a comprehensive approach that addresses all three elements of security sector: the Congolese defense forces, military justice, and the police.

We must work to develop more professional forces that respect human rights and protect both the DRC's territorial integrity and population. In this regard, the Defense Department has provided training to the Congolese military, including the training of a light infantry battalion in 2010.

Sexual- and gender-based violence prevention and human rights training were incorporated in every aspect of this effort. In addition to the ongoing training on human rights and law, the Defense Department engagements with the FARDC [Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo] have included logistics, exercise participation, basic military intelligence training, military medicine, humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian mine action. Moving forward, the Defense Department stands ready to work with our state colleagues ensuring the best way ahead in supporting security sector reform, including by providing additional infantry training for the FARDC.

Mr. Chairman, the scale of the need is significant. To date, we have trained one battalion of 500 soldiers in a military that numbers approximately 150,000. Other European and African partners have also provided training, but the FARDC absorptive capacity for assistance is limited. The Congolese Defense Ministry has been slow to respond to our requests for the provision of appropriate personnel for training and information necessary for congressionally mandated human rights vetting. The lack of language capacity further inhibits training opportunities.

While the DRC continues to work to develop its own security capabilities, the United Nations peacekeeping operation or MONUSCO [United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC], remains essential in providing security for the civilian population in the DRC. MONUSCO has a challenging mandate in a very fluid security climate. We are reviewing options for improving MONUSCO's ability to meet the civilian protection requirements in the DRC.

To assist MONUSCO, the Defense Department has seconded three U.S. military officers who are helping to support operational efforts and ensuring an efficient flow of information between MONUSCO headquarters and field components.

Despite many challenges, we have an interest, an enduring interest, in helping develop a more capable Congolese military, and this fits within Secretary Panetta's broader policy emphasis on building partner capacity. Our persistent engagement helps our partners to provide for their own security. These relationships can also foster respect for the rule of law and human rights.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, I am grateful for the efforts of Congress, and specifically this committee, for continuing to shine a light on this important issue, one that deserves attention on a continent crowded with security challenges. And I should also note the indispensable work of the many nongovernmental organizations, who not only provide policy advice but are helping people on the ground in the DRC each day.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important issue with you today, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Chollet can be found in the Appendix on page 65.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Carson, Secretary Carson.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Secretary CARSON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the committee, thank you very, very much for the invitation to testify today on the crisis unfolding in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, also referred to as the DRC.

The security and humanitarian situation in the DRC is the most volatile and violent in Africa today. An estimated 5 million people have lost their lives since 1998, and millions more have been uprooted and displaced. The people of North and South Kivu provinces in particular, have faced repeated cycles of conflict, atrocities, and displacement, with the current crisis simply being the latest iteration.

The rapid fall of Goma last month to the Congolese rebel group known as the M23 provided a stark reminder that the root causes of the entrenched instability and recurring conflicts in the DRC and the region remain unresolved.

At the highest levels of the United States Government, we are committed to helping the DRC and its neighbors in this cycle of violence and instability, so that we do not find ourselves back here in 3 years facing yet another crisis in eastern DRC.

Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice, Under Secretary For Political Affairs Ambassador Wendy Sherman, and I have all spoken or met with senior Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan, and U.N. officials in the past weeks and months to advocate for a rapid and peaceful resolution to the current crisis.

I have traveled to the region just last month with my British and French counterparts to press the Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan governments to work together to stop the crisis and to address the underlying causes of instability. All three governments reiterated to us their commitment to these shared goals. In the U.N. Security Council, we have taken action to ensure that five of the most senior M23's most abusive commanders are now under targeted

sanctions, and we have placed those same individuals under U.S. sanctions.

Talks between the DRC government and the M23 began on December 9, in Kampala, Uganda, and are being mediated by Uganda as the chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, known as the ICGLR.

While the two sides have yet to begin substantive talks, the current cease-fire in the eastern DRC is holding, and the parties continue to express commitment to a dialogue.

Much of the M23's military prowess and success would not have been possible without outside support. There is a creditable body of evidence that corroborates the assertions of the U.N. Group of Experts that the Rwandan government provided significant military and political support to the M23.

While there is evidence of individuals from Uganda providing support to the M23, we do not have a body of evidence suggesting that the Ugandan government has a policy of supporting the M23. Nonetheless, we continue to urge Ugandan officials to ensure that supplies to the M23 do not originate or transit through Ugandan territory.

We have not limited our response to diplomacy alone. As required by the Fiscal Year 2012 Appropriations Act, Secretary Clinton suspended foreign military financing, or FMF, to Rwanda in fiscal year 2012 because of its support to the M23.

The Department continues to closely monitor reports of external support, and we will continue to respond appropriately, including by reviewing our assistance to deter this support if it should develop.

The highest levels of the United States Government are committed to helping the DRC and the region achieve a sustainable peace. As my colleague, Mr. Chollet, said, President Obama spoke yesterday with President Kagame and underscored that any support to the M23 is inconsistent with Rwanda's desires for stability and peace in the region.

President Obama emphasized to President Kagame the importance of permanently ending all support for armed groups in the DRC. Abiding by the recent communication that he made in Kampala, along with Presidents Kabila and Museveni, and reaching a transparent and creditable political agreement that includes an end to impunity for M23 commanders and others who have committed serious human rights abuses. President Obama believes that from this crisis should emerge a political agreement that addresses the underlying regional security, economic, and governance issues, while upholding the DRC's sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Obama has also delivered the message to President Kabila that the DRC must take concrete steps toward security sector reform and improve governance in order to reach a lasting peace in eastern DRC.

Looking forward, we are using all the tools at our disposal to help address and end this crisis. We are monitoring humanitarian needs and working to mobilize resources to ensure continued emergency assistance to civilians in need.

We are calling upon everyone involved in the conflict to maintain the current cease-fire, to permit humanitarian access, and to pur-

sue a sustainable political resolution through honest and meaningful dialogue.

While the talks between the M23 and the DRC government continue, we believe that direct dialogue between Presidents Kabila, Kagame, and Museveni is paramount to achieving a long-term, durable solution in the region.

Some of the root causes of this conflict can only be addressed through government-to-government dialogue and negotiation. These include issues of land tenure, refugee resettlement, the illegal exploitation of natural resources, border security, and support networks for armed groups.

While the responsibility to implement change rests first and foremost with the governments of the region, we encourage the United Nations Secretary General to appoint a high-level U.N. special envoy to engage the relevant countries on a sustained basis to help them reach a durable political resolution and ensure the successful implementation of that resolution over the long term.

Throughout this peace-building process, civilian protection is and must remain a priority. The U.N. peacekeeping mission in the DRC, MONUSCO, has come under very heavy scrutiny in recent weeks. While we believe that MONUSCO's performance has been acceptable given the very difficult circumstances, there is always room for improvement.

We and our fellow U.N. Security Council members and troops-contributing countries are reviewing the proposals on the table to improve and strengthen MONUSCO's capacity to protect civilians and to counter armed groups. We are encouraging our partners to ensure that any new efforts are coordinated with and perhaps even integrated into the U.N. peacekeeping efforts.

In the meantime, we remain committed to supporting MONUSCO's robust implementation of its current mandate. The primary responsibility for protecting the DRC and the Congolese people rests with the DRC government itself.

The crisis over the past few months has demonstrated to devastating effect the critical need for a professional and capable Congolese army that can protect the country's citizens. To reach a sustainable peace, the DRC government must accelerate its efforts towards comprehensive security sector reform. We have and will continue to work with the DRC government to professionalize its military, including continuing our training to army officers and support to the armed forces' military justice capacities.

Along with military reform, the DRC government must expand governance across the country. The governance vacuum that exists in parts of the country has allowed armed groups to set up parallel civil administrations and to exploit the population.

Efforts to expand governance must include electoral reform, holding long-delayed provincial and local elections, and strengthening state institutions to provide much-needed public services.

We believe that the time has come for the DRC and the international community to permanently break the cycle of violence and impunity that exists in the region.

Today's crisis is a deep tragedy, but it also offers an opportunity to help the DRC and the region to set a more sustainable course toward peace, prosperity, and long-term stability.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary CARSON. We urge the international community, the Great Lakes Region, and the Congolese people to demonstrate the resolve necessary to achieve this peace and prosperity, and achieve the goals that we all seek.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Carson can be found in the Appendix on page 70.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Secretary Chollet, please describe the strategic defense priorities within Africa, and how does the situation in the DRC situate within these priorities?

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, thanks for the question.

First and foremost, the priority recently has been on counterterrorism issues, and we have seen that—oh, I am sorry. Can you hear me right now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary CHOLLET. Recently, the top priority is, of course, always with us, the Department of Defense, to protect the American people, and so we have been acutely focussed on counterterrorism issues throughout the continent, and that is, I think, most recently North Africa, where that has gotten a tremendous amount of attention.

We are also, though, very, very keenly interested in the overall security as it bleeds into the atrocities prevention concerns that we have. And the Great Lakes Region, of course, the brutal history of that region is something that we are all very well aware of, and that is why we have sought to focus some of our Defense Department efforts on improving the capacity of partner countries to ensure that hardships can be alleviated and that we can prevent atrocities.

But to be honest, the bulk of our focus in the Department, and particularly our AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] colleagues, has been on the counterterrorism mission as well as building partnership capacity to both fight that mission but address the humanitarian needs as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Carson, my understanding is that the State Department managed an effort known as Tripartite Plus to address issues in the DRC and in the region. My understanding is that the State Department stopped this effort in 2009. Can you explain why the Department of State is no longer pursuing this effort, and what has taken its place?

Secretary CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question.

Prior to 2009, there was in existence an effort called the Tripartite Plus. When the Obama Administration came into office in 2009, we contacted the leaders of the four key states in Uganda, Rwanda, DRC, and Burundi to ask those leaders whether they were interested in carrying on with the Tripartite Plus arrangement. There was no consensus among the states to do so. And in fact, Rwanda did not want to carry on the process.

We did not, in fact, attempt to pursue it when we found there was division among the four countries. However, to maintain our high level of interest, Secretary Clinton appointed a Special Advisor for the Great Lakes, the late Howard Wolpe, who was a Mem-

ber of the House of Representatives from the State of Michigan for many years, and he served for the first 2 years of the Obama administration as the special envoy. He passed away, and he was replaced by Special Envoy Ambassador Barry Walkley, an experienced diplomat who had served as Deputy Chief of Mission in the DRC and had served in a number of other francophone posts. He continues to work on regional Great Lakes issues, but the decision to stop the Tripartite Plus was based, in fact, on a reluctance of all of the governments in the region to carry on.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Carson, Rwanda has increasingly been getting attention as a major source of the problem in the region. And obviously, there is a lot of history here going back and forth across the border of atrocities, frankly, committed on both sides, the Congolese against Rwandans, and vice versa. And Rwanda has an interest, obviously, in maintaining security across the border, but it is very clear that, you know, that they continue to deny involvement in M23, despite the fact that it is obvious that they are deeply involved in that and other aspects of it.

And I think we are going to need as a country to start putting more pressure on Rwanda to change their behavior. And certainly, they are not the only part of the problem. There are a ton of gangs involved there. But I am curious, going forward, what do you think Rwanda sees as their interested in that region? Because, on the one hand, certainly they want to protect themselves from any cross-border problems. On the other hand, their support for M23 seems to be simply driving up instability, you know, and creating more armed gangs and armed violence right on their border. So I am curious what you think their thinking is on that.

And then the final piece of it is, you mentioned, I think both of you mentioned it in your remarks, the minerals that are so important to that region. There are a lot of folks involved there and a lot of people making a lot of money, despite the chaos. They figured out some ways to work with whatever local warlords they need to work with to get the stuff out. To what extent, in your opinion, is Rwanda involved with that? Is it the situation that the armed gangs that are there are creating enough wealth for Rwanda that they have got their cut, they have got their deal, and they are simply trying to protect that? Is that part of the equation now? What is Rwanda's thinking, and how can we better move them toward working toward stability, because right now, they are not being a positive actor? They are not even being honest about what they are doing in the region. How can we improve that situation?

Secretary CARSON. Ranking Member Smith, I think there are several obvious reasons for Rwanda's involvement and engagement in the region.

The first is their deep concern and worry about elements of the former Rwandan military who continue to exist in the eastern part of the country; the FDLR, as they are called, members of the Rwandan army who participated in the genocide in 1994. Rwanda's desire is to see all of these individuals taken off the battlefield,

brought to justice. And part of their actions are motivated by security and their desire to see the FDLR completely eliminated.

The second desire is to ensure that all Rwandaphone speakers, Tutsis in the region, who cross the borders between Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC, are treated fairly; that they are not subject to harassment and intimidation and to human rights violations. And there has been a deep concern that many Rwandaphone speakers have been disadvantaged in the eastern Congo.

And thirdly, they would like to see the issues of refugee resettlement taken care of. There continue to exist a large number of Congolese who are in refugee camps in Rwanda and in the region who should be allowed to go back to the east. All of these are things that motivate their interest in the area.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

I have one more question, but I see we have been joined by Congresswoman Bass, so I want to ask unanimous consent that non-committee Members be allowed to participate in today's hearing after all committee Members have had an opportunity to ask questions, if the chairman will permit.

The CHAIRMAN. No objection. So ordered.

Mr. SMITH. I will tell you, Mr. Chollet, the question on the other side of it is, whatever role Rwanda may be playing and that the DRC is clearly the main source of the problem, that they cannot provide adequate security in that region. You mentioned in our efforts to train battalions there, we have legislative requirements in terms of human rights standards that need to be met by what any country that the DOD is going to be involved in training their military, and that the DRC struggles to meet those standards. Can you talk a little bit more about that, and what the DRC would have to do and how problematic it is, the Kabila government is, in getting to a solution to this problem?

Secretary CHOLLET. Thanks for the question. You are absolutely right. The human rights concerns are huge in the DRC in terms of the—it is the FARDC, which is one of the reasons why we do have an interest in helping to train them. Because we have shown in the one battalion that we have trained, we have seen, as you pointed out, it is relatively successful. And that battalion has not shown any real—much evidence of human rights abuses or the certain things that we are concerned about when we think about the Congolese military.

In terms of training a second battalion, and then training going forward, we are engaging with the Congolese government about what standards they would need to achieve for us to proceed with doing that. In fact, there is an outstanding training MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] that we are awaiting for signature that would then perhaps allow us to move forward in the future in terms of—

Mr. SMITH. Are we going to be able to get that signed do you think? Do you think we have reached the point where that is going to work?

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, we will see. I mean, I think we are prepared on our end. It is on us to work with our Congolese colleagues to—

Mr. SMITH. Get the DRC to agree.

Secretary CHOLLET. Absolutely, absolutely. But that is a prerequisite for us being able to move forward for further training, which of course helps on the human rights abuses problem.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset, today you mentioned this was the last hearing we would have this year, and you and the ranking member are always very gracious in thanking the Members of this committee and our witnesses for the great job that they do, but we want to thank both of you for your hard work and also maintaining—this still is probably the most bipartisan committee, I think, in Congress, and we appreciate your efforts towards that.

Mr. Chollet, I have a question, and I don't—I support what you do, and I don't want you to misinterpret my question, but it is a question we have to ask, is, as we look—as you know, we have had cuts to national defense, and especially the Department of Defense. Some would argue \$487 [billion]. It is really more like \$800 billion in the last few years. We have got a half trillion we are looking at in sequestration. When you look at the dollars that we are spending with the DRC and Rwanda, can you give us any ballpark of what kind of resource dollars the Department of Defense is spending there? Secondly, are those dollars adequate? And third, how would you prioritize that in terms of some of the other cuts that you see coming down, and how do we justify that and explain that?

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, it is a great question. As you know very well, Secretary Panetta is seized with the issue of sequestration and possible future defense cuts and very concerned about the impact that will have on our military and our national security generally. So it is something that we are very focused on in all of the issues that we confront in the Department.

You ask a very good question about a total number. I would like to get back to you to add up all of the different pots of money that are coming in, so I can give you an accurate answer. I can say that in the grand scheme of our spending, it is a relatively modest expenditure in terms of our overall defense spending. And we are prioritizing the areas in terms of the security sector reform, as I said, particularly in the Congo, where through education and through basic training programs, we can help the Congolese—lift the Congolese military up and get it up to the—closer to the standards that we want to see in a military and the standards that we think would help solve the problem.

I want to stress that that is still a relatively modest investment of our money and time, and we find that we are able to get a fairly large return on that investment in terms of the output. But it is no secret that if we were to seek further defense cuts, if we were to be—those reimposed on the Administration, that it would—we would have to take a close look at all of these efforts, even as modest as the expenditures currently are.

Mr. FORBES. Well, Mr. Chollet, if you don't mind, and I don't want to catch you off guard today, but give that some thought and if you would get back to us for the record on that, and again, just

kind of pull together as best you can the dollars that we are spending.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 137.]

Mr. FORBES. But also, we would love your thought, are they adequate?

Secretary CHOLLET. Yeah.

Mr. FORBES. I mean, are we putting the right dollars in? And then, third, just give us some idea of the prioritization because at some point in time, we have got to look at all of that in the grand scheme of things.

Secretary CHOLLET. Absolutely.

Mr. FORBES. And we appreciate your opinion.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. McIntyre.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing.

I would like to ask the panel what you felt like with regard to M23, their ultimate aims, and do you feel like that their threat is subsiding? Or do you think it is possible that it could lead to a new regional war in terms of M23's motives and ambitions?

Secretary CARSON. Thank you. I will take that question, Congressman McIntyre.

The M23 is basically a rebel group that has been once integrated into the FARDC, the Congolese military, and has now broken away from the FARDC because they believe that the terms that were signed on their integration into the FARDC on March 23rd, 2009, were broken.

What we are seeing in eastern DRC is a rebel group that has defied its military command. They refused to be relocated out of the eastern region as units, and they refused to be relocated out their separate senior officers. This is at the heart of the current rebellion, but the origin of the M23 is that it was, in fact, a rebel group prior to 2009. It went under a different acronym then, the CNDP [National Congress for the Defence of the People], but it is basically a rebel group of military commanders who have sought to parlay their military influence into political influence.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Do you believe their activities are going to lead to some kind of regional war? And how serious are their continuing activities?

Secretary CHOLLET. That is the concern. They are a group of growing capability. They have shown in the recent months to be a match, if not a superior, of the Congolese forces. Their continued activity and the continued support that they get is something, that is the reason why we are concerned about it, because if this continues much longer, there is a fear that this would spark a deeper war, along the lines the Congo has unfortunately seen too much of in the last 20 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One question is, what is the estimated strength in terms of active participants in M23? Either one of you.

Secretary CHOLLET. Roughly 1,000.

Mr. COFFMAN. Roughly 1,000, and could you go over again—I think you mentioned that the support is coming from Rwanda. Do you believe, and if so, why again is Rwanda supporting M23? Why do you think that they are supporting M23?

Secretary CHOLLET. There is, as Secretary Carson has outlined, there is a credible body of evidence that Rwanda is supporting the M23. This is the part of the conversation the President had yesterday with the Rwandan president. I think one of the reasons that there is support there, it goes to the origins of the group and Rwanda's interest that Secretary Carson outlined, is that the M23 sees themselves as the kind of the guardians of the Tutsi in the east, and so the argument would be that if they—the extent the Tutsi are threatened and the M23 can help protect the Tutsi in the east.

Mr. COFFMAN. And what is the strength of the DRC military again, the army?

Secretary CHOLLET. So there are roughly 150,000 total, but the Congo is about the size of Western Europe, so I believe the estimates are somewhere in the 6,000, 5,000 or 6,000 deployed in that—or no, there is more. That is the MONUSCO, sorry, 5,000 or 6,000 deployed in that in the east. I don't know what the exact estimate of the Congolese military deployment in the east is because this is a vast amount of territory that the military is trying to cover with 150,000 troops.

Mr. COFFMAN. Still, I mean, we are talking about a force of 1,000, and so why is this such a big issue for the DRC in order to be able to basically prevail in this situation?

Secretary CHOLLET. You want to go?

Secretary CARSON. Yeah, let me say just a slight revision. I think probably today, the M23 probably has some 2,000 or so troops. I think Mr. Chollet has pointed out the size of the Congo, but I think it is useful to graphically describe the Congo as a country which is as large as the eastern part of the United States, from the Atlantic to the Mississippi. It is an enormous country, and since the split of Sudan, it is, in fact, geographically, the largest in Africa.

The eastern Congo is one of the most difficult areas in which to operate. It is an area that is deeply forested in some places, double and triple canopies. It is also an area that has a large number of volcanos, some of which are active, and it also sits in what is called the Western Rift Valley, which gives it both altitude and low-level depth at the same time. It is an area which is very difficult terrain-wise to operate in.

I think in terms of the estimation of the number of soldiers that the DRC has in the eastern Congo, probably is in the neighborhood of somewhere around 20,000 to 30,000, stretched over not only the North and South Kivus but also Ituri. They are not only faced with the rebellion of the M23. There are probably at least a half a dozen to a dozen other smaller rebel groups operating in the area, including the FDLR, which is an anti-Rwandan group which is of concern to the government in Kigali. But they are also operating against

probably seven or eight different groups that go under the name of Mai-Mai, that have a third acronym that goes behind them.

So it is an area that is volatile. Instability prevails, and a number of rebel groups are operating there, which also requires the attention both of the FARDC, as well as the MONUSCO forces from the U.N.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for being with us this morning. It is important that we are here discussing these issues, I think, talking about security and the abuse of human rights in the DRC, and I appreciate that effort. As you stated, the violence that is taking place in this part of the world is really a threat to stability and human rights across the globe. We know that such injustices always are. That is why we have to set those priorities, as has been stated, but we have to recognize the reality there.

Could you please speak specifically to the successes or setbacks in the efforts to professionalize the military forces in the DRC with regards to the effectiveness of those forces in combating sexual violence against women and children? To any extent that our efforts have been successful in this endeavor, how can we further support those efforts? And to the extent that we have seen no marked improvement, you mentioned earlier that indiscipline and impunity persists, what should we be doing to address it?

Secretary CHOLLET. Thank you.

And as I said in my statement, the sexual violence is something that—and preventing that is a huge priority for all of our programming in this part of the world, around the world, but particularly in this part of the world, where we have seen just horrific stories and accounts coming out.

A couple of comments. First, in the specific battalion that we have trained, we have seen a successful effort in terms of—so far at least—in terms of human rights abuses, lack of human rights abuses coming out of that group compared to the rest of the Congolese military. Secondly, we have a program—

Mrs. DAVIS. Can I just, to what do you attribute that? What is the—

Secretary CHOLLET. I think it is the training effort that we helped—to the education, the discipline that we were able to help instill in the command and control. The Congolese military is riddled with problems; among them logistics problems, and but simple training and education and lack of command and control. It is hard to keep discipline within that military.

But we also have ongoing programming. In addition to these focused training efforts, ongoing programming on the rule of law and military justice, we spend a few million dollars on that per year to work with the Congolese military in a more wholesale way on helping with education and mentorship to ensure that the rule of law and human rights are instilled throughout that military. And that is programming, I think, that, although relatively modest, again, we see some benefit from.

Mrs. DAVIS. And where you have seen the efforts not working at all, I mean, what is it that—is it the same where we see the successful efforts?

Secretary CHOLLET. Yeah, where we are seeing—again, the challenges are paramount. I mean, these are forces that don't have a great amount of discipline, don't have great training and, often cases, don't have great education. As I mentioned in my statement, there is a real absorptive capacity problem within the DRC, and so it makes it even harder to try to train them up in a way that meets the standards that we would like to see in any military.

Mrs. DAVIS. Did you want to comment further?

Secretary CARSON. Yes, I would. I would say that security sector reform in the army has been a failure for the most part. It is a failure because of all of the things that my colleague, Mr. Chollet, has said, but it is also a failure because of elements of corruption. Soldiers are not paid on a regular basis. They are not sustained and re-equipped in the field. They do not have appropriate housing for themselves or for their families. And many times, when they are sent out, they are basically forgotten.

I think that one of the reasons why our 391st Battalion has been successful is because we put down a number of very clear conditions on the Government of the DRC to ensure that this battalion would be effective. We said to the Government, they must be maintained as a cohesive unit; they cannot be broken apart and sent to different units.

They must be paid on a regular basis, and we even talked directly, and I must say, I spoke with President Kabila and members of his Government about this, introducing a mobile banking system to ensure that soldiers would be able to get their pay as long as they had a cell phone. This is starting to take place.

We also said that they must be properly housed, and they must be supported with resupply. And additionally, we also assigned and paid for a couple of mentors to work with them after their training to ensure that they would retain their cohesiveness and their sharpness. And in fact, they have been very, very good, and they were a part of the counter-LRA [Lord's Resistance Army] operations, the counter-LRA operations in the northeastern part of the country for a long time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Chollet, I represent Robins Air Force Base, which is the home of the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System], and I would like to talk with you a little bit about both the security and the humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the use of our ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] platforms over there to assist both in the humanitarian mission and in the military mission. And could you speak to what is being done now with the use of our ISR platforms?

Secretary CHOLLET. Thank you. And as you are very well aware, the ISR issue is incredibly important to us, and it is something that there is huge value in everything we are doing.

I can say on the issue we have been talking here today about regarding eastern Congo, there is not much ISR work there that we

are providing. Most of the military assistance we are providing is in the form of training and mentorship. And that is the kind of support we have been talking about.

Obviously, the ISR question is absolutely critical when it comes to the C-LRA [counter-Lord's Resistance Army] mission, which is the northern part. And that is something that we can—we are helping to contribute to as we are working with the Ugandan military on the C-LRA mission.

Mr. SCOTT. We do have the ability, though, with our ISR platforms, especially through the JSTARS, to show the tracks of where rebel units are moving. And I do think that is important, both from a humanitarian mission and from a military mission.

And, Mr. Carson, you said that we are going to have to permanently break the cycle. You used the word “eliminated” with regard to the FDLR. Certainly, what has gone on in the country of Africa and the human rights abuses, very few things in the world, I think, reach the level of the abuses that have been occurring there for years.

My concern with kind of the way we try to handle these things through the State Department, if you will, is that we are always playing defense. And so if it is going to be necessary to eliminate organizations like the FDLR and M23 to permanently break the cycle, at what point are we going to help the Democratic Republic of Congo go on offense against these groups?

Secretary CARSON. Thank you for the question.

As I said in my testimony, the responsibility for resolving the problems in the Great Lakes are principally the responsibilities of the Presidents and the leaders of the respective countries.

We have to engage diplomatically with them to recognize that instability, violence, continued refugee flows, and impunity are not in the interest of any of these states. It requires political will on their part to recognize that it is in their interests to promote peace, prosperity, and stability not only in their countries but also in the states that border them.

We will continue our diplomatic efforts, but we will also help, as we have pointed out, to train Congolese battalions. The 391st is a good example. We are committed to training a second battalion if the Congolese Government is prepared to sign an MOU with respect to how this battalion will be maintained.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Carson, I am close to being out of time. Can I ask you something—

Secretary CARSON. Sure.

Mr. SCOTT. The 391st, how many men make up that battalion? And how well equipped are they?

Secretary CARSON. Approximately 500 to 600. And they are well equipped. They have been maintained appropriately.

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. I again—and I apologize for interrupting you. But if we are going to permanently break this cycle, you can't—I don't understand how diplomacy works with somebody who has made a living out of raping and murdering other human beings. And I do believe that at some point, especially with our—I don't think that it needs to be the United States military that does this, but I do believe that our ISR platforms are an asset that we can

deliver to the people who are trying to get rid of the people that are committing the murders and the rapes over there.

And I would just encourage that as we go forward we help train another battalion and that we make our ISR platforms available to those battalions so that they can take out people who, quite honestly, aren't going to stop murdering and raping people until they are eliminated.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Carson, the first question is for you, and it has to do with—has to do with training and equipping. And we have several tools—the State Department and the Department of Defense have several tools available to them. A few years back, last year perhaps even, we created the goal—or authorized the goal of a Security Contingency Fund that was created for complex challenges like the issues we have in the DRC. And can we expect to see a contingency fund proposal for the DRC in the future?

For Ambassador Carson first.

Secretary CARSON. Let me say, that is under—that is under review, and it is quite possible that you—that you will see one.

We are, as I say, looking at the prospects of trying to train a second battalion in the DRC, provided the Government is willing to commit to a number of obligations which we think are important to ensure the effectiveness of those who might be trained.

Mr. LARSEN. Would you use a different—did you use, then, a different source of money for the first battalion, to train the first battalion?

Secretary CHOLLET. Yes.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, you did? What source of money was that?

Secretary CHOLLET. I think PKO [peace-keeping operations] funding was the—

Mr. LARSEN. Peace-keeping operations. And why would you not use PKO this time? Or why didn't you use Global Security Contingency Fund the last time?

Secretary CARSON. I think it was a matter of—yeah, well, I think—

Mr. LARSEN. One at a time, one at a time.

Secretary CARSON. It was a matter of what we had.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay.

Secretary CARSON. There is an enormous demand on all of our funding that is appropriated for Africa, both for our ACOTA [African Contingency Operations Training & Assistance] moneys as well as our PKO moneys.

Much of what we have done in the last several years has been to support what has turned out to be a successful effort in Somalia to eliminate Al Qaeda's representatives, Al-Shabaab, there.

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

Secretary CARSON. So we have put a lot of money into that effort. And we have put a lot of money into the counter-LRA effort with respect to Uganda.

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

So what would be in an MOU for the second battalion that wasn't in an MOU for the first battalion? Have things changed? Have we learned some lessons? Were things missing the first time around that we need to have in the second—to develop a second battalion, and what were those things?

Secretary CARSON. Let me—and Mr. Chollet can go into this.

What we said to the DRC Government is that we want you to sign an MOU with the United Nations to prevent the recruitment and retention of child soldiers in your entire military—not just in the battalions that we—but in your entire military. They have now done that. That was done about 45 days go.

We also said as a part of this MOU, there must be complete Leahy vetting of all of the participants who would be a part of this battalion.

Mr. LARSEN. Just for the committee's sake, Leahy vetting would be focusing on human rights.

Secretary CARSON. Exactly. Exactly.

And we also said, you must keep this as a composite unit, you must pay them regularly, you must equip them. And we said, these are the requirements going forward.

Mr. LARSEN. So those weren't in the first MOU?

Secretary CARSON. Those are things that we have demanded the first time around and we are insisting upon them for this time. But as I said, we have expanded out because we insisted that they must sign a document with an action plan with the Government to deal with child soldiers, retention and recruitment across the entire—

Mr. LARSEN. So those two big issues would be different than the first MOU.

Secretary CARSON. Exactly.

Mr. LARSEN. What is the organic logistics capability of the 391st? And what would you expect the logistics capability to be for the second battalion, as well? Getting at the point of, who is backing these folks up? Is it us, or is the U.N. mission? For the logistics—communications, transportation, moving these people from A to B.

Secretary CARSON. It the FARDC. It is the Government of the DRC that is responsible for moving these people around the country and providing additional equipment and supplies to them.

Mr. LARSEN. All right. That is great.

Mr. Chollet, do you have anything to add to these—as answers to these questions?

Secretary CHOLLET. No, the Ambassador has covered it quite well.

Mr. LARSEN. That is great.

Thank you very much. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thanks, gentlemen, for being here.

I would like to ask, we are talking about an area of operations here at the DRC, but I think we need to look at the bigger region, the area of interest. And so when we look at the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, we talked about the M23, but what are the other—we kind of mentioned it—what are the other major

nonstate, nonuniform belligerents that we have to contend with in this region?

Secretary CARSON. Let me say, Congressman West, there are probably a dozen. I don't have a list, but I will give you one and make sure that you do have it.

There is the FDLR, which is comprised of former Rwandan soldiers who participated in the genocide.

Mr. WEST. Okay.

Secretary CARSON. We know that there is a group of insurgents called the African Democratic Liberation Front who are in the eastern Congo, who are anti-Uganda and anti-President Museveni. And they have operated across the border.

The M23 and the M23's predecessor was something called the CNDP, which is a—was a rebel group.

And there are at least 10 other groups that start off their rebel names with the name Mai-Mai: Mai-Mai Cheka—there are various groups that are based on ethnic communities and allegiances of rebels—

Mr. WEST. So it is a multifaceted, mostly tribal-based, would you say?

Secretary CARSON. Yes, I would say mostly ethnically and regionally based.

And someone has passed on to me—

Mr. WEST. Thank God for staffs.

Secretary CARSON. That is absolutely right.

Let me just quick—ADF, which I mentioned, ADF Nalu, an anti-Ugandan group; APCLS, a Mai-Mai group; FDLR, Hutus who carried out genocide in Rwanda; FRPI, based in the Ituri area, doing conflict minerals. There is the M23. There is the Raia Mutomboki group. There is the Mai-Mai Cheka.

Mr. WEST. Well, let me get to my point because the time is running out. You know, I spent a few days in the military, and one of the things we always listened for: What are the tasks? So as I listened to the two gentlemen as you spoke, you talked about sustainable peace; you talked about training, you know, militaries, foreign internal defense type of mission; and then I also heard the term "eliminate," which means that is more of an aggressive action.

So what I am trying to understand, what exactly are you looking at being done? Because if you are talking about foreign internal defense, do we have the capability and the capacity with our SOC AFRICOM to be able to go in there and do that?

And, furthermore, while I looked at this list of belligerent groups, as soon as you put American soldiers there in that position, I got to tell you that some of the things that you all were talking about reminded me of three previous regions that we were in: Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Somalia. And we didn't do so well, you know, initially.

So what I am trying to ascertain is, what are we initially going in to do as far as the goal and objective at a strategic and an operational posture? Do we have the capability and capacity to do that? Do we need to go to coalition partners, being Britain and France? Do we need to go to the Organization of American States?

And then where is the potential of mission creep and escalation, which is exactly what we saw happen in Somalia? And we know

how that kind of dovetailed off in that battle at Mogadishu. And I don't think you mentioned the amount of warlords, did you?

Secretary CARSON. Warlords are not here, but these—

Mr. WEST. Yeah, so that is another that we added to the mix.

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, very briefly, the goal of our efforts, the Defense Department's efforts, are to help build up the Congolese military and to make them capable of taking care of these problems.

Mr. WEST. So that is foreign internal defense.

Secretary CHOLLET. Internal defense.

And the footprint issue, which you have quite rightly raised, is extremely limited. Right now, we have three personnel who are part of the MONUSCO mission. We have seconded to the U.N. mission to help them on information-sharing as well as some intelligence issues. When we had the training effort under way for the 391st, for this battalion, it was about 60 folks, special forces and others, to help train them up, but they are now out.

So it is a very limited footprint. We are one of many players, including the British and the French, the Belgians, the South Africans, and the U.N., importantly. About 17,000 U.N. troops in the Congo.

Mr. WEST. But my concern would be—and I will close on this—all of these different non-state, non-uniformed belligerents, you know, coming together against our efforts. Is that a potential to happen there?

Secretary CARSON. No.

And I would like to just underscore what Mr. Chollet has said. We are not talking about American soldiers on the ground engaged against rebel groups in the DRC. That is not something that is in our game plan or in our thinking.

What we need to be focused on—

Mr. WEST. But we said that in Vietnam and Somalia and other places.

But my time is gone. I yield back.

Secretary CARSON. Train, enable, build capacity. Build capacity, enable, and train.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The continent of Africa, gentlemen, is the richest in the world in terms of minerals and natural resources. This continent of Africa is the source of 90 percent of the precious minerals, gemstones, and strategic raw materials used by the industrialized nations of the world. But yet the people on the continent of Africa are the poorest of the poor. And I am pretty sure I would get no disagreement from either one of you on that point.

Another point I would like to make is that, over the recent centuries, dictators and corrupt leaders of failed African states have cut deals with multinationals from the developed world. These deals generally pay meager royalties for the raw materials that are extracted from the land. Part of the money goes into the Swiss bank accounts of the corrupt leaders, and the money never trickles down to the development within the country.

And it is the multinationals that export the raw materials out of Africa to places where they can be developed. And in that develop-

ment process, it means the people who live in the places where the goods are being refined are able to get jobs, and then they are able to have some prosperity throughout the land. But that does not take place in Africa.

Then you have the issue of the debt that is extended or moneys that are extended to these African countries for development and then the debt is unpaid and unforgiven, which permanently locks in poverty. Because the resources that are available that are not going into the Swiss bank accounts have to go to be paid—have to go to repay the debt.

And then in the DRC we have the same kind of abject poverty, hunger, starvation, disease, and lack of basic social services. And despite the fact that—and I will quote from our memo. It says, “Economic growth, buoyed by high global commodity prices, has been strong in recent years,” speaking of the DRC, “reaching an estimated 6.9 percent in 2011.” And DRC also receives high levels of donor aid, with over \$5.96 billion being disbursed in 2010.

What I would like to know is, what part does the economic exploitation of Africa and its natural resources play in the support of these forces that are throughout the DRC? You mentioned the Mai-Mai Cheka, the M23, the FRPI, and others. What impact does the quest for the natural resources of Africa have to play on the support of those groups?

Secretary CARSON. Let me say, thank you very much for the question. There is no question that conflict minerals contribute to sustaining conflicts in Africa. Groups are able to take control of mineral-rich areas and then to smuggle those minerals out through neighboring states into the international market. And so it does play a role in sustaining these kinds of conflicts.

And this is why legislation passed here by Congress has been useful in putting a check and a control over what U.S. companies can buy in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the gentleman’s time has expired. If you could finish that for the record, please.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 138.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brooks.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Could one of you all tell me how much the United States of America is spending on Congo efforts now, both military and non-military aid?

Secretary CHOLLET. I think, sir, the total cost in the last—from fiscal year 2009 to 2013, I believe, is about \$137 million in the security sector, both—that is military—from State and Defense.

Secretary CARSON. The total assistance package to the Democratic Republic of the Congo is running approximately \$480 million. And that is the total package that includes both the military and the economic and humanitarian assistance that we provide to the country.

Mr. BROOKS. Does the United States—

Secretary CARSON. Yes, a year, \$485 million.

Mr. BROOKS. Does the United States of America have a national security interest in Congo? And, if so, what is it?

Secretary CARSON. We do have interests there.

Mr. BROOKS. A national security interest?

Secretary CARSON. We have interests in helping to do as much as we can to maintain stability that can, in effect, have a direct impact on the United States. The largest single U.N. peacekeeping program in the world is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We spend and appropriate some 25 to 26 percent of what is authorized by the U.N. for this program. It consumes an enormous amount of time in New York at the Security Council, and we have to respond to humanitarian crises in the region——

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. Mr. Carson, I apologize for cutting you off, but we have limited time and I have some things that I wanted to cover.

It sounds like to me you are talking about a humanitarian interest as opposed to a national security interest. Something that threatens the survival of the United States of America is my definition of a national security interest.

And it also seems to me, and I may be wrong in my interpretation of your remarks, but the interest that you have just described would mean that the United States of America has a national security interest in every place in the world, the way you have defined "interest." And I noticed you focused on the word "interest" as opposed to "national security interest" in your answer to me.

I have reservations about the United States of America continuing to be the world's police cop.

And, Mr. Chairman, we all know the impact of President Obama's sequestration policy that Congress, unfortunately, approved in August of 2011, with the adverse effect on our uniformed personnel being numbers less than or equal to that of immediately before World War II, number of naval vessels being reduced or cut to naval operational size of World War I era, and then the Air Force having the smallest number of operational aircraft in the history of the United States Air Force.

And so that is what we are looking at because of President Obama's sequestration policy, again, that Congress approved. So it is everybody here in Washington that is involved in this attack on our national defense capabilities from a financial perspective. The United States of America has limited funding.

And, Mr. Chairman, that all being the case, to the extent that you and this committee have significant influence over where that money goes, I would strongly urge us to use that \$480 million being spent on the Congo, according to Mr. Carson's testimony, instead being used to help people in the United States of America who are in need of help or to help reduce the deficit that Admiral Mike Mullen testified from these very same chairs is the national greatest—excuse me, is the greatest national security threat to the United States of America. So it is a matter of priorities.

I would emphasize that I appreciate the very noble—and I emphasize the word "noble"—effort to try to help people who are in harm's way in various parts of the world. And my colleague from Florida mentioned Somalia and Mogadishu. Certainly, in Vietnam we tried to do the noble thing. But we are in a different financial reality. And in the absence of a compelling national security interest in the Congo and various other parts of the world, I am afraid

that sequestration is going to force us to retract, even though we may otherwise wish to the contrary.

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. A couple of questions.

First of all, if I recall correctly, sequestration is not only Obama's but it is also our responsibility. I believe we all voted for it. Let's keep that in mind.

Mr. BROOKS. I did not vote for it. But I can't speak for others.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I don't believe I yielded to you.

We have talked here about this whole issue. Mr. Frazer, who will be on the next panel, suggests that there is perhaps less than \$30 million of that \$480 million that is actually for the military issues. Is that about correct? Is that basically the number?

Secretary CARSON. 480—

Mr. GARAMENDI. \$480 million, but about \$30 million of that is directly related to the military issues here in the eastern Congo. Is that more or less correct?

Secretary CHOLLET. I am afraid I would have to get back to you on the specific number, but that sounds about—

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, that is his testimony. We will hear that in a few moments.

If that is correct, I would point out that this really is a national security issue for America because the destabilization of Africa provides the direct opportunity for Al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations to find safe havens.

Is that the situation in Africa today?

Secretary CHOLLET. I could speak first to this.

It is certainly throughout the continent that is a concern. In this particular region that we are focused on this morning, we have not seen that concern yet.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Beyond this region.

Secretary CHOLLET. Beyond this region, absolutely, that there is a concern in North Africa—

Mr. GARAMENDI. All right. So let's make it clear that Africa is a national security issue for the United States. Is that correct?

Secretary CARSON. There is absolutely no question that where we have—

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you.

Secretary CARSON [continuing]. Seen prolonged instability—

Mr. GARAMENDI. Just yes or no. I want to deal with the previous questioner.

The other issue is that we are currently, today or tomorrow, going to vote for an \$88 billion appropriation out of the National Defense Authorization Act for Afghanistan. That must assume the full contingent of American troops in Afghanistan for the entire year 2013 budget. And given the amount of money that is presently available to deal with the military situations in Africa, this committee might consider how we allocate American resources. I will put that on the table for the next NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act].

My next set of questions deals with the issue of, in your testimony, Ambassador Carson, you wrote that the underlying issues of illegal exploitation of natural resources is one of the major problems in this region, and I believe in other testimony and answers you have said throughout Africa. Is that the case?

Secretary CARSON. Yes.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Would you consider the ivory trade to be an exploitation of natural resources of Africa?

Secretary CARSON. Absolutely.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. Do you have any indication, any evidence that the ivory trade is supporting the M23 and related rebel organizations in the Congo?

Secretary CARSON. I don't know, but I could find out what we have on that and get back to you.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I will share with you that the international environmental and wildlife community believe the answer is yes.

What resources are we presently putting into the effort to understand the illegal ivory trade and its connection to not only the Congo situation but other destabilizing forces in Africa?

Secretary CARSON. Thank you.

Approximately 1 month ago, Secretary Clinton hosted at the Department of State a meeting between major African countries that have large wildlife populations and also a large number of countries in Asia that are believed to be the purchasers and recipients of illegal ivory. It was an effort to indicate our great concern.

We are putting more money into trying to beef up anti-poaching operations across Africa and also trying very much to get the demand reduced in Asia.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Excuse me. On the military side of it, what is the DOD doing?

Secretary CHOLLET. I am not aware of anything on that. I will have to get back to you.

Mr. GARAMENDI. You should be aware. My final 27 seconds. You should be aware. In fact, it is, by all evidence presented at an ad hoc hearing here in Congress just less than 3 weeks ago, a major element in the destabilization and in the support of various rebel groups, many of whom are clearly aligned with Al Qaeda. I would appreciate a detailed response from the military about exactly what the African unit is doing.

Thank you.

Secretary CHOLLET. You will have that, sir. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I have specific questions.

One, have you worked with the guys that have been training our troops in Afghanistan? When you talk about the Congolese military as unmotivated, illiterate, undisciplined, corrupt, a mobile banking system, all the stuff that we—those exact same words have been used to describe the Afghan military and the Afghan forces. I would hope there is crossover. All the lessons learned and the billions of dollars spent in Afghanistan over the last decade, the people that have been doing that there transferring their knowledge and capability to you and, frankly, anybody else in your situation

where you are training those types of troops and in the advise and assist role.

So is there a crossover?

Secretary CHOLLET. Absolutely. We have learned a lot of lessons over the years in Afghanistan in terms of training indigenous forces. And that is being applied across our military wherever we are performing these kinds of activities.

Mr. HUNTER. Specifically, people from Afghanistan, though, and lessons learned, tactics, techniques, and procedures from Afghanistan, putting in place specific procedures?

Secretary CHOLLET. As I said, there is—obviously, general doctrine has been influenced. I will have to get back to you whether the specific individuals who performed training in Afghanistan are perhaps some of those—the 60-some folks that helped train this Congolese battalion that I mentioned earlier.

Mr. HUNTER. Right.

And the second question is specifically on the ISR. You talked about ISR. Mr. Scott mentioned JSTARS. Do you have any of the lower-flying ISR systems right now or platforms? You don't, right?

Secretary CHOLLET. In this region?

Mr. HUNTER. Yes.

Secretary CHOLLET. No.

Mr. HUNTER. And the money that has been authorized, I think \$50 million I was just told, for ISR for the front end and the back end, what region is that going to? In this bill—

Secretary CHOLLET. I think that that is the counter-LRA mission.

Mr. HUNTER. So that is not specifically the mission that you are talking about right now today?

Secretary CHOLLET. It is not eastern Congo, no, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

Then—well, my question is, then, how is that going to help you?

Secretary CHOLLET. So it is a separate mission, the counter-LRA mission, which is in a part of Congo but not the specific issue that we are talking about in terms of the instability in the eastern Congo. But it certainly is related. It is what we are working with the Ugandan military on and to try to strengthen their efforts to go after the LRA.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, I mean, are you going to be able to use that money to set up systems that can be used in both places? Do you have the flexibility to use it in both places?

Secretary CHOLLET. I think it is—we are planning to use that against the C-LRA mission. In terms of using it for another mission, I don't—that is not in our plans right now.

Mr. HUNTER. And my last specific question on the ISR—and I don't know, there is not a military person up here that could probably answer this better. Are you expecting any capability gaps in the ISR that we have been using in the Middle East and southwest Asia? I mean, because it is totally different country, obviously. You talked about triple-canopy jungle versus desert and mountainous regions.

And I am curious to see, once this goes into effect, if we notice capability gaps because we haven't been looking at ISR in that aspect. Can it see through triple-canopy jungle? Does it work in that

kind of an environment? Because we may learn that it doesn't, right?

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, you are absolutely right. The terrain there presents specific challenges and unique challenges in terms of our ISR. I can get back to you a more detailed answer on the capability and how the money that we are asking for to spend on ISR on the C-LRA mission will go to the systems that will enable us to really use it.

Mr. HUNTER. I would hope that you would capture that for us and maybe give it to us because a lot of—there is probably not a whole lot of people looking at how the platforms we have now and the weapons systems we have now work in that type of an environment because we haven't had to be in that kind of an environment. But who knows what tomorrow brings.

So I would hope that you could capture that, put down some requirements, so we at least have people looking at, if we are not in a desert or just mountainous region, if we are in that triple-canopy jungle, does the stuff that we have, does it actually work.

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, we will definitely follow up with you on that.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Speier.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Can I have an estimate from each of you as to how many rapes occur in the DRC a year?

Secretary CARSON. I will get back to you on the precise number. It is extraordinary. It is probably a higher level than anyplace else in Africa and certainly maybe the highest in the world.

We do have an estimate, but I would like to give you a precise answer. Some have described it as the—as the rape capital of the world. The number is extraordinary. I have a number in my mind, but I don't want to—

Ms. SPEIER. Well, it is easily hundreds of thousands.

Secretary CARSON. Yes. The number is extraordinarily high.

Ms. SPEIER. So the rapes are taking place by representatives of M23 and the DRC; is that safe to say?

Secretary CARSON. Yes. It is taking place by all the rebel groups, and the FARDC has also participated in these illegal activities, as well.

Ms. SPEIER. So an article in *The New York Times* by Jeffrey Gettleman referenced the “rape capital of the world” comment. And he asked the question, “What strategic purpose is there of putting an AK-47 assault rifle inside a woman and pulling the trigger or cutting out a woman's fetus and making her friends eat it? The government's response has been a shrug.”

Now, that is diabolical. And yet we are funding on a yearly basis \$480 million into this country that allows this kind of horrendous abuse to go on. And it appears we do it with full knowledge of the extent of these rapes, and we are not holding them accountable. It is like giving an addict more dope. How do we justify it?

Secretary CHOLLET. Ma'am, if I could start, the funding that the Defense Department is providing is for the training and the education and the—that would instill the discipline to prevent this very kind of horrific behavior. Because it is absolutely unacceptable. And so the funding we have supported is for specific programming, for training and mentoring to make sure that we can prevent this from happening from the Congolese military.

Now, the rebel groups, that is another problem. But with the Congolese military, we fully understand there is a huge capacity problem there, that there is outrageous and unacceptable behavior happening by members of that military, and that is why our program is specifically aimed to ensure that that doesn't happen.

We have seen, in the modest programs that we have conducted, some success along those lines—

Ms. SPEIER. All right, I would like to have a list of the programs that you have funded and the, quote, “modest success” that you have defined.

Secretary CHOLLET. Absolutely. Absolutely.

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Carson.

Secretary CARSON. Let me say that we agree with you about how horrendous and horrible this is. And it has been a continuing priority of the Administration at all levels, including from the Secretary, to address this issue and to bring it to the leadership of the DRC Government. Starting from the very beginning of this Administration, we have pressed very hard that there be no impunity for anyone, including Government officials and soldiers.

In early 2009, Secretary Clinton traveled to Goma in the eastern Congo to see President Kabila, and this was one of the major subjects on her mind. At that meeting, she demanded and asked for the arrest of five senior DRC officers whose troops had been engaged in the rape of women. They were called the “FARDC Five.” We have been—

Ms. SPEIER. My time is running out. Could you tell me what—

Secretary CARSON. We have been aggressive on this, and we continue to be aggressive on it. It is not an issue that we have tried to hide. As I said, it is horrendous. It is the rape capital of the world. Jeffrey Gettleman—

Ms. SPEIER. Actually, Mr. Carson, let me just ask a specific question. The Secretary asked for these individuals to be incarcerated or removed. What has happened since her request was made?

Secretary CARSON. Three of them have been arrested. Two of them have fled—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired. If you could answer that for her on the record, please.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 138.]

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us.

I have just one question of our military witness there. I would be very interested to follow up with respect to what Mr. Hunter asked about with respect to lessons learned out of Afghanistan and training up the military and police or whatever it is that we are

doing that, and the real specifics to that. So if you could provide that for the record, I would appreciate it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 137.]

Ms. SANCHEZ. And the rest of my questions are for our Department of State Secretary there.

My question to you is about all the other programs, because it seems to me like the majority of the money is going in through the mission that we have there into other arenas. Some of the paperwork says, you know, trying to put in a justice system and local police, et cetera, et cetera.

I am interested, because I also sit on Homeland Security, Mr. Secretary, about border security. Because if M23 is being—if we are seeing Rwandan-backed troops coming across to aid or be part of M23 and then going back across, what, if any, of the programs that we are putting in between the countries?

Because it seems to me like this is a bad neighborhood. I have been in some of these areas, the Horn of Africa and coming toward—not specific to the Congo; I haven't been to the Congo. But in most every other area around there, I have been there.

And so my question would be border security and are we training up there. And what type—you know, give me a—paint a picture for me of what that looks like, if it can be easily traversed, if we are doing anything about it, if we are putting unmanned aerial to take a look at what is going on.

Secretary CARSON. Border security in the region is almost nonexistent. There is very little security along the borders. People move back and forth. They are not clearly delineated for the populations who live in the regions. These are forested areas in which—

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are they mountainous?

Secretary CARSON. They are indeed. Some areas are very mountainous.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I am trying to look at this topography map to try to figure out what is going on here.

Secretary CARSON. Yeah. No, they are. There are active volcanos right in and around Goma and both in the North and South Kivus. So people—

Ms. SANCHEZ. Is there some idea of maybe putting some effort toward that? Or is it just so porous that no matter where we would go—are we in passes? I mean, how do you do that?

Secretary CARSON. It is an enormous challenge because of the enormous size of the—of the country. This is a country that shares borders with nine other countries—nine other countries. As I said, geographically, it is as large as the eastern part of the United States and certainly as large as all of western Europe by a multiple.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And it seems to me it shares some waterway borders, too.

Secretary CARSON. It shares a—yes. The Congo River divides the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the Republic of the Congo, known as Congo-Brazzaville. And there are lakes that divide the country between its eastern neighbors and the Congo.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I would be interested, as Ms. Speier had asked for a delineation of the moneys, aside from military, that we are putting in there. And, you know, with a big question as to, why aren't we helping them with border security? I mean, that is one of the main things that we have found in Iraq that we needed to put in in order to ensure that, you know, the bad guys weren't going from one country into the other and then slipping across. And, of course, it is one of the biggest problems that we have with the mountainous regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

So, you know, some—some comment to this committee, specifically to me, about any ideas about how we handle some of that.

Secretary CARSON. Absolutely.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.

Secretary CARSON. Will do.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 137.]

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Bass.

Ms. BASS. First of all, let me thank the chair and ranking member for letting me sit in on today's hearing. I just have a couple of brief questions.

Ambassador Carson, you were responding to Congressmember Speier, and I wanted to know if you could finish. You were talking about the five commanders that the Secretary asked to be arrested.

Secretary CARSON. Yes. And I will get back to you and give you a status report on exactly what has happened to them. I know that this was back in 2009. We tracked these individuals for a period of time. Several were arrested; several of them fled. But I will get back and give you a status report on that.

But beyond that, I would go to some of the things that my colleague, Mr. Chollet, has said. We have put a lot of effort in trying to get the Congolese to address the human rights problems within their own government and within the military. We have strengthened the capacity of the military judicial system. We have called for no impunity. We have trained judges. We have increased the number of military—female military police officers and police.

Ms. BASS. Thank you.

Let me ask a couple other questions.

You mentioned the other rebel groups. I think you said there were about 10. And when we had the hearing last week in the Africa Subcommittee, I don't remember that coming up, the other groups outside of the M23.

But I wanted to know if you could talk about what their numbers are and who is supplying them. And if they are anti-DRC, are they collaborating with M23? You know, what is their basis for their—

Secretary CARSON. I can give you a listing of these organizations with a very, very rough approximation of their—the numbers. And I will pass that on to you.

There certainly are at least a dozen. Many of these groups have no affiliation with the M23. They are groups that are both self-protecting of ethnic communities and regions, and they are groups that are both protecting communities and exploiting communities and their natural resources.

Ms. BASS. Are they more like gangs? And who is supplying them? Are they supplied through the—

Secretary CARSON. They are self-sustaining because they are marauding groups that live in communities and exploit those communities. And they may be exploiting minerals, as well. They are protecting and doing things that the Government would do if it were capable of doing.

Ms. BASS. Right. Okay. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. That concludes our questions for Dr. Chollet and Dr. Carson. We want to thank you.

And the committee will adjourn for a few minutes while we change the panels.

Thank you very much.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I don't know why, but the media seems to be quite interested in this hearing.

Our second panel is comprised of Dr. Jendayi Frazer, distinguished service professor, Carnegie Mellon University; Dr. James Carafano, vice president, foreign and defense policy studies, and director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies from The Heritage Foundation; and Mr. Ben Affleck, founder of the Eastern Congo Initiative, and a few other things.

We are happy to have you here. And we will follow in that order. Dr. Frazer, please.

STATEMENT OF DR. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, PH.D., DISTINGUISHED SERVICE PROFESSOR, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY

Dr. FRAZER. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to testify on the evolving security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its implications for U.S. national security.

I will keep my remarks to 5 minutes or so and ask that you place my full written testimony in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. Five minutes will be fine.

Dr. FRAZER. Thank you.

Giving your time and your attention at this critical moment is a welcome sign of U.S. leadership that is essential for reinforcing regional efforts to achieve sustainable peace.

My analysis of the current crisis in eastern Congo is based on my shuttling between Kinshasa and Kigali since the M23 rebellion started in April. I have met and spoken repeatedly with Presidents Kabila and Kagame and senior ministers and officials in both governments. I have been an informal listener who knows the background, has built trust with the leaders, and is known to only be on the side of peace.

I mention this context because I believe the dialogue on how to resolve the Congo crisis has become unhelpful and polarizing, driven by sensational but shallow news reporting. It has dissolved into emotional grandstanding and official finger-pointing. Without a foundation in U.S. strategic interests and objectives, our policy

risks becoming rudderless and driven by narrow and vested interests.

So what are U.S. interests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? I believe the United States' primary interest in DRC should be to support local and regional efforts to, first, achieve national peace and regional stability; second, advance good governance and national integration and reconciliation; and, third, create the enabling environment for the development that benefits all Congolese.

Congo's strategic location at the very center of Africa, bordering nine countries, means that instability in the Congo touches all of Africa to the north, south, east, and west. Moreover, the country of 70 million people was endowed with vast human and natural resources, great forest and mineral wealth, and enormous hydropower, making it a strategic country in the global effort to address food security, climate change, and generate clean and alternative sources of energy.

Yet, despite its vast potential, 71 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, and many Congolese live in fear of marauding domestic armed groups, including the M23 rebels, and foreign negative forces that are on the U.S. terrorist exclusion list, namely the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR; the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces, ADF; and the Lord's Resistance Army. Tackling these negative forces is a necessary condition to achieve sustainable peace in DR Congo and regional stability in the Great Lakes region.

In addressing the evolving situation—security situation, an urgent priority has to be resolving the current crisis of the March 23rd Movement, M23, but doing so with an understanding that it is a symptom, while the root causes of insecurity in the Congo and region have to do with governance, institution-building, national integration, and porous borders.

As background, M23's precursor, the armed CNDP, signed a peace treaty with the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government on 23rd March 2009 that established CNDP as a political party. And many of its soldiers and officers were integrated into the country's armed forces, the FARDC. The CNDP units within FARDC were viewed as both capable and highly motivated to take on FDLR.

Two points are relevant from this background. The CNDP units saw their mission more locally and against FDLR. That is where they were fundamentally focused. And secondly, the DRC and Rwandan Governments were closely aligned from 2009 until this past April in their common efforts to eliminate negative forces from eastern Congo.

This spring, three largely concurrent developments led to M23's rebellion. First, the soldiers were dissatisfied with conditions in the army, particularly not receiving their pay and provisions, so they mutinied. Second, the international community's relentless pressure—relentlessly pressured President Kabila to arrest their ICC [International Criminal Court]-indicted leader, General Bosco Ntaganda, and he led M23 into mutiny. And, third, the Government made clear its plans to mainstream and redeploy former CNDP soldiers out of the Kivus. And M23 claims, of course, that they were not protected, so they mutinied.

The main point is that the current crisis is fundamentally a mutiny within FARDC, so coming out of deeper challenges of governance and regional security. Also, whereas in 2008 Rwanda demonstrated its ability to influence CNDP's actions when it prevented them from taking Goma, when we fast-forward to 2012 the past constructive cooperation between Kabila and Kagame has been severely undercut by the U.N. Group of Experts' accusations of Rwandan and Ugandan support for M23.

So what are the key recommendations for U.S. national security policy? My bottom-line three recommendations are: reinvigorate diplomacy, support regional mediation, back the proposed Neutral International Force. A whole-of-government effort is required for the United States to assist the Congo and the region to establish the conditions for sustainable peace and stability.

First and foremost, Presidential leadership is needed. Advocacy to a point of Presidential envoy for the Great Lakes region will only achieve its intended purpose if the President is engaged. Envoys gain their clout from perceptions that they really have the ear of a President that cares. A call every few years won't work. The sustained Presidential leadership of Bush, Rice, and Powell helped in the Congo war in 2003 and set the conditions for reasonably peaceful regional relations until they deteriorated this year.

Second, backing regional mediation is the surest path to a sustainable peace. Here I commend the Howard G. Buffett Foundation's recent announcement of an initiative to support the peace talks mediated by the Ugandan Government under the auspices of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region. It is a beacon that should be followed by the U.S. Government and advocacy groups.

The USG [U.S. Government] can also play a positive diplomatic role in the mediation by helping set the agenda and keep it focused on military grievances to prevent M23 from opening a wider and prolonged political dialogue that is better held in the DR Congo, where the broad civic participation is possible.

Third, sustained, robust, and imaginative diplomatic engagement is essential. Peace-building requires establishing processes that can build confidence between protagonists and communities as milestones are achieved. It is much more effective than sanctions that simply drive a wedge between the essential actors capable of ending the M23 rebellion, will freeze the conflict, and undermines U.S. efforts to engage all sides.

Fourth, to support confidence and peace-building efforts within Congolese communities, the State Department should consider properly securing and reopening Goma House to extend our diplomatic reach beyond Kinshasa.

Beyond diplomacy, the U.S. national security policy—beyond diplomacy for U.S. national security policy, I would suggest four more initiatives on the military side.

First, maintain the International Military Education and Training program and funding for demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, military justice; second, train a second battalion to augment the major military reform effort the USG has undertaken by training the 391st light infantry battalion; third, if asked, the USG should consider providing planners, logistics, and possibly

equipment to support a neutral international force to monitor borders between Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda and to act as a strike force against all negative armed groups.

USG can also use technology to offset some of the—to some degree, the number of peacekeeping personnel needed by offering contract advisers with unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor the border areas, watching for unlawful rebel crossings and illicit activities.

And, finally, there needs to be consideration of how to improve the peacekeeping MONUSCO's poor record of protecting civilians. Some in the Administration are considering an option to bring the neutral international force under MONUSCO's troop ceiling levels. Sierra Leone is a model that could be replicated. In that case, Pakistani forces joined the UNAMSIL [United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone] peacekeeping operation under a U.N. mandate but with a distinct mission to move the Revolutionary United Front rebels off the diamond mines in Sierra Leone.

However, the neutral international force should not become part of a peacekeeping mission where the mandate is confused, the rules of engagement are varyingly interpreted and communicated by U.N. headquarters in New York, the special rep to the Secretary General in Kinshasa, and the force commander in the east.

Dr. FRAZER. In conclusion, the U.S. Government, and we in civil society, must act with humility, recognizing that the governments and people of the regions themselves are ultimately responsible. We can only assist them to establish the inclusive governance, the robust regional security mechanisms that are the foundations for eliminating all armed negative forces in creating the conditions for empowered citizens and economic prosperity.

Thank you very much, Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Frazer can be found in the Appendix on page 79.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Carafano.

**STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO, VICE PRESIDENT,
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION**

Dr. CARAFANO. Thank you, sir. I want to start by saying, I believe the United States does have an interest in promoting peace, prosperity, and freedoms among the nations of Africa and that I believe the U.S. can play a constructive role in the DRC, albeit limited. And from a security standpoint, we want a stable Central Africa, so that we can focus on our real national security concerns in the region, which are a growing global Islamist insurgency and transnational terrorist threat out of North Africa.

So I think where we start is we start by acknowledging where we are. And that is that the status quo is, and I think everybody agrees that there is no status quo, that things are getting worse. And you know, one witness stated last week in the Foreign Affairs hearings, the Congo is too big to fail. Well, I would submit, in the eastern Congo, we are failing.

So I make three recommendations in my prepared statement. And the first one is, stop doing what isn't working. The U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo have been a failure. Our efforts to reform the

Congolese army have been a failure, and we should stop throwing a lot of good effort at the bat. I spent 25 years in the military. I am hard pressed to find a security force less competent and less equal to the task at hand.

So my second recommendation is that we really seriously think about the United States getting behind moving through a different model. Some people call this the Somalia model, but I do think that the alternative credible option is something like like-minded African nations banding together, working to provide security in this situation. And I think it may be controversial; I think, at the end of the day, Uganda and Rwanda have to be a part of that. They can't be the lead, because, obviously, they are not objective, and they have to play by the rules. But I think if they—if we construct a situation where they see that it is in their interest to cooperate and work in that direction, that that is a force that could credibly bring some peace to the east Congo.

So the third is, and what I principally want to talk about today is, what is the U.S. military role. And I think the U.S. military role is for the United States military in Africa under AFRICOM to continue to do the things that it does very well, which is limited but important capacity-building efforts. And the thing is, you build capacity, where you can; not where you want. So you have to work with countries that you can actually credibly do the capacity building. So some of these programs, such as IMET [International Military Education and Training program], the individual military education training program, they are very low cost and they have very, very high impact. For many years, I was affiliated with the National Defense University, the Fellows Program in the College of International Security Affairs. These are amazing programs. You know, I would meet—work with these guys one on one, and it wasn't about Americans lecturing to them because they were with fellows from countries all over the world facing very similar situations learning from each other. Everyone I ever worked with was incredibly dedicated. They were smart, and they left wanting to go back to their country and make a difference. And the ones that I have kept in contact, over the years, they have made a difference.

So I think these programs are enormously important. They have to be very well integrated with the rest of what the interagency community is doing on the other fronts. They have to be better integrated with other individual efforts, such as things being done like by the USIP [United States Institute of Peace] and some of their initiatives, and what some NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] and things can do. One of my favorites is Spirit of America. They are not currently active in the Congo, but Spirit of America is a terrific NGO that works with U.S. military on the ground, helping build capacity for what they need.

My biggest concern that I think that this committee should focus on is, keeping AFRICOM doing the right things; is that a sustainable effort over the long-term? And I have significant concerns there, when you look at the global responsibilities that the United States has to protect its interest and you look at the long-term plans to provide for that, I think they are simply inadequate. One of the first things that will fall off the table, and this is somebody that lived through this in the 1990s, when we almost went hollow

then, is the small low-cost efforts that have very big pay off, because they keep brush fires from becoming forest fires, are often the first thing to cut, to go.

And my two, I think, most important recommendations for the committee are: Number one, I really think you need an independent review of the next Quadrennial Defense Review to really get a cold, clear-eyed assessment if we are really providing the resources that our military needs to do all of these missions from the big important vital national security missions to these helpful tasks that prevent a future national security crisis. And the second is, I would recommend to the committee that you need a better way of really understanding the readiness of some of these low-end things, these assistance missions which are so important and helpful and very low cost—and if they are done correctly and they have the right mission sets, they don't just lead to mission creep—that those things aren't falling off the table. So I think this committee needs some way the Department of Defense can give them a better assessment of the readiness to do these mission and then the long-term viability of these missions. Because the Congo, regardless of the most brilliant solution that anybody on this panel comes up with today, this is not a problem that is going to go away in 5 minutes.

Thank you so much for the opportunity to speak today.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Carafano can be found in the Appendix on page 88.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Affleck.

STATEMENT OF BEN AFFLECK, FOUNDER, EASTERN CONGO INITIATIVE

Mr. AFFLECK. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished Members of the Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the Eastern Congo Initiative, I want to first thank you for holding this hearing and devoting your time and attention to the ongoing crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

My name is Ben Affleck. I am the founder of the Eastern Congo Initiative. We are the only U.S.-based grantmaking and advocacy organization entirely focused on working with, and for the people of eastern Congo, a region that has the unwanted distinction of being one of the most volatile in the world and the site of the deadliest conflict since World War II.

From the outset, let me say that I am not here to ask for American tax dollars. I am here today to respectfully request that you use the most important power you have, your collective voice as Representatives of the United States of America.

From 1998 to 2003, eight African nations fought on Congolese soil, causing the deaths of millions, forcing tens of thousands of children to become child soldiers and, in some areas of Congo, subjecting as many as two of every three women to rape and other forms of sexual violence.

The United Nations estimates that as many as 900,000 Congolese have been newly displaced in the North Kivu Province since fighting reignited earlier this year. As you know, just a few weeks ago in Goma, the economic center and capital of North Kivu Prov-

ince was temporarily controlled by the newly formed M23 militia and injuring hundreds, displacing tens of thousands.

M23 is just the latest in the long list of armed groups who have destabilized the Congo since 1994. With the latest violence, the world is reminded that the systemic sources of instability in this region have yet to be addressed.

Still, on the face of this violence and suffering, the people of eastern Congo remain committed to helping their neighbors and rebuilding their communities. ECI [Eastern Congo Initiative] staff and our partners have continued to work throughout the crisis, not only providing humanitarian assistance but continuing important development activities focused on a brighter future.

When heavy shelling began last month near our office in Goma, the surgeons, doctors, and nurses of ECI's partner, HEAL Africa, rushed to the hospital, anticipating increased numbers of wounded in what is already an overcrowded hospital. Many of these same caregivers were still at the hospital 5 days later, providing free treatment to numerous civilians wounded in the conflict.

Another ECI partner, Mutaani FM, continued to broadcast news throughout the crisis. Mutaani, the only independent radio station in Goma, is located across the street from the Congolese army headquarters, which was seized and occupied by M23 during the height of the conflict.

Despite the odds, these brave journalists, all young adults in their 20s, stayed on the airways, either reporting from the front lines or locked safely inside the radio station, reporting on the fighting as it spread across the region.

Every day I am inspired by the resilience and the determination of the Congolese, who desperately want to live their lives in peace, earn a decent living, and raise their families just like the rest of us.

Mr. Chairman, they deserve better than the cycle of violence and upheaval that continues to undermine their daily work of rebuilding this war-torn community.

While the M23 has withdrawn from Goma, they have not disbanded. In fact, as of this morning, our team on the ground tells us they are just 4 miles away from the city center, and there are fears that they may attack Goma again. We have seen this cycle repeat itself too many times: Violence flares up, and the international community turns its attention for a moment to this part of the world. Violence recedes, and the world turns away in relief, without addressing the systemic issues that must be dealt with in order for lasting peace to be established and maintained.

Since my very first visit to Congo in 2006, it is clear to me that the pursuit of durable peace in Congo is not hopeless; quite the contrary, in fact. The solutions are not new, nor are they particularly complex. But without persistent high leadership by the United States, the key players will not come to the table and will not do their part.

First, let's set aside the notion that the recent talks in Kampala will end this cycle of violence. Last week's negotiations were not even attended by the region's key players. It is for this reason that ECI has called on the U.N. Secretary General to appoint a special envoy under the joint auspices of the U.N. and the African Union

to bring all stakeholders together to craft real, implementable solutions. We are delighted that Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson announced the State Department's support for this idea in his recent testimony.

For 15 years, the United Nations has run a peacekeeping mission in Congo. The time has come to fundamentally reconsider its mandate. As M23 moved into Goma, the 17,000 troops deployed across DRC that make up the United Nations stabilization mission, known as MONUSCO, did not protect civilians in harm's way. This failure raises serious concerns. That said, the larger failure most certainly lies with the DRC's own security forces' continued inability to protect their citizens.

With focused U.S. leadership, the U.N. mandate should reflect the needs of the country, and the DRC security sector must be reformed. Last week we were delighted that the U.N. Secretary General launched a review of MONUSCO's mission. We hope that the United States will take the lead in the Security Council, supporting significant changes to MONUSCO's mandate. At a minimum, the mandate must be strengthened to enable whatever force remains to actually keep the peace and protect the people.

We also believe the U.N.'s mandate in Congo should not be indefinite. An open-ended mandate undermines the urgency for the Congolese Government to take responsibility for protecting their own citizens.

Looking beyond the United Nations, donor countries have enormous leverage in the region which they should exert to bring key regional players together for serious negotiations. International donors can play a more active role in preventing violence from returning.

And of course, Congo's neighbors play a critical role in regional security. There will be no lasting stability without their leadership.

The United Nations has been presented with evidence that M23 is sustained by significant outside support from Rwanda and Uganda. If these accusations are true, any support must end. Congo's neighbors have legitimate security concerns and their national economies greatly benefit from DRC's natural resources. We hope the President of Rwanda and Uganda will engage in serious discussions about the many issues that affect regional stability.

The Obama administration can and should leverage its unique relationship with these leaders to insist they pursue resolutions directly with the Government in Congo, rather than indirectly through the support of armed militias.

It is not enough for the M23 to withdraw from Goma. Until the militia is disbanded, the people of the eastern Congo will live with a daily threat of violence. To be clear, eliminating M23 alone will not restore peace. Just the last time I was in Congo in February, there were at least 27 armed groups operating in the eastern provinces.

The regional aspect of this conflict include failures in Kinshasa. Since the last ceasefire in 2006, too little has changed inside Congo. Kinshasa must take seriously its lack of legitimacy in many parts of Congo and act now to address the grievances of its people.

When Goma fell to M23, there were spontaneous riots in Bukavu, Kisangani, and Kinshasa, aimed not only at militia violence but

also at the failure of President Kabila's government to protect its citizens. To restore legitimacy, the Independent National Electoral Commission should immediately set a date for and begin to organize the provincial elections that were supposed to take place in March of this year. The electoral commission itself has been seen by opposition parties and international election observers as an obstacle to political legitimacy. It must be reformed.

President Kabila must also commit to the overdue reform of Congo's security sector. This is critical. Without competent military and law enforcement institutions, Congo's territory will continue to provide safe haven to armed groups who prey on civilians and disrupt economic development.

In April of this year, ECI helped lead an effort alongside nearly 300 Congolese civil society organizations to publish a comprehensive support about the need for security sector reform in Congo. This report, which I ask to be submitted for the record, calls for an end to the conflict through a comprehensive reform of security institutions, which include the military, law enforcement, such as police and the courts.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 113.]

Mr. AFFLECK. President Kabila has expressed an interest in SSR [Security Sector Reform], but it has not been a priority of his administration. It must become a priority now, and the U.S. has an important role to play in assuring that this happens.

Mr. Chairman, I realize we are laying out a very broad agenda, but we know that none of this, not the revised MONUSCO mandate, the increased donor involvement, the responsible behavior of DRC's neighbors, or internal DRC reforms, will happen without direct, high-level, focused U.S. leadership. President Obama and many of you have unique leverage with key international and regional stakeholders, and the United States is held in very high regard by the Congolese people. Your leadership can make a difference if we act so decisively, and do so today.

This is why ECI has called on the President to appoint a temporary special envoy to signal clearly that finding a lasting solution to the crisis in Central Africa is a priority for his Administration.

Past models for this approach, including Senator John Kerry to Sudan, the late veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke on the Balkans, or General Colin Powell to Haiti, demonstrates that high-level diplomatic intervention at the right moment can cut through deadly impasses and open the way toward peace and lasting stability.

At the United Nations, the new Presidential envoy should work with the Secretary General to establish a timetable for regional negotiations, revise MONUSCO's mandate, and draw up a strategy for reinstating a ceasefire in case violence flares up again.

Internationally, the U.S. should encourage our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and other key partners to provide police, judicial and military training so that the Congolese government can increase its capacity to protect its own people as MONUSCO's mandate winds down.

U.S. Africa Command's, AFRICOM's, work with the Congolese army has demonstrated that a little training could have a big im-

pact. During the most recent crisis, ECI staff in Goma got a car stuck in a ditch. It happens a lot, unfortunately. A truck full of Congolese soldiers pulled up and offered to help, and to be honest, our staff wasn't sure what to expect. In the past, this kind of help would most likely have been accompanied by a request for a bribe. In this case, the soldiers brought the car out of the ditch and simply waved goodbye. It turns out, they were part of the unit that AFRICOM trained in 2010.

The successful AFRICOM training mission is only the latest example in the 52 years since Congo's independence of the close U.S.-Congolese ties. As a major donor of humanitarian and other assistance our country has much more influence in Kinshasa than we have been willing to exert.

The President's envoy should engage directly with President Kabila to accept assistance in developing a strategy for implementing comprehensive security sector reform. With an agreed-upon deadline in place for announcing the SSR strategy, the U.S. should step in to provide Congo with whatever technical support it needs in partnership with the EU [European Union], NATO, and others to complete planning.

AFRICOM—I am rushing to try to get through the 5 minutes, which I think I passed about 15 minutes ago—AFRICOM's plan to train a second unit of the FARDC should be put on hold until provincial elections are organized and President Kabila produces and commits to a workable plan for implementing comprehensive security sector reform. But once that commitment is clear, Congo will need and deserves international support to ensure that reform takes hold.

Mr. Chairman, I know that Congress and the Armed Services Committee in particular hear more urgent requests for U.S. leadership in the world than can be answered. Resolving the cycle of violence does not necessarily require significant new financial investment by the United States or U.S. boots on the ground. It does, however, require American political leadership, moral leadership even, to bring the parties together to address the larger sources of instability in the region.

I may be naive, but I believe that our actions in foreign policy represent our values as a country. They represent who we are as a people. Soon, I will be making my tenth trip to Congo, and I know that if your constituents were to go to Congo and see what is happening there, they, too, would insist that we do something about it.

I founded ECI in part to serve as a megaphone to amplify the voices of the people of eastern Congo, and I thank you very much for the opportunity to do that today. In fact, it is an honor. Even in the face of violence and upheaval, the Congolese remain resilient and entirely determined to rebuild their country. The 70 million Congolese deserve a better tomorrow, and they haven't given up trying to build a better future.

With support from Congress and leadership from the President, the United States can help them get there. We can help, and we should. Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Affleck can be found in the Appendix on page 99.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

You brought up a point that always bothers me about these hearings. We bring in experts, give them 5 minutes to tell us everything they know about it, and then we are supposed to absorb all of that and make policy.

I would prefer sitting around the coffee table and discussing it to get really to the point of the matter. But it is what it is, and we will deal with it.

You all are very familiar with the situation. I, frankly, knew nothing about the Congo, other than what I have learned here today. It is not an area of the world that we have focused on. We have a war in Afghanistan. We just completed a war in Iraq. We are looking at other very serious threats around the world, and that is kind of where my focus has been, so I really thank Adam for bringing this to our attention, and for encouraging us to hold this hearing, because I think it has been a real eye-opener to me.

I was in a meeting the other day when it was brought up by a Member about the seriousness of Syria, and in a year, we have lost, had 40,000 people killed there. And that is something that the whole world is focused on. And yet, I come here today and learn that we have lost 5 million people in the Congo, and I didn't know about it until right now.

It is amazing what we know and what we don't know. Having said that and having listened to this testimony and understanding that we are spending \$480 million, roughly, a year in this area—you have all been there, you understand it—is that, are we spending it the way we should?

If you were a king for a day, or queen, what would you—say we are able to keep spending that money. We have sequestration that is hitting us. We are cutting a trillion dollars out of defense over the next 10 years if all of this goes through. You already heard the stories of how much we are cutting back our military and our ability to carry out our missions, but assuming we could keep spending that same money there, what would you do with that money, each of you?

Mr. AFFLECK. First of all, I am not sure sequestration is going to hit. We have to plan for success, I think, and my answers will reflect the assumption that that is—that doesn't take place.

There are a number of things I would do, you know, if I could wave a magic wand. But speaking in practical terms, you know, the mandate needs to be completely reexamined. Even if you talk to people within the United Nations, they talk about MONUSCO being a failure. You go to Congo and you talk to Congolese civilians, and they have got an anger and a resentment toward, you know, people from the United Nations that you can't believe. They are spending a billion [dollars] plus total down there trying to help people, and they deeply resent it. And the reason they deeply resent it is because their mandate is to protect civilians, but when trouble breaks out, they are hiding in barracks, or they are avoiding these confrontations, or they are allowing militias like M23, which is the size of half a battalion in the United States military, to run roughshod and take over the city.

So civilians are not being protected. The mandate is deeply flawed.

Leadership probably needs to be reexamined. I think that I would, in a very broad sense, look at making sure that we are protecting civilians and making sure that we are using the leverage that we have through MONUSCO—as you say, we are spending over \$400 million, you know, a year—that we get our money's worth for the American taxpayer, that we need to ask for better. It is a noble and valiant mission. It is a place where people are suffering, and we can do better.

And one of the ways that we can do better is to try to expand upon some of the training that they are doing there, trying to address this issue of soldiers getting paid, which is one of the real problems down there, is that nobody gets paid. Their salary is \$40 a month, and they are not even getting that. And there is a culture handed down since Mobutu that says, you know, well, don't worry about getting paid; you are really going to live off the population. And that is what has given rise to the FARDC being responsible for more than 40 percent of the gender-based violence in that country.

As you can see, it is quite a web, but I think, you know, we have a lot of levers for sure at the U.N., and we ought to be examining those right away.

Dr. FRAZER. Thank you, Chairman.

I think the first thing to do is to get the policy or the diplomatic framework correct. And by that I mean that, without spending any money, really, if the Administration would put in place the type of bilateral commissions in which they can then focus the Congolese government's attention on security sector reform and raise the priority and the attention of the Congolese government, that would go very far, without really costing anything more than plane tickets.

So that is the first thing, is really focus on the diplomatic framework in which this relationship is happening. Right now, it is extremely weak. It was much stronger during the last Administration through mechanisms that were put in place, like the Tripartite Plus process and joint planning cells.

Secondly, I think that Ben is exactly right; the MONUSCO mandate is problematic, but we strengthened it over many, many years. We are spending \$1.5 billion. That mission costs \$1.5 billion. I mean, it is not, obviously, having the effect that we want. I would really focus on training both the Congolese battalion that we talked about, but this international neutral force, which is really African forces, and we have done this before. We are doing it successfully in the AMISOM [African Union Mission in Somalia], which is mainly Uganda and Burundi, who have really stabilized Mogadishu and are playing a very positive role in Somalia. We did it very effectively in Liberia, when we first had African forces on the ground, and then they transitioned to blue helmets. In this case, we have a blue helmet force already, but I would say that if we can train up and work with regional forces, and the Southern African development community, namely South Africa, Tanzania, and maybe Angola, have said they would put forces. So plan with them, work with them, and they may not need equipment, and they may not even need movement because they actually have that capacity within their army. But the planning side, work very closely with them, bring them in as maybe part of MONUSCO's mandate;

maybe not. I think that is for the Administration to work out, but get a real strike force that could have some real capability on the ground.

And African forces are increasingly showing both the responsibility as well as the capacity to do this type of mission. And this is a planning mission. This is not U.S. boots, you know, getting into offensive operations. So that would be the second.

Thirdly, I would say that really we are not spending very much on the type of issues, as my colleague here said, on the IMET, the International Military Education Training. We are spending less than half a million dollars, about \$450,000, which is in military justice, on human rights training, and other types of professionalization and changing the ethos of the Congolese army. I think that, you know, \$500,000 really is not going to hurt anybody. Those numbers are actually decreasing. We probably should sustain that level, if not increase it slightly. But I don't want to ask for money in a certain environment, but certainly, we shouldn't be decreasing or we really need to put a focus on that type of professionalization and training of the Congolese army. Thank you.

Dr. CARAFANO. I will be very quick. I think we all agree, we could have different solutions, but we all agree that the security force that is there now is not adequate. So we are not getting the return on investment. I think that is very clear, and I would put that as number one.

I certainly think spending a lot more money is not going to make a lot of difference. This is the largest country in Africa. It is the 19th largest country in the world, [19th] most populous country in the world. But we can get much, much more efficiency for what we have.

So the one area where I might differ a little, is this notion of kind of, I think, top-down reform, particularly in the security sector, I am just not very optimistic about that at all. I do think the key has to really be empowering at the provincial level. So I think the provincial level is very important, but I, honestly, I mean, you know, we can build all the battalions that we want. In a country of this size, you know, we have got to have capacity at the local level, and I think we have to go from a top-down approach to a bottom-up approach.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Carafano, your opening remarks said a couple of things that are very near and dear to my heart, talking to the Somalia model and how this is really sort of, you know, building capacity of local partners, and it is a light footprint approach that can yield huge results. I think that is the direction that our foreign policy needs to go in, is partnership between DOD, State, and also we do need to really improve on the development and economic piece as well, so that we are not spending a lot of money and we are not putting, you know, U.S. lives at risk. Both, that saves us money, and it is also, as you just said in your last remarks, it is much more effective. You build the local capacity. We can't simply show up and say, we are here, we are going to fix your problems. That doesn't work. It has got to be capacity building. It has got to be locally driven.

And I think Somalia is an excellent model. We worked with Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya, and, you know, we have had success, by Somalia measures at any rate, based on their efforts in that country, in a very light footprint. And the partnership there has also helped us in Yemen. You look at what we invested in Iraq and Afghanistan versus what we invested in the Horn of Africa problem and what resulted, and you see the wisdom of this approach. And I definitely think that we need to move that that direction, and I think the DRC is a very important place to do that. It has to be locally driven.

That said, I want to explore a little bit on the training of the battalion issue. That kind of is locally driven. You know, light footprint, we train their military to get better at security, and it seems to me that none of this is going to happen unless we figure out how to do it.

I think the U.S. has to play a role. So, two questions about that. Do you think it makes sense to look for opportunities to train more battalions, use that light footprint to build the DRC capacity? And then, second, the thing that would be really helpful, but it is really tough in the eastern Congo, is to get the support from those countries I just mentioned, who gave us support in Somalia and also Angola to play a role in this, too. There is a lot of painful history with all of those countries in the eastern Congo. Do you think we can overcome that and that those countries can be a useful part of, sort of, you know, sort of flopping that Horn of Africa model over onto the eastern DRC? How do we build that vision?

Dr. CARAFANO. Let me answer the second part of that question first. I am a strategist, so for a strategist, the right answer is the right answer, right. There is no such thing as a universal model that works everywhere.

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely.

Dr. CARAFANO. On the other hand, I would say that this region is prime for something that looks like the Somalia model, recognizing all of the difficulties involved. The payoff here I think is enormous, and I think it is the quintessential piece.

To go back to the first question, I am just very skeptical about security sector reform in a country that is thoroughly corrupt, where the government is widely perceived as illegitimate, and where you don't have the infrastructure, and you have this enormous army. So these little tiny battalions, I am sure are wonderful little models, but it is the 19th most populous country in the world. And the eastern Congo is a huge region.

So I think if you want to get something in there and then stabilize that, the Somalia model a very worthy and important first step that stems the bleeding.

And then I think this, as in the DRC, I mean unless we—you are not going to see this dramatic reform from the top down at any time in the near future. You really have to look at models in the countryside, at the provincial level, empowering provisional officials to look after this.

Now, you can find bad examples of these things. If you don't do it right, you can have war lordism, right, and the country can devolve into civil war. If you are just throwing money and weapons at people—

Mr. SMITH. I think we——

Dr. CARAFANO. Right. So the key is actually something really you mentioned, and something where the United States has learned an awful lot of very good lessons, and that is to look at these things in a more holistic way, to do the kind of security development and economic development and civil society development. You know, there is no perfect model for this. Again, side by side, in tandem, keep these things in mind, and they do provide enduring solutions.

Mr. SMITH. But, actually, I think we have resources that can do that.

And, Mr. Affleck, I wanted to ask, if you could sort of put a positive piece on this, because I know in working with the Eastern Congo Initiative before, there are a lot of positive things going on in the eastern DRC, in terms of economic groups, in terms of groups. I was over there, visited with HEAL Africa, a group I know you support, trying to combat the institutionalized rape that happens there. There is economic development happening, which I know you guys have been focused on. Again, somebody can paint the picture and go, this is hopeless, nothing can be done there, but that is really not the case. Talk a little bit about some of the positive stuff that is going on, even now, in the DRC.

Mr. AFFLECK. Sure. You know, at ECI, we really see the country through the prism of the people that we meet on the ground. And I agree with you that, you know, there necessarily needs to be an effort from the ground up to reform some of these larger institutions.

I also believe that the top-down reform is necessary, as well.

But when I think about Congo, when I look at Congo, I don't think about well, you know, all of the dead and all of the sexual, the gender-based violence, all of the terrible things you hear; one in five children die before the age of 5 years old. That misery, that suffering, is real. Just as real is a tremendous and indomitable spirit that you see from Congolese people, that we see with so many of our grantees, who are teaching, who are building capacity with former child soldiers to help them find work in the economy, for people who are struggling mightily and oftentimes in the face of literal warfare to keep their country together, and not just keep their country together but to build their country. And so I have to reject on a very basic level this sort of pervasive notion of hopelessness that exists.

It becomes sort of fashionable to say, like in a larger sense, the continent of Africa, oh, well, you know, hopeless, corrupt, problematic, can't fix it. You know, not true. Not true in Africa. Not true in Congo. Not true in eastern Congo, because it is seeing advancements.

And I do believe that there is, you know, necessarily a kind of incrementalism that has to be part of one's approach that, yes, these battalions are rather small, and right now, they are just emblematic of what could happen, but it can in fact happen because I have seen other similar progress take place. And I have seen it engineered, conceived, and driven by people who live there, you know, which makes sense if you think about it. The people who are best equipped to rebuild their neighborhood are the people who live there. And so when I think about that, and when I think about the

hopefulness that I have seen, then I do believe that it is possible to, for example, where with funding through the Panzi Hospital in South Kivu, women's organizations for, sort of, to pursue legal solutions to having been raped. We see that some of the police force can, in fact, be improved, and we take these signs, albeit, you know, small measurements, and we assume that if it can be done in this minor way, it can be done on a larger scope. Will it be easy? No. Is it, you know, are they simple solutions? No. But I know for a fact, from having been on the ground, from having seen the people there who have a tremendous desire to work, and many of whom who are educated, many of whom who understand and reject the corruption in their own country. It is not a pervasive thing where all Congolese are corrupt. You know, as you all know, we fostered and supported a corrupt guy named Mubutu during the Cold War because he was, for national security reasons, and that inculcated a culture of corruption within the sort of official government level.

But people in that country don't want that. They reject it. And if people show up and say, let us partner with you in trying to rid your country of this, I think you will find that the people of Congo will be extremely receptive and not just willing but active partners.

Mr. SMITH. All right. Thank you very much. It is one of the, you know, most rich countries in minerals and resources. There is a lot of potential there for a very positive relationship with the U.S., you know.

Beyond just the terrorism concerns that can arise from instability, there is an economic opportunity there that I think we should work to try and seize. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COFFMAN. [Presiding] Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Mr. Affleck, Dr. Frazer, Mr. Carafano, I think you all raised one central issue, and that is the lack of security among the population. So, right now, we are relying upon the Congolese government to provide that security. In Afghanistan, we have had a questionable partner in the Karzai government, and that has been difficult. And we have a less than credible partner, I think, in the Congolese government. In Afghanistan, we have gone to these village stabilization operations to provide—as an alternative way to provide security at the local level within villages, within communities, whereby we have been providing some arms and some training to the local population there, so that they can provide their own security. Obviously, the Karzai government is opposed, has been opposed to that.

Are there any opportunities for any alternative strategies, given the nature of the Congolese government in the DRC?

Mr. Affleck.

Mr. AFFLECK. Well, I will, you know, in a second just yield to expert fellow panelists here, but you know, one of the things that I think, the basic issue, and a really simple issue and one that would go a long way and I alluded to earlier, is that, you know, applying some influence to President Kabila so that payment is made to his troops. I think that, if there is one fell swoop, one stroke that would dramatically improve people's lives off the bat, you know, that would be it. And that would do a sort of—that would take a wholesale step toward improving the security sector.

You know, but as we talk about security sector, as if it is this kind of mammoth thing, and on one level, it is, but on another level, if you had paid soldiers who had any incentive to fight, for example, you wouldn't have a major capital overrun and taken over by 1,200 guys. I mean, that is half the size of the kids at my high school. That shows you the degree to which the Federal Government, in effect, is unable to exert control, even the smallest amount of control in the east. And I think that that issue is—goes hand in glove with security sector reform, and then I will—

Mr. COFFMAN. Dr. Frazer, and then Mr. Carafano.

Dr. FRAZER. I will be very brief. This, actually, working in training in local communities for self-protection was actually done in Rwanda against the FDLR.

I am not so sure about doing this in Congo. It is attractive to me, but I guess I would say, depends on the community. And I also would say that I think that the key here, again, is really to engage and embrace the Congolese government at the most senior level, but not just at the presidential level, but even at the ministerial level, which is why I keep talking about some type of binational commission, because then I think you can start penetrating those ministries, which have the responsibility, even bring governors over, so that you can, you know, deal at the provincial level.

But I guess I think that the real heavy lift here is more on the diplomatic side and working very, very carefully with the Congolese government, which is essentially isolated and doesn't have very much contact, frankly, with our officials at this point in time.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Carafano.

Dr. CARAFANO. So I remember about an army that wasn't paid, and the Government reneged on all its promises. And when the American Revolution ended, the Continental Army went home. That says an awful lot about the nature and the character of the society, and I think that we will all agree that if you have a security solution that doesn't fit with the situation on the ground and the people on the ground, it is simply not going to work.

I am sorry, I am very skeptical that the Government in Kinshasa is ever going to be a force for good in resolving this. But, on the other hand, I totally agree with Mr. Affleck and Dr. Frazer. This is a country of great people, and if we can enable them to take control of their own lives, I think we will see constructive—that is why I am much more optimistic about solutions at the provincial level.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. West from Florida.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thanks to the panel for being here. And I want to try to a draw on, you know, what I saw my year in Iraq and 2½ years in Afghanistan. I see this kind of, how do you put together a train? And too often what we do, we put a caboose before the engine, and then we have the train wreck and come back and say, why did it happen? Because we never figure out what comes first, the secure environment, or does the legitimate governance, or does the individual, the military education and training?

So what I would like to ask you all, knowing what is the situation on the ground with Congo—and I do agree that you have to start at the provincial and the district level. I mean, we kind of

learned that lesson late in Afghanistan, because, I mean, that is the basis of that culture. Which is the right model to go with here?

Because, Mr. Affleck, you talked about 27 different militia type of groups, so even if you try to have the governance corrected, if the militia groups are still running around, they continue to delegitimize the efforts that you are doing with the Government, which is exactly what we saw in Afghanistan when we tried to focus on Kabul, and Kabul doesn't extend out beyond the city limits. So as we build this train in the Congo, which would you all recommend to come first in order for us to be on the track to success?

Dr. CARAFANO. You know, I would just start that, you know, if you get the international security assistance piece right, and you had European—I mean, excuse me, African nations, including Uganda and Rwanda, participating, then I think that gives you some breathing space to move on. So, to me, that is the essential thing that has got to happen first.

Dr. FRAZER. I guess I would say that, one, I take—I understand the premise, but I believe you can do both at the same time. I think you have to deal with governance, but obviously, creating greater security for the——

Mr. WEST. Governance at which level?

Dr. FRAZER. At all levels, but you cannot, I don't think, frankly, do real governance at the provincial level with governors, unless you are dealing with the capital, because of the nature of the Congolese government and how it works.

That said, I think that you start where you are, and you have MONUSCO. You have this force that is of no real effectiveness. Try to bring in units or create a new unit within it that has that capacity. And so I guess I would say that you definitely need—I guess I would put my, if I were forced to make a choice, I would—and I was dealing at the provincial level, the only force that is out there right now is MONUSCO. So I would try to bring into MONUSCO units that are actually capable.

What I would say is that it is ironic for me to hear the Somali model presented as a success because that is something that has taken years to get to the point where it is, and it is going to be the same thing in Congo. And we never said, well, we can't deal with the transitional federal government at the same time that we are dealing with AMISOM. We had to do them together, recognizing that it was going to take a long time. There were going to be casualties on the ground, and we were going to learn as we went. I mean, I think that it is really getting in there and working, without putting our forces at real risk, that is going to be necessary.

And so I—and also I would just say, add to that is, I have actually worked with the national government, and it is not as hopeless as is being presented here either. It obviously needs a lot of work, but you deal with who you are dealing with.

Mr. WEST. Okay.

Mr. AFFLECK. I did not have the honor to serve in the in our Armed Forces, and I did not have the opportunity to go to Afghanistan and Iraq, so I am speaking from secondhand experience. But the sense that I get was that the United States Government and United States Armed Forces successfully trained troops in Afghani-

stan and in Iraq, both under circumstances where, very much unlike DRC, where they were doing so under hostile circumstances, folks who were sometimes—and some folks who turned out to be hostile to the United States, and there was a situation of violence, and lives were lost.

What that tells me is that it is doable. It is a doable thing because the United States has done it. Not perfectly, you know, but it was done. Now, I am not suggesting that we spend the kind of money that that took, but I am pointing to that, in a much more difficult situation, this goal was achieved. Now, I don't think it should be the United States that steps in and reforms the 100,000-plus FARDC military. I do think that it is a job for multinational forces. I think it is a good idea. It may be a good job for NATO. It is the step, I believe, that will go the furthest the quickest in changing the quality of life for people and eliminating the 27 armed groups that you talk about—are going to find it much more difficult to operate when they feel as though there is a force present that they are not equal to. And all of a sudden people aren't going to want to take Goma and people aren't going to believe that they can achieve political goals through violent means because there is an active state security force that prevents that kind of thing from happening, so as happens in developed countries when people turn to the ballot box. I can't speak to the exact model of how that would work because I am not qualified to. But I can speak to the fact that it is possible.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. West.

Mr. McIntyre.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thanks to all of our witnesses for coming today.

Mr. Affleck, you mentioned in your testimony about how AFRICOM's work with the Congolese army is demonstrating that, as you said, a little training can have a big impact, and you gave the instant about the car being stuck. ECI, obviously, has a great impression of that presence of U.S. Forces, and working with AFRICOM and helping in the ways that we haven't been able to help. Do you feel like the perception of the U.S. by the people themselves, the Congolese, is a positive one for the presence we have in training and working with their forces?

Mr. AFFLECK. Yeah, I do, for the most part, you know. I mean, you have a big country, and it has got, you know, so there are a number of different competing opinions about it, you know, and it is not unlike the way we are here. However, I would say that primarily—I will give you an anecdotal example. I was asked to shoot a film for the U.N., and I went into a bunch of refugee camps. It was about refugees, and this was during the fighting, the early fighting, when the previous version of M23, which is called the CNDP, was being led by a guy named Laurent Nkunda, and they were making very similar advancements on Goma, a lot of instability, a lot of fighting.

And I was walking around with a camera with my big U.N. badge. And I was experiencing a lot of hostility from folks in the camp, and I was experiencing, you know, some real resentment to the point where I thought maybe it is not wise for me to be in here.

And so I took off the U.N. badge, and then people asked me, where are you from? You know, and I said, oh, America, I am American. And then, all of a sudden, among people who were really, really suffering at the bottom end of the pain ladder that was going on there, I was welcomed, you know, and treated quite nicely.

Now, this is anecdotal. It is one incident, and it could be the only place that happened, and I don't use this as an opportunity to beat up the U.N., who I do think, despite some of its failings, you know, also does do important work, you know, infrastructure work in particular in Africa and in the Congo in specific, but it did show me that Americans were respected and held in some esteem.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you very much.

And your efforts to call on the U.S. and the Administration for a special envoy, have those calls been received by anyone? Have you gotten any response yet from the Administration?

Mr. AFFLECK. I have been given the impression that this is under review, which is "government-speak" that I just learned.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Okay, right, very good. Fair enough, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I know we had a little question about the order a minute ago. I am going to yield the remainder of my time to my colleague, Ms. Sanchez, who I know had some questions she wanted to ask.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you to my colleague.

I really want to talk to Mr. Carafano, but I would like to—but it relates to something that Mr. Affleck said. He thought that we had done a good job with respect to training military and police, or both, in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I would probably—maybe I am the only one on this committee, but I would say that that is a disaster for us, in most cases, a lot of the work that we have done.

When we recruit in Afghanistan and 63-year-old Afghans come, I wouldn't hire a 63-year-old for a police or an army position here, let alone somebody who is probably coming from a country where 63 is really old.

So we have got all those phantom army people that we have in Afghanistan. We have trained supposedly over 350,000, but when we really take a count to see who is there, maybe 20 percent of them are hanging out there.

And remember, this is a force that we, the American taxpayer, are paying for. It is not being paid for by the Afghanistan government; it is being paid for by us. Their police stations are being paid for by us. So when I look at a situation like the Congo, where they can't even pay them \$40 a month, or what have you, I think there is a real problem.

So, Doctor, tell me the truth. Do you think that this can work, that we are actually going to go in there or somebody is going to go in there and train these guys, or some African group is going to go in there and train these guys and, you know, we are talking about a battalion? I mean, I think Mr. Affleck got very lucky that day, but what do you think? And you know, usually I am the most optimistic person, but on this issue, I just see disaster.

Dr. CARAFANO. Well, I mean, they are both good and bad lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. We have learned an awful lot. But Afghanistan is a very good example, where at the end of the day, we

are kind of getting it wrong because we got on too quick a path, and we focused on a metric of just getting numbers by a certain dates. We are throwing a lot of people out there that don't have their requisite skills and training and capacity to do the kinds of things we are going to expect them to do when we turn things over to them.

So you draw yourself a little triangle, and you say, what is the security situation? What is my goal here? And then how much am I willing to spend? And then, on the third point of that triangle is, it says, okay, what is a realistic capability that I can put on the ground that is going to accomplish my goal?

So it is all a question of, you know, good security is security that is good enough, right? So, you know, an American—creating an American unit is almost impossible feat. I mean, we spent, you know, years and years and years creating an NCO [non-commissioned officer] core, training officers, sending them to college. So I think it is about, you know, about this balance of having the clear-eyed realistic goals for the amount of resources that you are willing to commit with and what you are going to accomplish.

So you brought up the point of ISR and border security before. Those are good examples of things that are really extremely expensive to field and sustain. So ISR is great, and the question is like, well, what kind of ISR do you want. And my favorite story was, a guy from California told me, he said, we were having forest fires, and the DOD guy came in and said, here is some satellite imagery we have for you. And the guy goes, oh, this is cool. Usually, we use a Cessna, but thanks. I mean, so there is a case, you know, where—kind of a not good match of resources.

So maybe the ISR you want isn't necessarily a Global Hawk or a Scan Eagle. Maybe it is people on the ground that you can trust with a cell phone who are calling and telling you what is going on in the countryside. So it really is about this kind of realistic planning, and that is honestly, at the end of the day, that is the great thing about AFRICOM. If AFRICOM does its job right and it does the IMET and it does the training exercises and it does the capacity building that they know how to do, they are going to provide, they are going to help Africans provide realistic solutions.

Heritage was, I think, the first foundation to make a credible argument for establishing AFRICOM. And we made the argument not because the United States is going to take over Africa, but because we want to facilitate solutions within those countries to solve the problems so the United States doesn't get drawn in. So if we let AFRICOM do its job, it could lead people through these triangles in partnership with the other interagency people and the NGOs and create sustainable solutions. I really believe that.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Doctor.

And Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging. I am sorry.

Mr. AFFLECK. Can I just add one thing? I think I may have—conjuring up Afghanistan may have been a mistake because it is associated with a lot of intense political feelings that folks have. And this was an example of a space where there were, you know, exponentially more hurdles to constructing a police force and a military force than there are in Congo.

My point simply was that we have done it in the past. Yes, we have failed in some ways; yes, in some ways, we have fallen short, but we have done it. It is doable, and if it is doable in places that are much more difficult to work in and operate in than DRC, then it can be done here. It is simply a note of optimism rather than an effort to try to sort of—

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Affleck.

I didn't mean to—I mean, I was sort of just putting my position on this.

Mr. AFFLECK. I understand.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Because there may be some on this committee, maybe a majority, who thinks that we have got the job done in Iraq and Afghanistan. I got news for you, America, we don't have that job done. And it is going to be very expensive for us, and it continues to be very expensive for us, and you know, it is a lot of money.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Larsen, State of Washington.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A couple of issues where there seems to be maybe only slight differences among the three folks, and I just want to get some elucidation from you all on why you think the way you are thinking, and mainly under the purview of the committee, so it is mainly defense and training issues, as opposed to other issues.

And it gets to the difference here between Mr. Affleck's call to delay, if you will, the training in the second battalion until after there is a commitment from the Congolese government or commitment to reform, versus Dr. Frazer's comments and even Mr. Carafano's comments about, you know, focusing on the training. And maybe it is—maybe it is an omission that you think that ought to be delayed until there is a commitment to security reform, and maybe there is no difference at all.

But if there is a difference, perhaps, Dr. Frazer, you could start by commenting, do you think we ought to move forward on training a second battalion without a commitment to reform, and why is that?

And then, in interest, obviously, of the different view, Mr. Affleck, maybe respond about why you think it is important to have that reform in place first before you move forward.

Dr. Frazer.

Dr. FRAZER. Sure. Thank you for the question.

Yes, I think we should move forward right away. And I don't think that we should delay. I think the delay is an issue about trying to leverage the Congolese government to do some other things that they probably need to do for sure. But the amount of time that it actually takes us to actually do a training mission, the lead time that is necessary, the sort of, you know, interagency work that is necessary, it could be a very long time after the decision is made before we are actually doing that training mission. So I don't think that we should delay.

Moreover, I think—I don't think, as a matter of policy, we should use this issue of training a battalion that can protect civilian lives; we shouldn't hold it up for another issue about the nature of the election that has happened and, you know, the legitimacy. That is a different question that fundamentally has to be decided within

Congolese society. And if we had this high-level policy engagement that I am talking about, you could address that issue of legitimacy in the elections while at the same time preparing to protect people by training a battalion.

Mr. LARSEN. Sure.

Mr. Affleck.

Mr. AFFLECK. Yeah, I respect and appreciate Ambassador Frazer's position and admire her a great deal for her work in Africa.

I think it is a very, very small distinction, frankly. Part of our position revolves around this notion of making sure that we are dealing with good partners in good faith. And that is really—really the question.

And, again, it goes to the issue raised by many—many Congressmen and women here today about, well, how do we know, you know, that we are working with good partners? And the idea is to take—to try to take equal steps down that road rather than just saying, hey, look, we are going to sort of come in and do this and the status quo can go on.

Ambassador Frazer's point is well-taken, that it is a time-sensitive thing to get people out there to protect civilians. I see that as sort of a micro-issue that would kind of be—not in principle; I believe it in principle. But what we are asking for are the symbols of that. What we are going to get out of Kabila and his government before we do this will probably be something that would be addressed once we sort of got into the weeds of that situation. But both the Ambassador and I, I think, agree on that.

Mr. LARSEN. A second issue, and this gets at the envoy issue. And Ambassador Carson's testimony from the previous panel said that the Administration encourages the U.N. Secretary-General to appoint a high-level U.N. special envoy, whether they—you know, whether they have done that recently or not, but they certainly encourage it.

Should it be a U.N. envoy, as you all, ECI has said? Or should it be an envoy within the United States Government? Is that a better fit?

Dr. Frazer and then Dr.—how about this?

Mr. AFFLECK. Go ahead.

Dr. CARAFANO. Well, I work at The Heritage Foundation, so I am never going to sign up thinking that another U.N. thing is a good idea.

So, you know, I think there is a role for a U.S. interlocutor there. I think, you know, you have to bring something to the table. So I do think we—we need to get our strategy together so we are bringing something to the table when we are trying to move this.

And I think that might be a helpful role if, indeed, we are bringing something in the sense of a coherent way to address this, other than the concerns which have rightly been raised, which is, we get excited when it is in the news, and then when, you know, Mr. Affleck goes back to Hollywood, we all ignore it again.

Mr. LARSEN. I don't think he lives there.

Dr. FRAZER. Well, if you can have the disclaimer of The Heritage, I will disclaim as a former Assistant Secretary who never wants a special envoy.

But, with that said, I have seen them work. Senator Danforth's worked extremely well.

And I really do think it is about tying it with the President. So the U.N. has its envoy, the special representative of the Secretary-General, that is on the ground there. I think if we are going to have a high-level, it should be a Presidential U.S. envoy, and they should be able to go into the Oval Office and tell the President what they are doing and the President gives them guidance about what they should do. And then it could be quite constructive.

Mr. AFFLECK. Yes, I—Heritage Foundation never offered me a membership. I guess it is fitting that I am on the far left of the panel.

But I do—I—I strongly believe, frankly, that we should have both. I think there is a role for both. I think there is a role for a U.N. envoy. That is quite important, as Ambassador Frazer said. There is a role for an envoy for the United States.

And I do believe it should be a very, very high-level envoy. Again, I concur with this idea that these envoys are only as effective as their ability, or their perceived ability, at the very least, to access the President of the United States.

And if we are able to do that, I think you will find that that person can make a huge difference just by doing shuttle diplomacy and can warm things up and can move policy. So, yeah, I would advocate for that.

Mr. LARSEN. All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just quickly, we all have to go home somewhere. It is a matter of if we keep thinking about the things we are working on when we are there.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Johnson of Georgia.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The history of the Congo, the Belgian Congo and all of its iterations from the, I guess, 1700s up to the mid-20th century, characterized by colonialization, European colonialization, extracting the raw materials and minerals, taking them elsewhere to be developed, leaving the nation impoverished.

Then during the 1950s and 1960s you have insurgencies that seize power from the colonialists. And Mobutu Seko comes to power; renames the country Zaire. Gross corruption. His Swiss bank accounts were fatter than many industrialists'—\$4 billion. He comes to power. He is corrupt, but he is an anticommunist, so he is America's buddy. But when the Soviet Union falls, then he ceases to be useful.

And, meanwhile, Laurent Kabila seizes power. He is—his son, Paul Kabila—excuse me—Paul Kagame is a child soldier—commander of a group of child soldiers participating in that movement to get rid of Seko.

So Laurent gains power. Then he is assassinated within hours of the close of the Clinton Administration, back in 2001. His son, 30 years old, former child—commander of a child army, emerges as the President. And he remains in power up to this time.

Now, his daddy was supported by the Rwandans, the Angolans, the Ugandans, the Zimbabweans in his quest for power. And when he got to power, he told them all that I am going to be the one that controls the natural resources of this country.

After he is assassinated, his son, what—what attributes do any of you all attribute to the son, as far as his leadership abilities? Joseph Kabila, who was recently reelected in an election in 2011, which many characterized as a rigged election. What do we know about the current President?

And why do we support leaders in Africa who exploit their citizens, and the poverty that ensues makes them more susceptible to extremist elements like Al Qaeda, talking about you will receive 100 virgins when you—when you do the suicide attack and what-not. You know, how—how can we get ourselves out of this, America?

Somebody talk to me, please.

Dr. CARAFANO. Can I just say very quickly that, you know, I think you are right and I think you raised a key issue. This is part of a generation of African leaders that are simply not going to move their countries forward. Fundamentally, at the end of the day, this is really an issue of economic freedom. And until they have the opportunity and these people in these countries to create societies in which there is economic opportunity and freedom so they can govern their own lives and their own use of the resources, we are just going to come back here and have hearings over and over again. So I do believe that you hit on exactly the right issue. And I hope it is the one thing that we all walk away today thinking is very important.

The only other thing I would say is, from my perspective, Mr. Affleck is sitting on the far right, but I am okay with that. Because I think here today we really—

Mr. AFFLECK.—that point of view.

Dr. CARAFANO. But we all do agree that the issues that you raise really are the things that fundamentally are—addressing those are really the fundamental future of these African countries.

Dr. FRAZER. You asked a question about the character of Joseph Kabila and what we do know about him. I have actually worked with him. I first met him in 2001, in January, when he came to meet with Secretary Powell. And they sat in the—in the Secretary's office, soldier-to-soldier and statesman-to-statesman.

And Joseph Kabila laid out a vision about what he wanted for his government. And that was a vision of democratic governance, about peace with his neighbors, and economic development for his population.

Mr. JOHNSON. What country put Joseph Kabila into—

Dr. FRAZER. I would probably say the entire international community, for the very reasons of the history that you just laid out, brought him to his position. Which is, it is a long and complicated and dirty history that we have all participated in.

The point is is that Joseph Kabila is often underestimated. He is shy in nature. He has—he does—he is visionary. He is leading a huge and complicated country. And into a second term, it may show some weariness of leadership that often comes with trying to move such a big country forward.

I think that there is much more that is needed from him. I think he is capable of delivering it. And that is why I think that the U.S. Government needs to work with him. He is isolated internationally today, and it doesn't help. He is who he is, and he is where he is.

And our interests are to try to push him to deliver on that initial vision that he set out with President—with Secretary Powell.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Would you disagree with that, Mr. Carafano?

Dr. CARAFANO. I guess I am just a pessimist.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Mr. Smith, Ranking Member.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is fine. I wasn't sure if he was done or not.

Mr. COFFMAN. Oh, I am sorry.

Mr. SMITH. But respect for Members' time, I think he is over time.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Very well.

Mr. SMITH. If you have any more questions, we could submit them for the record.

I am sorry, and I think that will close our hearing. I don't think there are any more Members asking questions.

I just want to again thank the chairman and thank the Members of the committee for having this hearing.

Thank our witnesses. This brings us together for a very important issue.

Mr. AFFLECK. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. COFFMAN. Hearing adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

DECEMBER 19, 2012

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

DECEMBER 19, 2012

**Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Update on the Evolving Security Situation
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Implications for U.S. National Security
December 19, 2012**

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

I would like to start by thanking my colleague and the committee’s ranking member, Mr. Smith, for suggesting that we hold this hearing on the DRC. I believe that it will help the committee to understand the complexity of some of issues within Central Africa.

The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve and is driven by a complex interplay of regional power dynamics as well as an intricate web of economic and social issues. What is clear is that the situation in the DRC is tragic for the innocent people caught in the conflict—innocent people who are simply trying to raise their families and live their lives.

As I have followed the media coverage of the situation in the DRC, I cannot help but reflect on the millions of innocent people around the world who are caught in fundamentally unjust and socially complex situations. These situations can make anyone’s heart break and naturally leads one to consider the simple question: What can be done?

Of course, the question—and likewise the answer—becomes more complex as we contemplate what can be done within the context of U.S. national security interests, constrained budgets, ongoing commitments in Afghanistan and around the globe, and potential future contingencies that the military has to be prepared to execute. Given the looming threat of sequestration, or further cuts to the military, I believe most of us on this Committee have become ever more focused on ensuring our military’s missions are both essential and appropriately tailored.

That said, there may also be options outside of the DOD to address the situation in the DRC. I understand that in the recent past, the Department of State conducted important diplomatic efforts such as the “Tripartite Plus,” which furthered stability in Central Africa—and within the DRC in particular. Although the Administration is no longer pursuing this particular effort, perhaps there are other, similar opportunities—given how the situation has

negatively evolved in the DRC. Moreover, it seems the U.S. could pursue deeper diplomatic engagement with regional partners and our allies to leverage their knowledge, expertise, and resources to address this issue.

Indeed, the world remains a complex and dangerous place. We cannot neglect to consider the linkages between instability in Central Africa and the global terrorist threat. But from Afghanistan, to Syria, to Iran, to North Korea, we also must recognize the existence of nonstate actors and regimes that directly threaten the United States and our allies. Therefore, we must ensure that our military is sufficiently resourced and that our national leaders prioritize our defense resources toward efforts that are appropriate for the U.S. military and our vital national security interests.

I look forward to learning more about the situation on the ground as well as what the U.S. Government is doing to address the situation in the DRC.

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Update on the Evolving Security Situation
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Implications for U.S. National Security
December 19, 2012

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome our witnesses today and thank them for appearing to talk about this important topic.

The United States faces complex national security challenges across Africa. The terrorism and violent extremism that plague the continent, along with instability, corruption, governance, poverty, illicit trafficking, and more, combine into a potent mix that threatens the long-term prospects of the African people, our interests, and the interests of our friends and partners. Nowhere are these challenges more apparent than in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), particularly in the eastern portion of the country.

The Eastern Congo has been mired in seemingly endless conflict and an insidious cycle of instability. It is a crisis that has, by some estimates, led to the death of over 5 million people over the last 14 years, an untold amount of sexual violence and the current displacement of nearly 1.5 million people.

The United States has clear strategic national security interests in the DRC due to its size, location, and especially because instability within the DRC can breed instability within the broader region. The government of the DRC cannot project law and order in much of its territory nor secure its borders and we know that Al Qaeda and affiliated groups are present in East Africa and in West Africa and are looking for places for safe haven.

Any U.S. effort to address this instability has to take a “whole-of-government” approach. Diplomacy and development, under the direction of the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), have the primary responsibility. But they can do nothing if there is no security. To that end, then, the Department of Defense, through U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), has a significant role to play. Capacity-building efforts like those in place in Uganda to address the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are an example of the way in which AFRICOM can play a significant role in the whole-of-government approach to promote American priorities within Africa and help inform our response to the Eastern Congo’s lack of security.

As AFRICOM has recognized, Africans are best suited to solve African security challenges. The U.S. has trained the first of what was originally intended to be multiple Congolese Army battalions in 2010. Our assistance provided for basic military training, of course, but also the sharing of values that are intrinsic to our armed forces, such as military justice, human rights, civil-military relations, rule of law and defense resource management—qualities

that many military organizations in the region lack. From accounts on the ground, this battalion has been well regarded by those who have observed it in action. Too often the Congolese military (FARDC) are the perpetrators of violence and abuse. Additional training could go a long way toward the development of a meaningful Congolese security force that is not only capable but respects human rights.

This process of enabling our partners to better deal with our shared security challenges is the way forward here. We have had success with this model in the Philippines, Somalia and Yemen, for a comparatively small amount of resources and troops. It is the right approach: it presents a light footprint, and it is also fiscally responsible in a time of tight resources.

The key to any partnership is that both partners believe they share mutual interests and work toward mutual goals. The U.S. is fortunate in that we have a long-standing relationship with the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda and so together we can work to achieve a long-term peaceful solution. As noted in the recent United Nations Group of Experts Report, however, the support DRC's neighbors are providing to the primary rebel group, M23, is deeply concerning and must stop. The United States has cut off military aid to Rwanda in response but more can be done to hold to account anyone providing significant support to the M23. Additionally, today the House will take up the Conference Report on the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, which will go a long way to reduce the financial support available for the M23 and potentially limit its ability to undermine stability in the region.

While the challenges in the Eastern Congo may seem daunting, there is hope. It is an incredibly robust region with massive potential. The Congolese are anxious to grow and create greater opportunity, and end the constant displacement. If they can achieve peace and stability, there is an abundant amount of opportunity for the DRC, the region, and the world.

I look forward to engaging with our expert witnesses today and continuing the dialogue about how best to achieve peace and stability in the Eastern Congo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Testimony for House Armed Services Committee
"Democratic Republic of the Congo"

Derek Chollet
Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
U.S. Department of Defense
December 19, 2012

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC, and the struggle to bring about long-term stability for the people of the DRC and Great Lakes region.

One of the key threats facing Congolese civilians, particularly in the eastern DRC, is a wide array of violent armed groups – most notoriously including the M23, the Lord's Resistance Army, and the remnants of the genocidal militias now calling themselves the FDLR. But undisciplined state security forces have also proven to be a danger to civilians, particularly when the forces are not well-supported, have absorbed armed groups without vetting for human rights abuses, are allowed to operate under a separate chain of command, or have not been trained in their legal obligations.

The Department of Defense (DoD) is closely following the security developments in DRC and Great Lakes region. The unfolding crisis has highlighted the Congolese government's failure to provide effective security, governance, and services in the eastern provinces. It has also highlighted the continued political and economic tensions between the DRC and its eastern neighbors, particularly Rwanda. Outside support, in particular from Rwanda, has enabled M23 to be the threat it is today and has posed a serious setback to efforts to stabilizing eastern DRC and ensuring the protection of civilians. We will continue to closely monitor reports of external support and respond appropriately, including by reviewing our assistance, to deter this support as the situation develops.

In the short term, U.S. efforts are focused on maintaining the tenuous cease-fire and ultimately resolving this crisis. In the long-term, we must also address the specific needs of the DRC for reform of its security sector. I note that the report published by the Eastern Congo Initiative in April states that "the Congolese government's inability to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on everything else. An effective security sector - organized, resourced,

trained, and vetted - is essential to solving problems from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence, to economic growth or the trade in conflict minerals.” We agree with this assessment.

The current crisis in eastern DRC has highlighted for international partners the scope of the challenge within the DRC’s problematic security sector, and has served as an eye-opener for the Congolese government including President Kabila. The United States aims to work with the international community and the DRC to develop a holistic and specific agreement for security sector reform – through training and institution building – that addresses all three elements of the security sector: (1) the Congolese defense forces; (2) military justice; and (3) police. We would like to work to develop a more professional force, one that respects human rights, protects the DRC’s territorial integrity, and protects civilians. These efforts must be led by the Congolese and supported holistically through coordinated efforts of the international community in order to promote domestic and regional peace in the long term. We recognize this is a long-term effort, but the DRC, working with its international partners, can make concerted progress in the medium-term.

While the DRC builds its own security capabilities, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) will continue to be essential in providing security for the civilian population in the DRC, enabling the Government of the DRC to focus on reform, and coordinating international SSR efforts. MONUSCO has a challenging mandate in a very fluid security climate, and we will support the Department of State as the UN, Security Council members, and troop contributors review options for improving MONUSCO’s ability to meet the security requirements in DRC. To assist MONUSCO, DoD has seconded three U.S. military officers, who are serving as military intelligence officers and the Chief Information Officer within the mission. These officers are helping to support MONUSCO operational efforts and ensuring an efficient flow of information between MONUSCO headquarters and field components.

DoD’s engagement in the DRC has largely been in support of State Department-led defense sector reform initiatives and providing training to the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC), including the training of a light infantry battalion in 2010. U.S. Special Forces provided a 12-week training course to the battalion commanders, platoon leaders, staff officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). This course focused on skills to train, manage and lead the battalion in accordance with the Law of Land Warfare. U.S. Special Forces also provided seven months of training for the entire battalion.

Sexual and gender-based violence prevention and human rights training were incorporated into every aspect of the training and reiterated throughout it. The Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) delivered this training and continues to train elements of the FARDC.

In addition to the on-going DIILS training funded through the Department of State, DoD engagements with the FARDC have focused on logistics, exercise participation, basic military intelligence training, military medicine, humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian mine action. These are areas that assist in the FARDC modernization and professionalization and where there is absorptive capacity within the FARDC. DoD's logistics engagement is via the Defense Institute Reform Initiative (DIRI), which has been working with the FARDC to develop a logistics sustainment plan that can be used as a foundation for the sustainment of their forces across the DRC.

DoD has also remained engaged with the FARDC leadership on efforts to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). DoD has personnel at the UN's Joint Integrated Operations Center (JIOC) in northern DRC, focused on liaising with the FARDC, UN, and Ugandan military personnel on operational and intelligence fusion efforts regarding the LRA. While the FARDC leadership have not been as proactive in counter-LRA efforts as we would like, they continue to maintain their engagement with U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and the regional Chiefs of Defense every two months to discuss ways to improve efforts in countering the LRA threat.

The scale of the need is significant-- we have trained one battalion of approximately 500 of the approximately 120,000- 150,000 FARDC soldiers. There are significant security sector obstacles for moving ahead with the FARDC and future engagement will require our continued patience and a long-term view. The FARDC's absorptive capacity for assistance is limited. The Ministry of Defense has minimal bureaucratic structure and activities are often *ad hoc*. As a result, for example, the Ministry of Defense has been slow in responding to our requests for the provision of appropriate personnel for training and information necessary for human rights vetting. The lack of English language capability further inhibits training opportunities both in the U.S. and in DRC. Coordination of international donor activities has also been a struggle.

The current crisis in eastern Congo has reinforced the need for sweeping reform within the Congolese military. The DRC government's signing in October 2012 of a UN Action Plan to end the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers and

efforts to systemize the electronic payment of soldiers are signs of the government's willingness to engage on SSR, but the current situation in eastern Congo and the increasing signs of FARDC involvement in human rights abuses clearly demonstrates that more needs to be done.

I will close by saying that these problems are significant, but so is the potential of a stable and secure DRC and Great Lakes region. If the Government of the DRC commits itself to reform, U.S. and international community assistance can help implement the needed reforms. President Kabila has indicated his determination to enact needed changes, but his vision must resonate throughout the DRC government to ensure that donors have a partner interested in working together for long-term success. Until that happens, reform will be minimal, and the prospects for instability will remain high.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these important issues with you today. I look forward to answering your questions.



Derek Chollet

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs**



Derek Chollet is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA). He is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy issues related to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Middle East, and Africa, their governments and defense establishments. He also has oversight for security cooperation programs, including foreign military sales, in these regions.

Prior to being confirmed in June 2012, Mr. Chollet served at The White House as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council Staff.

From February 2009 to 2011, Mr. Chollet was the Principal Deputy Director of the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff. From November 2008 to January 2009, he was a member of the Obama-Biden Presidential Transition Team.



Previously, Mr. Chollet was a Senior Fellow at The Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution, and an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University. During the Clinton Administration he served as Chief Speechwriter for U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke, and as Special Adviser to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. From 2002 to 2004, Mr. Chollet was foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John Edwards (D-N.C.).

Mr. Chollet has also been a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Fellow at the American Academy in Berlin, and a visiting scholar and adjunct professor at The George Washington University. He assisted former Secretaries of State James A. Baker III and Warren Christopher with the research and writing of their memoirs, Ambassador Holbrooke with his book on the Dayton peace process in Bosnia, and Deputy Secretary Talbott with his book on U.S.-Russian relations during the 1990s.

Mr. Chollet is the author, co-author or co-editor of six books on American foreign policy, including *The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) and *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11*, coauthored with James Goldgeier (PublicAffairs, 2008), and his commentaries and reviews on U.S. foreign policy and politics have appeared in many other books and publications.

Testimony
Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson
Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Before the House Armed Services Committee
“Update on the Evolving Security Situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Implications for U.S. National Security”
Wednesday, December 19, 2012

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the Committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify today on the crisis unfolding in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC, and our comprehensive response.

As you know, the security and humanitarian situation in the DRC is the most volatile in Africa today. An estimated five million people have died in the years since the second regional war began in 1998, and millions more have been affected and forced to flee their homes. The people of North and South Kivu provinces in particular have faced repeated cycles of conflict, atrocities, and displacement, with the current crisis simply being the latest iteration.

We are committed to helping the DRC and its neighbors resolve not only this current crisis, but the longer-term sources of instability in the region as well, so that we do not find ourselves back here in three years, facing yet another cycle of violence in the DRC. Among other things, we are helping to mobilize an effective humanitarian response. We are also engaging with the highest levels of the DRC, Rwandan, and Ugandan governments to urge them to continue honest and transparent dialogue and find a durable political resolution to the underlying causes of instability. We have been steadfast in our condemnation of all external support to the M23. We have also supported the involvement of the UN Security Council, the UN Secretariat, and the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC in responding to the humanitarian and security crises. In addition, we are urging the DRC government to accelerate its efforts to professionalize and reform the Congolese army, recognizing that the responsibility of security in the DRC rests first and foremost with the government.

The rapid fall of Goma last month to the M23 rebel group provided a stark reminder that, even as the international community has made major investments in humanitarian aid, development, security sector reform, and peacekeeping, the root causes of the entrenched instability and recurring conflicts in the DRC remain

unresolved. The Congolese government continues to suffer from weak state and security institutions and has failed to provide effective security, governance, and services across its territory, including in North and South Kivu, in part due to the systemic disruption of violent armed groups and external support for such groups. Political and military tensions persist between the DRC and its eastern neighbors, particularly Rwanda. The current crisis in particular has been fueled and exacerbated by Rwanda's interference in the DRC.

The M23 is one of the most lethal armed groups operating in eastern DRC. Most of its officers were at one time members of the National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP, and nominally integrated into the Congolese army, a concession they extracted after nearly capturing Goma as part of a precursor insurgency in 2008. Once integrated, these officers operated in a parallel chain of command and enjoyed impunity for their human rights abuses and illegal exploitation of the country's mineral wealth. When the Congolese government appeared poised earlier this year to challenge these arrangements, several of these officers mutinied and reconstituted themselves under a new name, the M23. The commanders of the M23 represent a "who's who" of notorious human rights abusers in the eastern DRC, including Bosco Ntaganda, who faces an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for sexual violence, the recruitment of child soldiers and other crimes against humanity.

The M23 would not be the threat it is today and would not have had the military success it has experienced without external support. There is a credible body of evidence that corroborates key findings of the UN Group of Experts' reports – including evidence of significant military and logistical support, as well as operational and political guidance, from the Rwandan government to the M23 from the early stages of this most recent conflict. While there is evidence of individuals from Uganda providing support to the M23, we do not have a body of evidence suggesting that Uganda has a government policy of supporting the M23. Nonetheless, we continue to urge the government of Uganda to ensure that supplies to the M23 do not originate in or transit through Ugandan territory, including from individual officials that may be acting on their own. We have not limited our response to diplomacy alone. As required by Section 7043(a) of the FY 2012 Appropriations Act, the Secretary suspended Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, to Rwanda in FY 2012 because of its support to the M23. The Department continues to closely monitor reports of external support, and we will continue to respond appropriately, including by reviewing our assistance, to deter this support as the situation develops.

After M23 attacked and captured Goma, the DRC government agreed last month to meet with the M23 in Kampala and hear its grievances related to the March 2009 agreement. The government has rightfully made clear its refusal to hear those claims by the M23 that undermine state authority, threaten the territorial integrity of the DRC, or go against the DRC Constitution. While parties have yet to begin substantive talks, the current ceasefire is holding and the parties continue to express commitment to dialogue. We are concerned, however, by reports that M23 maintains a significant presence within the 20-km buffer zone around Goma in defiance of the November 21 and 24 agreements by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, or ICGLR, and about the reports that the M23 may be increasing its presence in the area. Such moves exacerbate instability and, should the conflict resume, will put at risk thousands of highly vulnerable individuals in the vicinity of Goma who were displaced by the recent violence. We call on the signatories of the November 24 agreement to ensure the full implementation of the agreement. All parties must refrain from provocative acts and respect the current ceasefire.

The highest levels of the U.S. government are committed to helping the DRC and the region achieve a sustainable peace. President Obama spoke yesterday with President Kagame and underscored that any support to M23 is inconsistent with Rwanda's desire for stability and peace. President Obama emphasized to President Kagame the importance of permanently ending all support to armed groups in the DRC, abiding by the recent commitments he made in Kampala along with Presidents Kabila and Museveni, and reaching a transparent and credible political agreement that includes an end to impunity for M23 commanders and others who have committed serious human rights abuses. President Obama believes that from this crisis should emerge a political agreement that addresses the underlying regional security, economic, and governance issues while upholding the DRC's sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Obama has also delivered the message to President Kabila that the DRC must take concrete steps toward security sector reform and improved governance in order to reach a lasting peace in eastern DRC.

In addition to the President's engagement, we have actively engaged with regional leaders and key stakeholders throughout this crisis. Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice, and Under Secretary Sherman have spoken or met with senior Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan, and UN officials to advocate for a rapid and peaceful resolution to this crisis. I traveled to the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda last month with my British and French counterparts to deliver a clear and common message that these three governments must work together to stop the crisis and

work toward a sustainable resolution of underlying issues. We stressed that, while the DRC government has agreed to hear the political grievances of the M23, we absolutely will not accept any effort to undermine the authority of the DRC government or infringe upon the country's territorial integrity. We have also been steadfast in insisting that there be no impunity for senior M23 leaders or other rebel group leaders who are under ICC indictment or international sanctions for human rights violations. Accountability is necessary to achieve a just and durable peace in the DRC. All three governments have reiterated their commitment to finding a lasting solution, but we must now see the parties take affirmative action to make this a reality.

Looking ahead, we are monitoring humanitarian needs and working to mobilize resources to ensure continued humanitarian access and assistance to civilians affected by this crisis. The humanitarian situation in the eastern Congo remains deplorable, with more than two million Congolese currently displaced internally or to neighboring countries. Over 700,000 people have been displaced during this year alone, many of them displaced for a second or third time. The United States provided more than \$110 million in humanitarian assistance for Congolese refugees, internally displaced persons, and conflict-affected civilians in Fiscal Year 2012.

We also believe that direct dialogue between Presidents Kabila, Kagame, and Museveni is paramount to resolving not only the immediate crisis, but also the underlying causes of instability in the region. Even while the talks between M23 and the DRC government continue, there are root causes of conflict that can only be addressed through direct dialogue between governments, including issues of land tenure, refugee flows, the illegal exploitation of natural resources, economic and border security, and support networks for armed groups. In addition, government cooperation will drive the success, or failure, of economic integration and its potential contribution to regional stability and development.

While the responsibility to implement change rests with these governments, we encourage the UN Secretary-General to appoint a high-level UN Special Envoy to engage with these governments on the ground and on a sustained basis. We want such a high-level Special Envoy to be dedicated to helping to coordinate with the government stakeholders to reach a durable political resolution and ensure the implementation of that resolution over the long-term. Even the most optimistic among us recognize that lasting stability in the Great Lakes region is a long-term goal that will require patience, perseverance, and political will. We will work with our partners and the proposed UN Special Envoy to ensure that any agreement

between the regional governments is transparent, sustainable, inclusive, and enjoys the support and commitment of the region, including Congolese civil society and civilian communities.

Throughout this peace building process, civilian protection is and must remain a priority. This includes substantial efforts by the DRC government on security sector reform, or SSR, which I will address shortly. But first, I want to address the mandate and current efforts of the UN peacekeeping mission currently in the DRC, MONUSCO, which has come under heavy scrutiny in recent weeks. MONUSCO has endeavored to protect civilians under difficult circumstances since the onslaught of this current crisis last spring, often serving as the only buffer between the M23 and civilian populations. We commend the brave service of the peacekeepers from several dozen countries who are operating in very difficult, often dangerous conditions. No matter MONUSCO's mandate or resources, no peacekeeping mission is intended to take the place of a national army in the middle of an armed crisis. We must remain realistic about what MONUSCO can be expected to achieve with its mandate and resources and across a country the size of Western Europe.

We agree that more must be done to protect civilians in the eastern DRC, and that includes working with the UN and MONUSCO, as well as with the DRC government, which has the primary responsibility for protecting its territory and all of its citizens. The United Nations has had a peacekeeping presence in the DRC since 1999. We have supported that presence as it has helped to avert regional war, support critical electoral processes, and deter human rights abuses. Yet UN peacekeeping efforts have struggled to fulfill their longer-term goal of stabilizing the eastern DRC because of the continued weakness of their Congolese counterparts and continued meddling from the outside.

We and our fellow UN Security Council members and troop contributing countries are reviewing options for improving the UN's ability to protect civilians and helping to implement defined aspects of a potential regional political settlement. There are multiple proposals on the table for how to boost MONUSCO's capacity against armed groups. We are closely following the ICGLR proposal to develop an effective neutral and regional fighting force in the Kivus and the Southern African Development Community's proposal to possibly alter the mandate for the South African contingent in MONUSCO and move it to North Kivu.

We support regional efforts to find a peaceful and enduring political solution to the threat posed by the M23 and other armed groups. We strongly encourage countries to coordinate with MONUSCO and the UN, particularly with regard to command-and-control, resourcing, and mandate, in order to avoid undermining current security efforts. Any new force or additional troops will take time to deploy. In the meantime, we continue to encourage MONUSCO to robustly implement its current mandate.

I want now to draw specific attention to the critical need for comprehensive and sustained security sector reform, or SSR, in the DRC. As I noted earlier, the DRC government has the primary responsibility for protecting its territory and all its citizens. The crisis over the past few months has revealed the endemic weaknesses of the DRC national army, or FARDC, and has demonstrated to devastating effect the critical need for a professional and capable DRC army that can protect the country's citizens. While the FARDC experienced initial success in resisting the M23 in the early months of the offensive, the army rapidly lost ground to the M23 once the rebels started receiving outside support. The DRC military's perennially problematic leadership and command and control, logistical deficiencies, and poor military planning have also made the army far less effective. The recent reports of rapes and other abuses committed by army forces in Minova show that indiscipline and impunity persist.

We have been working with the DRC government for some time now on SSR. Our assistance has included the training of a light-infantry battalion, training to army officers and support to the armed forces' military justice capacities. However, much, much more must be done. We are urging President Kabila to undertake a credible and sustained effort to professionalize and reform the Congolese security forces. In a positive move, the Congolese government recently signed a Child Soldiers Action Plan with the United Nations, which we advocated over several months. This is one step but broader reform will take time, and the Congolese government needs to demonstrate the political will and commitment to achieving SSR, particularly after recent years of dismal progress and few signs of sustained political will. Demonstrable commitment includes taking clear and bold measures to ensure that Congolese soldiers are professionally trained, adequately paid and supported, and respectful of international human rights norms.

SSR goes beyond the military. The DRC government must also work to build up its judicial infrastructure and other security apparatuses, including prisons. We will also work to ensure that civil society has a greater input in assessing the

functions and overseeing the performance of the FARDC and Congolese National Police.

As part of SSR, we are also pressing the DRC government to assertively address impunity, which is rampant in all ranks of the military and across all security services, and undercuts the civilian population's trust in these security forces. The government needs to hold human rights abusers accountable by arresting and prosecuting them, regardless of their military rank. We will continue to speak out against the forcible recruitment of children, acts of sexual violence, and targeted attacks against civilians, whether committed by armed groups or the government forces.

Along with military reform, we are making clear that the Congolese government must accelerate its efforts to deploy and strengthen state institutions and provide needed public services to all Congolese citizens in the Kivus. The governance vacuum that exists in parts of the country has allowed armed groups to set up parallel civil administrations, including taxing the population and exploiting border crossings and the Congo's mineral rich resources. We are assisting the DRC government to better provide much-needed public services, including those focused on responding to and preventing sexual violence. We are training select security forces on how to address gender-based violence crimes and assisting the Congolese military justice system in their efforts to better investigate and prosecute cases of conflict-related sexual violence.

The expansion of governance across the country must include electoral reform, as well as the holding of long-delayed provincial and local elections. This extension of effective governance, combined with legitimate provincial elections, is necessary for a lasting peace. There are a plethora of drivers behind the instability in the DRC, but we must not lose sight of the DRC government's own responsibilities to reform and build up its security forces and deliver effective governance to all corners of its territory.

We believe that the time has come for the region's leaders and the international community to permanently break the cycle of violence and impunity in the region. The blame for this cycle of violence cannot be cast upon any one entity; similarly, the solution lies not in an individual country or president, but in the combined and cooperative efforts of the region. We all have a moral, humanitarian, and security imperative to help build a future for the Congolese people who have seen more conflict than peace over the last two decades. Such a future must be rooted in strong and credible institutions, the transparent and

legitimate use of the DRC's vast mineral wealth for transparent economic development, and respect for human rights. The people of the DRC share this responsibility with us. The current instability in the DRC did not arrive overnight and similarly it will not be repaired quickly.

We need to build on recent signs of progress, many of which have been gravely set back by the M23 rebellion and the violence committed by other armed groups. The decisions taken now will set the trajectory of the next several years. The M23 and its supporters are waiting to see if their strategy of destabilization will win them what they want. Other abusive militias in the Kivus are similarly watching to see if violent behavior is an effective path to power and influence. And the world is watching to see whether the eastern DRC can transcend its history as a theater for proxy conflict and finally advance towards the peace and prosperity owed to its people and promised by its natural wealth and diversity. We are working diligently with our Congolese and international partners to ensure that armed groups are turned back, outside support ceases, and peace carries the day.

Today's crisis is a tragedy, but it also offers a real opportunity to help the Congolese people and the broader region set a more sustainable course toward peace. We urge the international community, the Great Lakes region, and the Congolese people to demonstrate the resolve to see this process through to the peace that we know lays ahead for the Congo.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your questions.

Biography



Johnnie Carson

Assistant Secretary
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Term of Appointment: 05/07/2009 to present

Ambassador Johnnie Carson was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African Affairs, on May 7, 2009. Prior to this he was the National Intelligence Officer for Africa at the NIC, after serving as the Senior Vice President of the National Defense University in Washington D.C. (2003-2006).

Carson's 37-year Foreign Service career includes ambassadorships to Kenya (1999-2003), Zimbabwe (1995-1997), and Uganda (1991-1994); and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs (1997-1999). Earlier in his career he had assignments in Portugal (1982-1986), Botswana (1986-1990), Mozambique (1975-1978), and Nigeria (1969-1971). He has also served as desk officer in the Africa section at State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1971-1974); Staff Officer for the Secretary of State (1978-1979), and Staff Director for the Africa Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives (1979-1982).

Before joining the Foreign Service, Ambassador Carson was a Peace Corps volunteer in Tanzania from 1965-1968. He has a Bachelor of Arts in History and Political Science from Drake University and a Master of Arts in International Relations from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of London.

Ambassador Carson is the recipient of several Superior Honor Awards from the Department of State and a Meritorious Service Award from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The Centers for Disease Control presented Ambassador Carson its highest award, "Champion of Prevention Award," for his leadership in directing the U.S. Government's HIV/AIDS prevention efforts in Kenya.

**Testimony of Jendayi E. Frazer
Distinguished Service Professor, Carnegie Mellon University
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs**

**Before the House Armed Services Committee
“Update on the Evolving Security Situation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Implications for U.S. National Security”**

Wednesday, December 19, 2012

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith and Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to testify on the evolving security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and its implications for U.S. National Security. Giving your time and attention at this critical moment is a welcome sign of U.S. leadership that is an essential ingredient for reinforcing regional efforts to achieve sustainable peace.

I will take just a moment to give context to my remarks today. I have worked on the Great Lakes region since 1999 as a Director in the Clinton National Security Council and then from 2001 to 2008 as Special Assistant for Africa to President Bush and as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs working with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Many of the recommendations I will offer today are informed by the diplomatic initiatives developed and experience gained during those years.

My analysis and framing of the current crisis in Eastern Congo is more driven by my shuttling between Kinshasa and Kigali since the M23 rebellion started in April. I have met and spoken repeatedly with Presidents Kabila and Kagame and senior Ministers and officials in both governments. I have been an informal listener who knows the background and have built trust with both leaders because the only side I have ever taken is for peace.

I mention this context because I believe the dialogue on how to resolve the Congo crisis has become unhelpful and polarizing. It has dissolved into emotional grandstanding and finger pointing. Without a foundation in U.S. strategic objectives, our policy risks becoming rudderless and driven by narrow and vested interests.

U.S. Interests in the DR Congo

The United States primary interests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) should be to support local and regional efforts to:

- 1) achieve national peace and regional stability;
- 2) advance good governance, national integration and reconciliation, and;
- 3) create the enabling environment for development that benefits all Congolese.

Congo's strategic location at the very center of Africa, bordering nine countries – Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia – means that instability in Congo touches all of Africa to the north, south, east and west. Moreover, the country of 70 million people is endowed with vast human and natural resources, great forest and mineral wealth, and enormous hydro power making it a strategic country in the global effort to address food security, climate change, and generate clean and alternative sources of energy.

Yet, despite its vast potential wealth, 71 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, and many Congolese live in fear of armed groups present in North and South Kivu, Equateur, Orientale Province, Maniema, and Katanga Provinces. These armed groups are domestic, including Mai Mai militia and the M23 rebellion, and foreign from neighboring countries such as the Ex-Rwandan Armed Forces, Interhamwe militia members, and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Tackling these negative forces is a necessary condition to achieve sustainable peace in DR Congo and regional stability in the Great Lakes region.

The Evolving Security Situation

Resolving the current crisis of the March 23 Movement (M23) rebellion is the most urgent priority given the national humanitarian crisis and regional destabilizing impact of the conflict in north Kivu. It is well known that M23's precursor, the armed rebel group, National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), signed a peace treaty with the DRC government on 23 March 2009. The agreement established CNDP as a political party and many of its soldiers and officers were integrated into the country's Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). Not as well known is that CNDP units within the FARDC were viewed as both capable and highly motivated to take on the FDLR. The DRC and Rwandan governments were closely aligned from 2009 until this past April in their common efforts to eliminate negative forces from eastern Congo.

The M23 rebellion was sparked by three largely concurrent developments: First, the soldiers, like many in the FARDC, were dissatisfied with conditions in the army, particularly not receiving their pay and provisions. Second, the international community relentlessly pressured President Kabila until he called for the arrest of their leader, General Bosco Ntaganda, who is indicted by the International Criminal Court, despite the government lacking the capacity to execute an arrest. Third, the government made clear its plans to redeploy former CNDP soldiers out of the Kivus, and M23 claims, without the necessary security for those so redeployed.

Whereas in 2008 Rwanda demonstrated its ability to influence CNDP actions when it helped prevent them from taking Goma; fast forward to 2012 and the past constructive cooperation between Kabila and Kagame has been severely undercut by the UN Group of Experts' accusations of Rwandan and Ugandan support for M23.

What Lessons for U.S. Policy?: Reinvigorating Diplomacy

A whole of government effort is required for the United States to assist Congo and the region to establish the conditions for sustainable peace and stability.

First and foremost, presidential leadership is needed. President Bush, Secretary Powell, and especially National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice were actively engaged in ending the Second Congo War. President Bush met with Kabila and Kagame together and separately throughout his Presidency and his Secretaries of State helped forge common understanding and backed robust and active U.S. diplomatic engagement to end the war and build confidence between the neighbors.

Advocacy to appoint a “Presidential Envoy” for the Great Lakes Region will not achieve its intended purpose if the President is disengaged. Envoys gain their clout and gravitas from perceptions that they really have the ear of a President that cares.

Second, sustained, robust and imaginative diplomatic engagement is essential. Peace building requires establishing processes across government ministries and at local levels and within communities that can build confidence as milestones are achieved.

- The Bush team’s efforts included developing a “**Tripartite Plus**” Process in 2004 that created a forum for problem-solving and sharing information between DR Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and eventually Burundi. It was attended by Foreign Ministers, Defense Chiefs of Staff, Intelligence Chiefs, and Presidential Advisors from the four countries and eventually led to the full normalization of diplomatic relations marked by sending Ambassadors to reopen their missions in capitals.
- We financed and supported a **Joint Planning Cell** in Kisangani for Operations and Intelligence officers from DR Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda to share information and develop plans to tackle the negative forces in eastern Congo.
- We launched the **Awards for Justice** program across the region to track former Rwandan genocidaires to reinforce accountability, remove spoilers, and as importantly to reinforce good faith between the neighbors.

Third, more confidence- and peace-building efforts are needed within Congolese communities. The State Department should consider properly securing and re-opening **Goma House**, initiated under Secretary Condoleezza Rice as an American Presence Post to extend our diplomatic reach beyond Kinshasa.

- Houses of Peace in major cities in each Province should be funded to provide neutral ground for diverse communities to nurture communication to prevent and mitigate conflict over local issues.
- Local government efforts to build cross border community ties can help to reduce regional tensions and promote economic development and cooperation.

Fourth, regional mediation is the surest path to sustainable peace. Supporting the mediation process of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) under President Museveni will deliver greater results in resolving the crisis than sanctioning Rwandan and Ugandan officials. The call for sanctions simply drives a wedge between the essential actors capable of ending the M23 rebellion.

- USG can play a positive diplomatic role in the ICGLR mediation by backing it financially and helping to shape the agenda, especially to keep the focus mainly on military grievances rather than allowing M23 to open a wider and prolonged political dialogue. Any national dialogue or reconciliation process should properly be held in DR Congo where broad civic participation is possible.
- The Howard G. Buffett Foundation's recently announced initiative to support the peace talks is a beacon that should be matched by the United States.

What Next for U.S. National Security Policy?

Backing the regional ICGLR initiative is also prudent in light of the limited U.S. government resources appropriated to effect lasting positive change in DR Congo. Comprehensive security sector reform is needed to improve the Congolese government's and especially its military's capacity to tackle armed negative forces marauding throughout the east. Preparations should also start now to mobilize international support for any Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs for M23's rank and file. Several initiatives can be undertaken to improve security and stability without deploying U.S. forces or a major new commitment of USG financial and personnel resources.

First, the USG should increase funding for International Military Education Training and targeted security sector reform. The USG provided less than \$20 million in Peacekeeping Operation Funds (PKO), \$6 million in International Crime, Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds and \$500,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) in FY2011. U.S. efforts to build institutional and operational capacity of the military and police as trustworthy providers of security are currently mainly focused on "seconding" a few advisors and trainers working with Congolese officials and holding workshops. The IMET funding is now declining to \$450,000 (FY2012) and \$400,000 (FY2013) at a time when more effort is needed to instill a new ethos and professionalize FARDC, especially on military justice, human rights and civil-military operations.

Second, train a second battalion to augment the major military reform effort the USG has undertaken to date, i.e. the FARDC's 391st light infantry battalion. This training program known as "Operation Olympic Chase" began in 2009 and cost \$15 million. In June/July 2012 the 391st was deployed to North Kivu to fight the M23 rebels. Positive consideration should be given to training a 392nd to build an effective military that is respectful of Congolese citizens and accountable to civilian authority.

Third, if asked, the USG should consider providing planners, logistics, and possibly equipment to support an International Neutral Force (INF) to monitor the borders between Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, and to act as a strike force against all negative armed groups. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has decided to commit 3,000 troops from Tanzania, South Africa, and maybe Angola. The INF can fit within the current MONUSCO force ceiling of 19,000 since the UN force is currently undermanned at approximately 17,700. The USG has had success backing such African regional peacekeeping operations in Burundi and Somalia. The USG can also use technology to offset to some degree the number of peacekeeping personnel needed by offering contract advisors with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to monitor the border areas watching for unlawful rebel crossings and illicit activities.

Fourth, consider how to improve MONUSCO's poor record of protecting civilians. The force has been flawed from its beginning in 1998 and its damaged reputation, after allowing Goma to fall to M23 on November 20th, may be irreparable. Careful consideration is required to assess the best option for deploying the INF. It would be a mistake to bring the INF into a mission where the mandate is confused and the rules of engagement are varyingly interpreted and communicated to the command by UN headquarters in NY, the UN Special Representative in Kinshasa, and the Force Commander in the region. Sierra Leone is a model that could be replicated. Pakistani forces joined the UNAMSIL peacekeeping operation under a UN mandate but with a distinct mission to move the Revolutionary United Front rebels off the diamond mines in Sierra Leone.

Conclusion

American leadership – including Presidential engagement; robust imaginative diplomacy; and targeted military and security assistance – can arrest the rapid decline since spring of security and confidence in the DR Congo and Great Lakes Region.

A coherent, comprehensive and ambitious initiative is required to foster the conditions needed to build sustainable peace and development. Congo has for too long been portrayed as a country of continuous instability, insecurity, rampant human rights violations, and epidemic rape and sexual violence. This image obscures the country's vast potential, distorts the reality, and robs Congolese of their dignity.

The U.S. Government and we in civil society must act with humility recognizing that the governments and people of the region themselves are ultimately responsible. We can only assist them to establish the inclusive governance, and robust regional security mechanisms, that are the foundations for eliminating all armed negative forces and creating the conditions for empowered citizens and economic prosperity.

Carnegie Mellon University



Dr. Jendayi E. Frazer
Distinguished Public Service Professor
Director, Center for International Policy and Innovation

Jendayi E. Frazer is a faculty member at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) with joint appointments in the Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences' Department of Social and Decision Sciences, and in the H. John Heinz III College's School of Public Policy and Management. She is the Director of Carnegie Mellon's Center for International Policy and Innovation (CIP) that seeks to utilize new technologies and apply innovative solutions to core issues of development and governance. Under her direction, CIP recently published an edited volume, *Preventing Electoral Violence in Africa*, for which she served as co-editor and author. Frazer is also an Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations where she directs a high-level roundtable series entitled *Africa After 50* that examines new trends and regional dynamics that are shaping Africa's future and will impact U.S. policy opportunities on the continent.

Ambassador Frazer served as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from August 2005 to January 2009 and as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council from January 2001 until her swearing-in as the first woman U.S. Ambassador to South Africa in June 2004. Frazer was instrumental in establishing the Bush Administration's signature initiatives, including the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Account. She is widely credited for designing the administration's policies for ending the wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Burundi, and for helping resolve Kenya's 2007 post-election crisis. In recognition of her contributions, Condoleezza Rice presented Frazer with the Distinguished Service Award, the highest award bestowed by the Secretary of State. In July 2010, Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf awarded Frazer with the distinction of Dame Grand Commander in the Humane Order of African Redemption in recognition of her contribution to restoring peace and democracy to Liberia.

Dr. Frazer received her B.A. degree in Political Science (honors) and African and Afro-American Studies (distinction) in 1985, and M.A. degrees in International Policy Studies in 1985 and International Development Education in 1989, and a Ph.D. in Political Science, 1994 all from Stanford University.

**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION**

Witness name: Jessy E. Frazier

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

 Individual

Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: _____

FISCAL YEAR 2011

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
N/A - no grants			

FISCAL YEAR 2010

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
N/A			

FISCAL YEAR 2009

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
N/A			

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): N/A;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): N/A;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): N/A;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2011): N/A;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): N/A ;
Fiscal year 2010: _____ ;
Fiscal year 2009: _____ .

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): N/A ;
Fiscal year 2010: _____ ;
Fiscal year 2009: _____ .

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): N/A ;
Fiscal year 2010: _____ ;
Fiscal year 2009: _____ .

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2011): N/A ;
Fiscal year 2010: _____ ;
Fiscal year 2009: _____ .



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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

**Making the Most of U.S. Military
Assistance in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo**

**Testimony before the
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives**

December 19, 2012

**James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.
Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and
Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies
The Heritage Foundation**

My name is James Jay Carafano. I am the Vice President of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies and the Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. The United States has important interests to safeguard in Central Africa. Those interests can best be served by being a constructive force for peace, stability, and economic freedom in the region.

What I would caution against, however, is the bigger Band-Aid approach—just doing a little more to show we care. Throwing “more” at the challenges in Central Africa might satisfy the compulsion of the free world to do “something,” but that is more about making us feel good about ourselves—not making the most effective use of U.S. power to achieve the greatest good. Certainly, much can be done to build a “better” Band-Aid and more efficiently apply assistance, but the most vital role U.S. power can play is in its broader mission of advancing policies to keep America and its friends and allies safe, free, and prosperous.

In particular, U.S. military assistance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo should remain limited. It would take a great deal more U.S. military assistance to have a very significant impact—and an intrusive American presence on that level would create as many problems, if not more, than it might potentially solve. Rather, across the Middle East and North Africa U.S. military assets must remain focused on deterring large-scale conventional conflict and supporting efforts to counter an enduring global Islamist insurgency that includes a serious transnational terrorist threat. Indeed, in meeting these missions there is much more that should and must be done to make the U.S. military presence more effective.

Further, as you know, the U.S. draws forces globally to respond to military needs wherever they are in the world. My assessment is that current and projected funding for defense will be inadequate to meet the armed forces’ global responsibilities. Readiness and capabilities will decline. This will exacerbate the challenges of the U.S. military remaining a constructive force in Africa—for two reasons. First, when budgets get tight the low-cost, high-impact military programs that can make a difference on the margin, particularly when they are well integrated into an effective package of assistance, are usually the first to be cut. Second, the decline in U.S. military power will contribute to increasing instability in the Middle East and North Africa and the ripple of these troubles will carry them further south.

In my testimony today, I would like to 1) review the current security situation in the region; 2) make the case that pouring more resources into the current strategy won’t work. The United States should reassess its support for the current United Nations peacekeeping mission, increase accountability for the inept government in Kinshasa in addition to Rwanda and Uganda, and emphasize the need for an African-led strategy; 3)

outline the appropriate direct role of U.S. military assistance; and 4) outline the challenges the U.S. military faces in meeting these responsibilities and suggest substantive reforms in addressing regional issues.

What We Do

My responsibilities at The Heritage Foundation comprise supervising all of the foundation's research on public policy concerning foreign policy and national security. Over the past decade, we have assembled a robust, talented, and dedicated research team. I have the honor and privilege of leading that team. Our research is non-partisan and it is all freely available on the Heritage Web site at heritage.org.

In recent years, we have recognized that U.S. policy towards Africa—in particular advancing economic, political, and religious freedoms as well as improving public safety—has become particularly important. The Heritage Foundation was the first think tank to make a compelling case for establishing the U.S. Africa Command. We argued this should be done to “provide American political leaders with more thoughtful, informed military advice based on an in-depth knowledge of the region and continuous planning and intelligence assessments [so that] better situational awareness of military-political developments could preclude the need for intervention or limit the prospects for engaging in open-ended or unsound military operations.”¹ The right American military strategy is not more U.S. military in Africa, but making the U.S. military presence more effective—in particular helping to set the environment for advancements in public safety, civil society, and economic freedom.

Since then Heritage analysts have studied and written authoritatively on regional issues regarding security, economic freedom, counterterrorism, and peace and reconciliation. I am particularly proud of our Africa Working Group, chaired by Heritage Researcher Morgan Roach. This forum brings together a diverse assembly of policymakers and thought leaders to discuss the region's most challenging issues in a non-attribution setting. These discussions have not only greatly benefited our research agenda, but they have been an important catalyst for fresh thinking on how to make the most of the U.S. presence in the region.

In short, our research agenda on Africa reflects the foundation's commitment to advancing public policies that enhance our security; encourage economic growth by promoting the legitimate exchange of goods, peoples, services, and ideas among free nations; and foster a free and open civil society—all at the same time.

Where We Are

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has a long history of instability, poor governance, and poverty. No one can credibly argue that things are getting better. A

¹ James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner, “U.S. Military Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution,” Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 1697, October 15, 2003, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2003/10/us-military-assistance-for-africa-a-better-solution>.

continuous U.N. peacekeeping presence for over a decade, billions of dollars in economic and humanitarian assistance, and ongoing diplomatic efforts have not averted the current crisis. For example, the Congrès National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), one of the most prominent rebel groups in the country, officially disbanded in 2009 but re-hatted under the new designation “M23” in reference to the March 23, 2009, peace agreement. In November, during M23’s attack on Goma, numerous media accounts reported that U.N. peacekeepers from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) quickly retreated when the Congolese army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), fled, abandoning civilians to the M23 rebels.² This incident casts serious doubts on the competence of MONUSCO and efforts to improve the capacity of the Congolese military.

Further, there is a lack of government structure upon which to build effective security capacity, let alone civil institutions and economic opportunity. The government has used violence, corruption, and cronyism to maintain power. The November 2011 election was ridden with irregularities and targeted violence against the opposition. Government resources are awarded to bolster loyalty, not address needs or development.

What We Can Do

Building a better Band-Aid has to start by stopping policies that are not working.³ For starters, the U.S. should increase accountability for the inept government in Kinshasa. The federal government is an impediment to stability because President Joseph Kabila and his government cannot deliver on their commitments. Yet, there are no legitimate local representatives to fill the void. The U.S. should press President Kabila to decentralize authority and transfer power away from Kinshasa to the provincial and local governments. Provincial and local elections should be scheduled to replace officials that were undemocratically handpicked by Kabila.

Next, press Uganda and Rwanda to be part of the solution. The US should implement sanctions on those shown to support activities that contribute to instability in the DRC. However, changing the role of Rwanda and Uganda requires more than the threat of sanctions, Rwanda and Uganda need to see that their concerns – economic and security – will be addressed through a regional strategy.

For instance, many argue that Rwanda and Uganda’s contribution to instability in the DRC is directly linked to the DRC’s mineral wealth. Rwanda and Uganda have much to

² Jessica Hatcher and Alex Perry, “Defining Peacekeeping Downward: The U.N. Debacle in Eastern Congo,” *Time*, November 26, 2012, <http://world.time.com/2012/11/26/defining-peacekeeping-downward-the-u-n-debacle-in-eastern-congo/> (accessed December 13, 2012) and Gaaki Kigambo, “MONUSCO in the Spotlight over ‘Failed Mandate,’” *The East African* December 1, 2012, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Monusco-in-the-spotlight-over-failed-mandate/-/2558/1634400/-/jukkbo/-/index.html> (accessed December 13, 2012).

³ Portions of this section are adapted from Morgan Lorraine Roach and Brett D. Schaefer, “A Fundamental Rethink Is Needed on the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Heritage Foundation *Issue Brief*, December 18, 2012.

gain from a stable eastern DRC, particularly one with greater autonomy, that would be open to trade and investment. Following the decentralization of governance, provincial leadership should be granted the authority to forge economic ties with neighbors.

Finally, the country needs to transition towards a different security framework. It is time to take steps to sharply diminish the size of MONUSCO, circumscribe its mandate, and establish a framework for terminating the mission. Peace can best be built with participation by regional stakeholders. The African Union Security Council has pledged its support towards the deployment of a Neutral International Force in Eastern Congo.⁴ Such a peacekeeping mission should ideally be led by a contingent not directly related to the conflict, but should allow for Rwandan and Ugandan participation to enable those governments to directly observe the situation to alleviate their concerns.

What the U.S. Military Can Do

The most constructive role for the U.S. military is through the security-capacity-building programs managed by U.S. Africa Command working through those countries and stakeholders willing to help bring peace and security to the people of the DRC. These should include the traditional tools employed by the command, including International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales and Financing, multilateral exercises, and training engagements conducted by small teams led by our Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Special Operations Components, which General Carter Ham described as being conducted “at a low cost and with a small footprint.”⁵ Further, the command should continue to work to ensure that its efforts are synchronized with the rest of the government team, initiatives by independent agencies such as the United States Institute of Peace, and private sector and non-governmental organization initiatives.

What this committee should be concerned about is the adequacy and sustainability of these programs. When General Ham testified before this committee in February, for example, he made only one brief reference in his prepared statement to the DRC and security challenges in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, principally referring to combating the remnants of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Further, in Secretary Panetta’s most recent Defense Strategic Guidance issued in January 2012, entitled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” the word “Africa” is only mentioned once in the whole 16-page document. That has to be a concern, coming from a document which purports to give the U.S. Armed Forces and the civilians supporting them the Defense Secretary’s broad vision and policy priorities.⁶ I see neither document reflecting a recognition of the importance of appropriate military engagement activities,

⁴Frank Kanyesigye, “Congo-Kinshasa: AU Commends Regional Efforts on Congo,” *The New Times*, December 13, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201212130054.html?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link17-20121213 (accessed December 13, 2012).

⁵ General Carter Ham statement before the House Armed Services Committee, February 29, 2012, p. 15, <http://www.africom.mil/fetchBinary.asp?pdfID=20120301102747> (accessed December 18, 2012).

⁶http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf

but rather reflecting the resource squeeze that is increasingly not leaving the armed forces the capacity to cover all its responsibilities to protect U.S. interests.

What Needs to Change

Beyond the immediate tasks of assisting in addressing regional security issues, the committee must be concerned about the adequacy of U.S. forces to play a construct role in advancing peace and security throughout the region from the northernmost regions of the Near East through Central Africa.

The administration's Quadrennial Defense Review underestimated global force and modernization requirements and, in particular, the requirements for forces to promote stability in the region.⁷ The President's 2011 Strategic Guidance only exacerbated the mismatch between missions and capabilities. Put simply, Washington is taking a peace dividend on an account that is overdrawn. This has to stop.

How U.S. forces are applied needs rethinking as well. The most urgent priority is U.S. counterterrorism strategy which is overly focused on targeting the leadership of transnational terrorist groups rather than being structured to engage with and defeat a global Islamist insurgency which sees its path to power through attacking the freedom, prosperity, and security of the U.S. and its friends and allies.⁸

Next Steps

The situation in the DRC and the capacity to influence it reflects the reality that America is at the tipping point in its capacity to defend our interests around the world. There are steps that the U.S. military should take, in concert with a more responsible and comprehensive regional strategy, but the confidence that that will happen in the long term is in grave doubt, because of the lack of overall military capacity.

For starters, Congress should demand an independent review of the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review. Further, Congress must have better assessments of readiness and capabilities to conduct assistance and engagement missions. The Congress needs a "canary in the mine shaft" so it know when the resources to undertake the urgent are crowding investments to undertake the important.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on this important issue. I look forward to your questions.

⁷ The Heritage Foundation, "A Strong National Defense: The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost," Heritage Foundation *Special Report* No. 90, April 5, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/04/a-strong-national-defense-the-armed-forces-america-needs-and-what-they-will-cost>

⁸ The Heritage Foundation Counterterrorism Task Force, "Counterterrorism Strategy for the Next Wave," Heritage Foundation *Special Report* No. 98, August 24, 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/a-counterterrorism-strategy-for-the-next-wave>

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Dr. James Jay Carafano
Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation

James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security, defense affairs, and homeland security at The Heritage Foundation. Before assuming responsibility for Heritage's entire defense and foreign policy team in December 2012, Carafano had served as deputy director of the Davis Institute as well as director of its Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies since 2009.

He has testified before the U.S. Congress many times and has provided commentary for ABC, BBC, CBS, CNBC, CNN, C-SPAN, Fox News, MSNBC, NBC, SkyNews, PBS, National Public Radio, the History Channel, Voice of America, Al Jazeera, and Australian, Austrian, Canadian, French, Greek, Hong Kong, Irish, Japanese, Portuguese, and Spanish television. His editorials have appeared in newspapers nationwide including *The Baltimore Sun*, *The Boston Globe*, *The New York Post*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *USA Today* and *The Washington Times*. He is a weekly columnist for the *Washington Examiner*.

Carafano served as a member of the National Academy's Board on Army Science and Technology, the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee, and is a Senior Fellow at the George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute and the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Advisory Committee. He was the creative director for the feature-length documentary *33 Minutes: Protecting America in the New Missile Age*.

An accomplished historian and teacher, Carafano was an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y., and served as director of military studies at the Army's Center of Military History. He also taught at Mount Saint Mary College in New York and served as a fleet professor at the U.S. Naval War College. He has also served as a visiting professor at the National Defense University and Georgetown University.

He is the author of many books and studies. His most recent book is *Wiki at War: Conflict in a Socially Networked World* (Texas A&M University Press, 2012), a survey of the revolutionary impact of the Internet age on national security. Carafano coauthored *Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom*. The first to coin the term, the "long war," the authors argue that a successful strategy requires a balance of prudent military and security measures, continued economic growth, the zealous protection of civil liberties and winning the "war of ideas" against terrorist ideologies.

Carafano joined Heritage in 2003. Before becoming a policy expert, he served 25 years in the Army. Carafano rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel. He served in Europe, Korea and the United States. His assignments included head speechwriter for the Army Chief of Staff, the service's highest-ranking officer. Before retiring, Carafano was executive editor of *Joint Force Quarterly*, the Defense Department's premiere professional military journal.

A graduate of West Point, Carafano also has a master's degree and a doctorate from Georgetown University and a master's degree in strategy from the U.S. Army War College.

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
none			

FISCAL YEAR 2009

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
NONE			

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): NONE;
 Fiscal year 2010: NONE;
 Fiscal year 2009: NONE.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): NONE;
 Fiscal year 2010: NONE;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): NONE;
 Fiscal year 2010: NONE;
 Fiscal year 2009: NONE.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2011): NONE;
 Fiscal year 2010: NONE;
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Current fiscal year (2011): none;
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Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): none;
 Fiscal year 2010: none;
 Fiscal year 2009: none.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): none;
 Fiscal year 2010: none;
 Fiscal year 2009: none.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2011): none;
 Fiscal year 2010: none;
 Fiscal year 2009: none.

House Armed Services Committee

Testimony by Ben Affleck, Founder of Eastern Congo Initiative

Wednesday, December 19, 2012

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, Distinguished Members of the Armed Services Committee, on behalf of Eastern Congo Initiative, I want to first thank you for holding this hearing and devoting your time and attention to the on-going crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. My name is Ben Affleck, and I am the founder of Eastern Congo Initiative. We are the only U.S. based grant-making and advocacy organization entirely focused on working with and for the people of eastern Congo, a region that has the unwanted distinction of being one of the most volatile in the world and the site of the deadliest conflict since World War II.

From the outset, let me say that I am not here to ask for precious American tax dollars, I am here today to respectfully request you use the most important power you have, your collective voice as representatives of the United States of America.

From 1998 to 2003, eight African nations fought on Congolese soil, causing the death of millions, forcing tens of thousands of children to become child soldiers and, in some areas of Congo, subjecting as many as two of every three women to rape and other forms of sexual violence. The United Nations estimates that as many as 900,000 Congolese have been newly displaced in North Kivu province since fighting reignited early this year. As you know, just few weeks ago Goma, the economic center and capital of North Kivu province was temporarily controlled by the newly formed M23 militia injuring hundreds, displacing tens of thousands. M23 is just the latest in a long list of armed groups who have destabilized Congo since 1994.

With the latest violence, the world is reminded that the systemic sources of instability in this region have yet to be addressed.

Still, in the face of this violence and suffering, the people of eastern Congo remain committed to helping their neighbors and rebuilding their communities. ECI's staff and our partners have continued to work throughout the crisis, not only providing humanitarian assistance but continuing important development activities focused on a brighter future. When heavy shelling began last month near our office in Goma, the surgeons, doctors and nurses of ECI's partner, HEAL Africa, rushed to the hospital anticipating increased numbers of wounded in what is an already overcrowded hospital. Many of these same caregivers were still at the hospital five days later, providing free treatment to numerous civilians wounded in the conflict. Another ECI partner, Mutaani FM, continued to broadcast news throughout the crisis. Mutaani, the only independent radio station in Goma, is located across the street from the Congolese Army's headquarters, which was seized and occupied by M23 during the height of the conflict. Despite the odds, these brave journalists, all young adults in their twenties, stayed on the airwaves either reporting from the front lines or locked safely inside the radio station -- reporting on the fighting as it spread across the region.

Every day, I am inspired by the resilience and determination of the Congolese, who desperately want to live their lives in peace, earn a decent living, and raise their families just like the rest of us. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, they deserve better than the cycle of violence and upheaval that continues to undermine their daily work of rebuilding this war torn community.

While the M23 has withdrawn from Goma, they have not disbanded. In fact, as of this morning, our team on the ground tells us they are just 4 miles away from the city center and

there are fears that they may attack Goma again. We have seen this cycle repeat itself too many times: violence flares up, and the international community turns its attention, for a moment, to this part of the world. Violence recedes, and the world turns away in relief, without addressing the systemic issues that must be dealt with in order for lasting peace to be established and maintained.

Since my very first visit to Congo in 2006, it is clear to me that the pursuit of durable peace in Congo is not hopeless, quite the contrary in fact. The solutions are not new, or particularly complex. But without persistent, high-level leadership by the United States, the key players will not come to the table and do their part.

First, let's set aside the notion that the recent talks in Kampala will end this cycle of violence. Last week's negotiations were not even attended by the region's key players. It's for this reason that ECI has called on the UN Secretary General to appoint a Special Envoy, under the joint auspices of the UN and the African Union, to bring all stakeholders together to craft real, implementable solutions. We are delighted that Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson announced the State Department's support for this idea in his recent testimony.

For 15 years, the United Nations has run a peacekeeping mission in Congo. The time has come to fundamentally reconsider the scope of its mandate. As M23 moved into Goma, the 17,000 troops deployed across DRC that make up the United Nations Stabilization Mission – known as MONUSCO – did not protect the civilians in harm's way. This failure raises serious concerns. That said, the larger failure most certainly lies with DRC's own security forces' continued inability to protect their citizens. With focused U.S. leadership, the UN mandate should reflect the needs of the country and the DRC security sector must be reformed.

Last week, we were delighted that the UN Secretary General launched a review of MONUSCO's mission. We hope the United States will take the lead in the Security Council supporting significant changes to MONUSCO's mandate. At a minimum, the mandate must be strengthened to enable whatever force remains to actually keep the peace and protect the people. We also believe the UN's mandate in Congo should not be indefinite. An open-ended mandate undermines the urgency for the Congolese government to take responsibility for protecting their own citizens.

Looking beyond the United Nations, donor countries have enormous leverage in the region, which they should exert to bring key regional players together for serious negotiations. International donors can play a more active role in preventing violence from returning.

And of course, Congo's neighbors play a critical role in regional security -- there will be no lasting stability without their leadership. The United Nations has been presented with evidence that M23 is sustained by significant outside support from Rwanda and Uganda. If the accusations are true, any support must end. Congo's neighbors have legitimate security concerns, and their national economies greatly benefit from DRC's natural resources. We hope the Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda will engage in serious discussion about the many issues that affect regional stability. The Obama administration can and should leverage its unique relationship with these leaders to insist they pursue resolutions directly with the government in Congo, rather than indirectly through the support of armed militias.

It is not enough for M23 to withdraw from Goma. Until the militia is disbanded, the people of eastern Congo will live with the daily threat of violence. To be clear, eliminating M23 alone

will not restore peace. Just the last time I was in Congo, in February, there were at least 27 armed groups operating in the eastern provinces.

The regional aspects of this conflict include failures in Kinshasa. Since the last cease-fire in 2006, too little has changed inside Congo. Kinshasa must take seriously its lack of legitimacy in many parts of Congo and act now to address the grievances of its people. When Goma fell to M23, there were spontaneous protests in Bukavu, Kisangani and Kinshasa, aimed not only at militia violence, but also at the failure of President Kabila's government to protect its citizens.

To restore legitimacy, the Independent National Electoral Commission should immediately set a date for, and begin to organize the provincial elections that were supposed to take place in March of this year. The Electoral Commission itself has been seen by opposition parties and international election observers as an obstacle to political legitimacy – it should be reformed.

President Kabila must also commit to the over-due reform of Congo's security sector. Without competent military and law-enforcement institutions, Congo's territory will continue to provide safe haven to armed groups who prey on civilians and disrupt economic development. In April of this year, ECI helped lead an effort, alongside nearly 300 Congolese civil society organizations, to publish a comprehensive report about the need for security sector reform (SSR) in Congo. This report, which I ask to be submitted for the record, calls for an end to the conflict through a comprehensive reform of security institutions, which include the military and law enforcement such as the police and the courts. President Kabila has expressed an interest in SSR, but it has not been a priority of his Administration. It must become a priority now, and the U.S. has an important role to play in ensuring this happens.

Mr. Chairman, I realize we are laying out a very broad agenda. But we know that none of this -- not the revised MONUSCO mandate, the increased donor involvement, the responsible behavior of DRC's neighbors, or internal DRC reforms -- will happen without direct, high-level, focused U.S. leadership. President Obama and many of you have unique leverage with key international and regional stakeholders, and the United States is held in very high regard by the Congolese people. Your leadership can make a difference if we act decisively, and do so today. This is why ECI has called on the President to appoint a temporary special envoy to signal clearly that finding a lasting solution to the crisis in Central Africa is a priority for his administration. Past models for this approach -- sending Senator John Kerry to Sudan, the late veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke to the Balkans, or General Colin Powell to Haiti -- demonstrate that high-level diplomatic intervention at the right moment can cut through deadly impasse and open the path toward lasting stability.

At the United Nations, the new presidential envoy should work with Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to establish a time table for regional negotiations, revise MONUSCO's mandate, and draw up a strategy for reinstating a cease-fire, in case violence flares up again.

Internationally, the U.S. should encourage our NATO allies and other key partners to provide police, judicial and military training so the Congolese government can increase its capacity to protect its own people as MONUSCO's mandate winds down. U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) work with the Congolese Army has demonstrated that a little training can have a big impact. During the most recent crisis, ECI's staff in Goma got a car stuck in a ditch -- it happens a lot, unfortunately. A truck full of Congolese soldiers pulled up and offered to help. To be honest, our staff wasn't sure what to expect: in the past, this kind of "help"

would most likely have been accompanied by a request for a bribe. In this case, the soldiers brought the car out of the ditch and waved good-bye. It turns out they were part of the unit that AFRICOM trained in 2010.

The successful AFRICOM training mission is only the latest example in the 52 years since Congo's independence of the close U.S.-Congolese ties. As a major donor of humanitarian and other assistance our country has much more influence in Kinshasa than we have been willing to exert. The President's envoy should engage directly with President Kabila to accept assistance in developing a strategy for implementing comprehensive security sector reform. With an agreed-upon deadline in place for announcing the SSR strategy, the U.S. should step in to provide Congo with whatever technical support it needs -- in partnership with the EU, NATO, and others -- to complete planning.

AFRICOM's plan to train a second unit of the FARDC should be put on hold until provincial elections are organized and President Kabila produces -- and commits to -- a workable plan for implementing comprehensive security sector reform. But once that commitment is clear, Congo will need -- and deserves -- international support to ensure reform takes hold.

Mr. Chairman, I know that Congress -- and the Armed Services Committee in particular -- hears more urgent requests for U.S. leadership in the world than can be answered. Resolving the cycle of violence does not necessarily require a significant new financial investment by the United States, or U.S. boots on the ground. It does, however, require American political leadership -- moral leadership even -- to bring the parties together to address the larger sources of instability in the region.

I may be naïve, but I believe that our actions in foreign policy represent our values as a country – they represent who we are as a people. Soon I will be making my tenth trip to Congo, and I know that, if your constituents were to go to Congo and see what is happening there, they would insist we do something about it. I founded ECI in part to serve as a megaphone to amplify the voices of the people of eastern Congo, and I thank you for the opportunity to do that today. Even in the face of violence and upheaval, the Congolese remain resilient and entirely determined to rebuild their country. The seventy million Congolese deserve a better tomorrow, and they haven't given up trying to build a peaceful future. With support from Congress, and leadership from the President, the United States can help them get there. We can help, and we should.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

BEN AFFLECK**Actor, Writer, Director & Advocate**

In addition to a successful career as an actor, writer and director, Ben Affleck is also a passionate advocate and philanthropist. In 2010, Ben founded Eastern Congo Initiative (ECI), dedicated to supporting effective, local, and community-based approaches to sustainable economic and social development in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). ECI is the first U.S.-based advocacy and grant-making initiative wholly focused on working with and for the people of eastern Congo.

Since 2007, Ben has made multiple trips to eastern Congo with the goal of understanding the causes and consequences of conflict in the area, and of supporting effective, African solutions to the problems affecting the DRC. Ben has partnered with multiple media, philanthropic, and government partners to raise awareness, amplify ECI's message and motivate global action. In 2011, Ben testified before the US House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, encouraging directed support of women and children in eastern Congo. In June, Ben joined Secretary Hillary Clinton in delivering strong commitments to increase the survival rates of children under five in the DRC. He has also worked with multiple media outlets including TIME, ABC Nightline, Good Morning America, CBS, Washington Post and others to tell the hopeful Congolese story.

Ben Affleck recently turned forty. He is married and has three children. He has appeared in over thirty films, written five and directed three, of which *Argo* is the most recent.

**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION**

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 112th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: BEN AFFLECK

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

☒ Individual

☐ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: EASTERN CONGO INITIATIVE

FISCAL YEAR 2011

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
AID-DAA-A-10-00271-2	USAID	\$69,600.00	Landscape Analysis Expansion
AID-DAA-A-10-00271-3	USAID	\$477,340.50	Maternal, Newborn & Child Health
	USAID	\$2,900,000.00	Kivu Specialty Coffee Farm Asst.

FISCAL YEAR 2010

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
AID-DAA-A-10-00273	USAID	\$300,000.00	Landscape Analysis in eastern DR Congo

FISCAL YEAR 2009

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

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Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): 3;
 Fiscal year 2010: 1;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____;

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): USAID;
 Fiscal year 2010: USAID;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____;

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): MNCH Agricultural Development Landscape Analysis
 Fiscal year 2010: Landscape Analysis of Community Org in Congo;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____;


Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2011): \$3,446,981.50;
 Fiscal year 2010: \$300,000.00;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____;

NVF received funding from USAID to implement the MNCH and the Landscape analysis programs, but did not subgrant the money to ECI. NVF directly contracted with vendors (ECI prior to being incorporated as a 501 c3 was a special project of NVF). NVF reimbursed out of pocket expenses to implement projects in Congo through ECI DRC. So technically, this money did not go through ECI-c3 and thus my understanding is that this would not typically need to be reported through this report. The Kivu-Coffee grant money will go through USAID to CRS to ECI-Goma - because Goma is a separate entity from ECI c3, this would also not typically be reported on for USG, since the US Government doesn't recognize them as an entity (they are international). That stated, we wanted you to be aware of funding that ECI DRC and ECI (special project of NVF) did receive to support implementation of USAID funding.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

DECEMBER 19, 2012



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This report is produced
by the following organizations:

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

- Eastern Congo Initiative (ECI)
- The Enough Project
- Eurac: European Network for Central Africa
(Consisting of 48 European NGOs working
for peace and development in Central Africa)
- International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
- OENZ: Ecumenical Network for Central Africa
- Open Society Initiative for Southern African (OSISA)
- Refugees International
- UK All-Party Parliamentary Group
on the Great Lakes Region of Africa (APPG)

CONGOLESE ORGANIZATIONS

- African Association of Human Rights
(Association Africaine des Droits de l'Homme (ASADHO))
- Congolese Network for Security Sector Reform
and Justice (Consisting of 289 Congolese NGOs
and set up to monitor progress of security sector reform)
- Groupe Lotus
- League of Voters (Ligue des Electeurs)
- Pole Institute - Intercultural Institute
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The 2006 elections were a moment of great hope for the DRC, as the country and its people moved out of the shadow of one of the most destructive conflicts the world has known. The international community has invested heavily in the years since. Official development assistance since the end of the post-war transition totals more than \$14 billion¹. External funding makes up nearly half of the DRC's annual budget². The UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, costs more than \$1 billion a year³. The international financial institutions have buttressed the DRC's economy, most importantly through writing off⁴ \$12.3 billion debt and granting access to IMF loans. Trade deals, notably the one struck with China⁵, push the aggregate figure up still further.
2. Taking stock of progress as the DRC moves through its second post-war electoral cycle is sobering. Investment has not resulted in meaningful change in the lives of ordinary Congolese. The country is now in last place in the annual UNDP development rankings, 187th out of 187 countries⁶. Despite slight improvements, life expectancy and child mortality are below average for the region. National income per capita is less than 50 cents a day⁷. The DRC will miss all of its Millennium Development Goals. 1.7 million Congolese are displaced⁸, a further 500,000 refugees outside the country⁹. There are worrying signs of renewed conflict in the East. The investment of billions of dollars has had little impact on the average Congolese citizen.
3. The central cause of this suffering is continued insecurity. The Congolese government's inability to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on everything else. An effective security sector - organized, resourced, trained and vetted - is essential to solving problems from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence, to economic growth or the trade in conflict minerals. This is not a new finding. The imperative of developing effective military, police and judicial structures has been repeatedly emphasized. Yet, far from showing sustained improvement, Congolese security forces continue posing a considerable threat to the civilian population rather than protecting them¹⁰. The recent allegations of an army Colonel leading his troops to engage in widespread rape and looting of villages near Fizi in 2011 underscores the fact that failed military reform can lead to human rights violations¹¹. The military - the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) - has been accused of widespread involvement in the most serious human rights violations. Police corruption is endemic, and almost any form of judicial protection out of reach for the vast majority¹².
4. The root of the failure to implement security sector reform (SSR) is a lack of political will at the highest levels of the Congolese Government. Rather than articulating a vision for Congolese security and marshaling assistance to achieve it, the Government has instead encouraged divisions among the international community and allowed corrupt networks within the security services to flourish, stealing the resources intended to pay basic salaries or profiting from exploitation of natural resources. Unless this is changed, sustainable reform will be impossible. The investment made by Congo's partners could be wasted, and Congo's people will continue to suffer.
5. The international community also bears significant responsibility. The DRC's international partners have been politically incoherent and poorly coordinated. Little has been spent on security sector reform, despite its paramount strategic importance - official development aid disbursed for conflict, peace and security totaled just \$530 million between 2006 and 2010, roughly 6% of total aid excluding debt relief. Spending directly on security system management and reform is even lower, \$84.79 million over the same period, just over 1%¹³. A lack of political cohesion after 2006 undermined effective joint pressure on the Congolese government¹⁴. Poor coordination resulted in piecemeal interventions driven by competing short-term imperatives. The resulting failures have led many to give up on systemic reform altogether.

6. This is unsustainable and unacceptable. The DRC's external partners, old and new, must take a stand on SSR. As the dust settles after the 2011 presidential elections, many of the DRC's partners are reassessing their programs⁶⁵. The international community must take this opportunity to be more forceful in pressing the DRC government to engage in reform. If international donors acted in concert, and effectively capitalized on their political and economic investment in the DRC, they could positively influence DRC government behavior. Their full weight needs to be brought to bear.
7. The international community therefore needs to create a new pact with the Congolese government, one that puts in place clear conditions and benchmarks for progress on achieving army reform and minimizing harm to the population in return for continued assistance and recognition. These benchmarks must be based on positive efforts to achieve change. A strategic plan for military reform must be implemented, and a high-level body to coordinate on-going programs set up. And steps must be taken to improve the protection of Congolese civilians, through minimizing human rights abuses carried out by the security forces, and prosecuting the worst offenders.
8. This new pact must transcend traditional donors. China will need peace in the DRC for future generations to reap the rewards from its investment. South Africa also has huge and growing economic interests in the DRC. Angola has pressing issues of national security at stake. All need the stability that can only come from effective SSR. The international financial institutions (IFI) have rewarded the stabilization of Congo's macro-economic situation with significant support⁶⁶. They must recognize that continued growth will be dependent on new investment, which in turn demands security. Regional organizations, most importantly the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), need to play an active role in marshaling effective pressure, and providing a framework for discussion. Critically, this pact must also include the Congolese population. Congolese civil society must have a key voice in defining a global vision for Congo's security, and connecting high-level reform processes with those that matter most, Congo's people.
9. And the new pact must happen now. Flawed presidential elections have been completed. The DRC's relations with its neighbors have improved significantly in recent years. Though security in the DRC is precarious, and there are worrying signs of a resurgence of violence in the East, challenges to the Congolese government from non-state armed actors have receded. In fact, the biggest threats perhaps now come from within the army itself. The government needs effective SSR, particularly of the military, to rebuild its reputation at home and abroad, an imperative reflected by President Kabila in his speech to the UN General Assembly in November 2011⁶⁷. Since the elections there have been some promising signs of greater receptivity on the part of the Congolese government⁶⁸. The opportunity to engage in an honest dialogue with the Government must not be missed.
10. Though the picture painted above is bleak, it is leavened with hope. There are signs that, with the right will and appropriate support, change is possible. Increased numbers of prosecutions for sexual violence (including of a senior officer⁶⁹) and the reintegration of child soldiers show that justice can be done. FARDC formations trained by the US, South Africa and Belgium have performed well in intervening in delicate domestic environments. A census of military personnel is nearly complete. If these glimmers of hope are to be sustained and magnified, robust action is necessary. With the right political will in Kinshasa, endemic corruption can be tackled, salaries paid, and the worst abusers removed. Once the right conditions are in place, the long term and large scale work so clearly necessary – reducing the size of both police and military through retirement or new demobilization programs, vetting, reinforcing capacity and increasing the combat effectiveness of troops – can begin in earnest.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Congolese Government

Recognize the urgent need for serious reform to create an effective, professional security sector, especially the military. Overcome previous suspicions and engage positively with the international community in building a new coalition to assist with SSR efforts. Ensure that the voices of the Congolese people are heard in elaborating a new vision for security in the DRC.

1. Renew political commitment to security sector reform at the highest levels. Make military reform a top political priority of the new government. Remove from office those individuals that are obstructing SSR and take all necessary steps to achieve effective reform.
2. Urgently develop and implement a global vision for security and defense in the DRC in collaboration with Parliament and Congolese civil society, and implement a strategic action plan for achieving the vision of the FARDC set out in legislation. Request international expertise or assistance as appropriate.
3. Positively engage with international partners, notably in a high-level international forum on security sector reform, including through allocating a senior co-Chair, and agree on transparent, measurable benchmarks for progress.
4. Collaborate with international partners in re-launching a working-level cooperation body for military reform, based in Kinshasa, including through nominating a high-level co-Chair. Agree on an international partner to provide appropriate technical and administrative support.
5. Take urgent action to address the most pressing short-term requirements for ameliorating the performance of the security sector, notably the progressive demilitarization of the East, effective action to end corruption in the security services, and bringing the worst military human rights abusers to justice, including through requesting appropriate international support to meet short-term resource gaps.

To all DRC's international partners²⁰

Overcome the legacy of frustration and failure built up since 2006, and use political space opening up in Kinshasa and the new government's need for support to generate new political will on security sector reform. Provide high-level political commitment and coordination, including the appointment of sufficiently senior officials to provide momentum and leadership. Robust benchmarks and nuanced conditionality will be essential. Assistance must be sustained for the long term, and founded on a realistic understanding of what is possible.

6. Re-energize efforts and cooperation on security sector reform in the DRC through concerted pressure at the highest level for Congolese Government commitment to effective security sector reform.
7. Collaborate in a broad-based coalition of international and regional actors engaged in the DRC, notably through the launch of a high-level forum on security sector reform in the DRC.
8. Agree benchmarks for progress with the Congolese government, to include; progress on the human rights record of the security services, development of a global vision for security and a strategic reform plan for the military; and the establishment of an effective coordination body on military reform. Put in place a binding series of conditions for on-going political and programmatic support.
9. Ensure that the imperative of effective SSR, and the benchmarks and conditions agreed at the high-level forum, are reflected in any new programming decisions or bilateral agreements.
10. Assist with short-term quick-win projects to raise confidence and open space for broader reform, notably progressive demilitarization of conflict-affected areas, anti-corruption activities and effective judicial action against human rights abuses committed by the security forces, as requested by the Congolese Government, and urge for long-term, sustained reform efforts.

To the Great Lakes Contact Group (US, UK, EU, UN, France, Belgium and the Netherlands)

11. Catalyze diplomatic efforts to build a new coalition on SSR, though pro-active high level diplomatic contacts with key partners, notably Angola, South Africa, China, the AU and SADC, and their inclusion in an expanded Great Lakes Contact Group.

To the UN Security Council and MONUSCO

12. Generate renewed engagement on security sector reform through an urgent debate on the issue. Encourage, in parallel with the AU, the organization of a high-level forum on security sector reform in the DRC.
13. Amend the mandate of MONUSCO to include assisting the DRC government on all aspects of SSR, including military reform.
14. Increase the resources allocated to the MONUSCO SSR unit, notably in fulfilling its mandated task of collating information on existing and planned SSR programs. Remind all member states of their responsibility to share information.
15. Extend the UN sanctions regime to include political and military leaders impeding effective SSR and direct the group of experts to provide information about the identity of these individuals.
16. Ensure that the UN system has sufficient in-country resources to make a comprehensive assessment of the human rights performance of the Congolese security services.

To the EU

17. Renew the mandates of EUSEC and EUPOL, and reflect the imperative for progress on SSR in the planned 2012 program review. Stand ready to offer technical assistance to the DRC in elaborating a strategic reform plan for the army.
18. Extend targeted sanctions to individuals hindering effective SSR.

To the AU

19. Encourage, in parallel with the UN, the organization of a high-level forum on security sector reform in the DRC
20. Participate actively in the high-level forum and technical cooperation mechanism, including through agreement of benchmarks and conditions.

To the World Bank and IMF

21. Expand the assessment criteria for on-going support to the DRC, notably access to the IMF loans, to include progress on security sector reform and budget allocations to key priority areas, especially justice.



Soldiers cooking their breakfast on a campfire. Many troops are missing basic requirements like military issue boots.

Insecurity: Congo's Achilles Heel

1. Taking stock of progress in the DRC since 2006 is sobering. The war has been over for a decade. An elected government has served a full term. Between 2006 and 2010, the DRC received considerable external assistance, including more than \$14 billion in official development aid and a UN mission costing more than \$1 billion a year. Yet this investment has yielded little result. Life expectancy and child mortality remain far below the Central Africa average. National income per capita is less than 50 cents a day²¹. In fact, the DRC has slipped to last place in UN development rankings, 187th out of 187 countries²². Public discontentment is rife, and there are concerning signs of renewed violence in the East. A decade on from the end of a devastating war, and all that has been invested in the DRC risks going to waste. The Congolese people deserve better.

2. The proximate cause of this failure is simple. Congo's population continues to suffer, directly and indirectly, at the hands of men with guns. There are an estimated 1.7 million²³ internally displaced people in the DRC, most in the conflict-affected Eastern provinces, driven from their homes by fear of a variety of armed groups – from the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the North East, to Mai Mai groups, bandits and Front Democratique pour la Liberation de Rwanda (FDLR) rebels further South – and at the mercy of malnutrition, ill-health and pervasive fear.

Nearly half a million are refugees outside the country²⁴. UNICEF estimates that thousands of children are still being used in various capacities by armed groups in DRC, including by the Congolese Army²⁵.

3. This failure is not just indicative of the inability of the Congolese security apparatus to defeat these groups. It is also the result of abuses at the hands of the security services themselves. A survey of more than 10,000 households in North and South Kivu cited the FARDC as the second most common source of insecurity, after banditry²⁶. In June and July 2011, UN human rights monitors recorded more abuses at the hands of the FARDC than armed groups²⁷. Congolese soldiers are responsible for some of the rapes reported across Eastern DRC²⁸. Members of the security services are also responsible for pervasive low-level predation, including involvement in illegal resource exploitation and theft²⁹. Many abuses have been perpetrated by deserters from the military, or by those reacting to abuses at the hands of the army.

4. Abuse by Congolese security forces extends beyond immediately conflict-affected zones. The abuse has been most visible in the brutal suppression of political protest or internal unrest, notably in the suppression of the Bundu dia Kongo group, the crushing of MLC forces loyal to Jean-Pierre Bemba

²¹ THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Taking a Stand On Security Sector Reform

in Kinshasa, and heavy-handed responses to political protests around the 2011 elections. It has also been felt in the arbitrary arrest or killing of regime opponents, human rights activists and journalists, as well as day-to-day predation and lack of access to even-handed justice.

5. This is not a new insight. The establishment of an effective security sector is the fundamental step to meeting all other objectives, from ending the humanitarian crisis, preventing human rights abuses, encouraging investment and growth, stopping the trade in conflict minerals and preventing regional tensions from escalating. Adequate security is widely acknowledged to be a development, economic and geostrategic imperative. The Congolese Government recognized its pivotal importance in the 'Governance Compact' it produced immediately after the 2006 elections³⁰, repeated again by

President Kabila in his address to the UN in November 2011³¹. All major bilateral and multilateral actors have engaged in a wide variety of security sector reform programs, from capacity building in the justice system, to rebuilding key infrastructure, or training military and police. The UN considers SSR to be the process of enhancing effective and accountable security in a country and the transformation of "security institutions to make them more professional and more accountable"³². Security institutions can include the armed forces, police, judiciary and others³³.

6. Yet despite this consensus, military reform efforts have failed, both during the transition and afterwards. They have failed for two primary reasons. The first is the lack of political will on the part of the Congolese government; the second inadequate and poorly coordinated assistance from the donor community.

Congolese Government: Insufficient Political Will

7. The Congolese Government has lacked the will to follow through with reforms of the security sector, notably the military. A brief look at the record of reform failure demonstrates the government has not wanted a professional and effective military, as it would constitute a threat to the entrenched political and financial interests of the Congolese elite, especially those around the Congolese President. The Congolese government stalled on senior appointments to key bodies, failed to agree a workable strategic blue-print for reform or effectively follow up plans that were agreed³⁴, enabled or turned a blind eye to corruption, delayed the passing of essential legislation, and consistently undermined donor coordination.

8. This was in part due to a lack of capacity and a very low baseline for reform. The integration of former belligerents into unified military and police structures during the transition, a process known as 'brassage', was partial and ineffective³⁵. Parallel chains of command survived within the army and other security structures, and tens of thousands of combatants remained in non-state armed groups. Government administrative control was weak, notably in the East. The post-2006 administration immediately faced a variety of armed opponents³⁶. Additionally, sensitivity to international interference on security issues was acute - the close supervision that the international community had exercised during the transition, embodied in CIAT³⁷ and MONUC, had been a source of considerable frustration, even humiliation. Memories of wartime occupation were vivid, by powers widely perceived - rightly or wrongly - to be acting on behalf of elements of the international community³⁸. The government is defensive of its autonomy, and wary of dealing collectively with the international community.



Officers' Quarters at Camp Rapiando in Ituri, North Kivu province. Originally intended to house 450 people, the camp is now home to more than 10,000 people including many soldiers' families.



Most military families cannot afford to send their children to school. Children often work from a young age to contribute to the family income.

9. But these issues are as much a result of continued failures of SSR as they are the cause – and they do not present a compelling reason to ignore the need for SSR. The fact remains that the Congolese government consistently failed to give sufficient political backing for serious change. Most importantly, it did not take steps to end corruption, ill-discipline and weak command structures undermining reform efforts in the security sector. Despite President Kabila's high-profile declaration of 'zero tolerance' for sexual violence and corruption in July 2009, not enough has changed on the ground. Support to justice, investigation and anti-corruption efforts are minimal and inadequate – the Justice Ministry was allocated just 0.1% of government spending in 2011⁴⁹, and its budget reportedly fell by 47% between 2007 and 2009⁵⁰. Many in senior positions in the government and military continue to profit from corruption, either in raking off salaries, taking kickbacks, or involvement in illegal mining, trade or protection rackets.

10. No comprehensive national vision exists for defense and security policies, despite UN Security Council insistence and the emphasis placed on SSR in the government itself. A blueprint for the Congolese military has been developed, after many false starts⁵¹, and has finally been given legal foundation with the promulgation, in 2011, of much delayed legislation⁵².

A joint committee on justice reform was formed in 2005, the 'Comite Mixte de la Justice', co-chaired by the Minister of Justice and a senior diplomat, and a three year 'priority action plan' for the justice sector was launched in 2007. A coordination body for police reform, the 'Comite de Suivi de la Reforme de la Police' was launched by the Ministry of Interior in 2008⁵³.

11. Though they represent positive steps forward, these bodies are reportedly of mixed effectiveness⁵⁴, suffer from poorly-defined roles and tensions between stakeholders, and are not part of a comprehensive strategy for security. The army reform plan has not been followed up with practical planning for implementation⁵⁵, remains theoretical and is routinely bypassed or undermined in day-to-day decision-making. Changes to military structures such as the 'regimentation' process of 2011⁵⁶, for instance, bear no relation to the vision enshrined in official military planning. The Presidential Guard and intelligence services have been systematically excluded from reform, and remain completely unaccountable. Salaries for police and soldiers, despite some limited increases, remain inadequate and frequently unpaid⁵⁷. An ICC indictee, Bosco Ntaganda, holds high rank in the military⁵⁸. Senior positions remain unfilled, and formal command structures are routinely bypassed.

International Community: Inadequate and Incoherent

12. The second aspect key to understanding SSR efforts since 2006 is the attitudes and actions of the international community. The international community has been frequently criticized for political incoherence, leading to inadequate, incompatible and ineffective interventions, based on short-term national priorities and imperatives rather than achieving meaningful, sustainable reform¹⁰. There is a long list of donors and agencies that have engaged in reform or training of elements of the security services¹¹. These efforts have not resulted in meaningful, sustained improvements, let alone the transformation in attitudes and effectiveness required.

13. The international community had been remarkably unified up to 2006. Under the leadership of an activist UN mission and heavy-hitting SRSF, and coordinated through a body, CIAT, with legal standing under the transitional arrangements, the widely agreed goal of elections drove policy. But once the transition was completed, divisions began to appear. Some of the signatories to this report urged the creation of a successor organization to CIAT, but the Congolese government rejected it as unacceptable. In the absence of a 'lead nation'¹², and with the UN looking towards managing its departure, there was no overarching authority to harmonize police and, following elections, no single goal to work towards. International forums, notably the Great Lakes Contact Group, which had a broad membership¹³ during the transition, swiftly devolved to include only traditional donors, and policy coherence even within multilateral organizations such as the EU fractured¹⁴. Pressure on the Congolese Government to sustain reform faltered.

14. The success of the 2006 elections resulted in attention across much of the international community turning away from the DRC. With the DRC redefined in many capitals as a 'post-conflict' state, resources were reallocated to concentrate on other issues of immediate concern across Africa. Policy was recalibrated to reflect this new reality. Many donors looked to long-term development. Despite manifest needs, official development spending on security-related programs between 2006 and 2010 was just \$530 million, roughly 6% of the total¹⁵ - this drops to just 1% for projects working on security system management and reform. This figure is alarmingly low given the fundamental importance of an effective security sector in protecting civilians, and in achieving all other development objectives.

15. And, far from being 'post-conflict', the DRC continued to suffer from extremely serious bouts of violence. Through the post-2006 period, successive spikes of conflict or regional tension left the international community scrambling to address acute short-term political crises or humanitarian emergencies. There were demands for immediate action against armed groups such as the CNDP, FDLR or LRA - necessitating the mass deployment of ineffective and poorly trained FARDC units¹⁶.




A commander inspects his troops. Formal command structures in the FARDC are routinely bypassed.

Political settlements with Congolese armed groups, notably the CNDP, resulted in the unplanned, ad hoc integration of tens of thousands of former rebels and indicted war criminals into the ranks of the Congolese army¹⁶. Demobilization programs have unwittingly encouraged a churn of individuals from disarmament to recruitment. All of these factors are incompatible with strategic reform.

16. International incoherence has perhaps been most acutely felt in relation to SSR, particularly military reform, despite consistent calls for harmonization¹⁷. Technical coordination on the ground has been mixed. As seen above, committees bringing together donors, agencies and the Congolese government have been established on police and justice. They are functional, albeit with uncertain effectiveness. But no coordination body exists between the Congolese government and donors in relation to the military, worsened by the Congolese Government's infamous refusal to coordinate SSR attempts with its different partners.

17. This is reflected by a failure of coordination between members of the international community themselves. There have been attempts at harmonization, including informal consultations between Defense Attaches in Kinshasa agreeing a local division of labor, an Ambassadors Forum on SSR chaired by the UN, and regular diplomatic frameworks such as regular meetings of EU Heads of Mission. But while ad hoc communication may have avoided the most egregious duplication of effort, it was insufficient to generate real coherence, or political momentum for reform. Many resist sharing the detail, or even the fact, of their programs. There is no consolidated list of SSR-related interventions¹⁸, or a comprehensive record of bilateral military programs and financing. Given the weakness of Congolese administrative capacity, it is likely that not even the Congolese government had a coherent picture of SSR activities at any one time.

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Congolese police patrol the main streets of Onna.

18. The result has been a range of disconnected bilateral initiatives on training, sensitization, infrastructure rehabilitation or capacity building. There have been some successes, notably in relation to justice and police⁶⁰, and in the performance of some military units, though many were short-lived, due to a subsequent lack of support - accommodation, equipment and salaries - or the break-up of units. Some offers of training have not been taken up, with centers and instructors standing idle. There have been attempts to engage with structural issues within the FARDC undertaken by MONUSCO⁶⁰ and EUSEC, a mission of the European Union launched in 2005. Involving small numbers of embedded European officers, EUSEC has had some success in relation to the 'chain of payments' - ensuring salaries reach individual soldiers - and in conducting a census of FARDC personnel, as well as in administrative reform⁶¹. But while these initiatives have been valuable, they are not sufficient to bring about systemic change.

19. This is by no means the exclusive responsibility of donors. As argued above, all coordination attempts suffered from patchy or inadequate engagement and political obstruction by the Congolese authorities. This has been most acutely felt by the UN. The most obvious candidate to carry out the role of in-country coordination is MONUSCO. But while it has a unit devoted to SSR, and has been mandated by the Security Council to act as coordinator and information hub since 2008, it has not been sufficiently well resourced, and was systematically undermined by a Congolese government reluctant for the UN to play such a prominent role. MONUSCO essentially stopped facilitating collective discussion on SSR following the demise of the Ambassadors Forum, which has been moribund since 2010. It currently has no mandate to engage in military reform.

The Shared Imperative of SSR

20. In combination, these factors have resulted in the view that the Congolese security sector, and particularly its military, are simply too dysfunctional for reform to be achieved. The result has been an increasing detachment on SSR. Support for military reform is now frequently subsumed under wider stabilization efforts⁶², or framed as a response to a specific threat, such as the US project to train units to tackle the LRA⁶³. Though numerous projects are on-going to improve the justice system and build police capacity⁶⁴, and some progress has been made, the most important challenge facing the country, namely systemic transformation of the military, has largely been abandoned. Initiatives on large-scale FARDC training reduced to the point that only two bilateral programs were reported to be operational in January 2011⁶⁵.

21. This is compounded by the view that pushing the DRC government to take serious action is too dangerous to attempt - that effective sanctions would generate a political backlash, disrupt bilateral relationships, and risk defections, mutiny or insurrection. This is certainly the case in relation to entrenched corrupt networks and the impunity of the most infamous war criminals.

22. But this view must no longer be allowed to dominate. The status quo, of failed reform and popular discontent, presents far greater dangers. The most significant risk of renewed conflict comes from within the Congolese security services itself, particularly the FARDC⁶⁶, and from the inability of the Congolese government to control its territory or protect its people⁶⁷. Reform of the security sector would no doubt bring short-term pain, but the long-term risk of inaction is far greater. The human, political and financial cost of the DRC again collapsing back into war is difficult to fathom.

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23. Yet these costs would be felt by all of the DRC's external partners. China struck a landmark deal with the DRC government in 2007, exchanging a \$6 billion investment in infrastructure – building roads, hospitals and universities – in return for long-term access to Congolese mineral resources, extending decades⁶⁸. Internal and regional stability will be vital for this deal to come to fruition, demanding an effective security sector. South African companies have invested heavily in the DRC, and peace in the DRC and across Central Africa will be vital for its long term prosperity⁶⁹. And Angola, the DRC's key regional security partner, considers chaos across the border to be a core threat to its national security⁷⁰. It too needs an effective Congolese state. All three states have already engaged in bilateral reform and retraining.

24. Regional organizations, most importantly the African Union (AU) and the Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC) have a pressing and legitimate interest in regional prosperity and stability. And the international financial institutions – frequently cited as the actors with the most significant leverage and access in Kinshasa⁷¹ – are committed to helping the DRC achieve sustained economic growth. The IMF is the only actor currently providing direct budget support to the DRC government⁷².



A military family living in Camp Katinda, North Kivu. Most families in the sprawling army camp live in tents or makeshift structures.

25. Reform is not only vitally necessary, it is possible.

Compared to 2003 or 2006, political and military conditions in the DRC are now such that renewed, joint efforts on SSR could yield real and lasting results. The transition was characterized by acute political competition between wartime enemies, enmeshed in an unwieldy political structure. The years immediately after saw a fragile new government challenged by sustained and serious violence. Both acted as severe constraints on the possibilities for reform⁷³.

26. These constraints are now less acute. Congolese non-state armed groups may be reduced in number and scope⁷⁴. Foreign armed groups are significantly less powerful than in the past⁷⁵. Though both remain a considerable threat to civilians, neither presents the same challenge they once did to regional peace and security, or to the Kinshasa government. The political context has also changed. President Kabila and his government are facing a crisis of legitimacy. The 2011 elections were roundly criticized by international and Congolese election monitors, and have little popular credibility. The single most telling step that the government could take to rebuild its reputation at home and abroad, and to improve the lot of the population, would be to undertake meaningful reform of the security apparatus. There have been some promising signs recently. For example, the Commissioner General of the National Police in March 2012 publicly asked the international community for assistance in completing the police reform process⁷⁶.

27. The overriding need for meaningful SSR cannot be questioned. There is a broad synergy of interests across the international community and the DRC's neighbors, economic partners and population. The timing is right. It will be a long and difficult road, but the first step to unlocking a more hopeful future for the population is simple. The Congolese government must take responsibility for serious, sustained and strategic reform, particularly of the military, backed by political commitment at the very highest levels.

28. The international community must recognize this imperative. It must act on it. All other objectives – humanitarian, developmental, economic or security-related – will be difficult or impossible to achieve without concerted SSR. The DRC's external partners must make a collective stand on serious security sector reform, both to engender political will and to support resulting Congolese reform processes. The Congolese government has received significant financial and diplomatic support since the end of the war. The weight of these commitments must be brought to bear.



Military wives seek to supplement their income with small-scale trade in the local markets. "We have to beg for support from our acquaintances. The government does not support us at all," said one soldier.

A New Deal on SSR

29. It is a new political commitment that is urgently needed above all, on both sides. The international community should seek to strike a new collective pact with the Congolese Government on SSR. This need not involve the immediate allocation of significant new resources. In the absence of political will and the establishment of oversight structures, significant new programs could be counter-productive, replacing functions that need to be carried out by government. Though investment will certainly be necessary, a new push on SSR need not be expensive in the short-term.

30. Such a pact would see political backing and coordinated, targeted programmatic support exchanged for Congolese leadership and robust benchmarks on progress towards mutually agreed goals. It would need to involve all international actors engaged in the DRC, including the traditional donor community, newer international actors including China and South Africa, the DRC's neighbors either bilaterally or through regional organizations (AU and SADC), and the international financial institutions. It would demand renewed commitment, coordination and communication, robust benchmarks, and quick-win confidence raising projects.

31. It should be launched in a spirit of transparency and collaboration, recognizing that a new effort on SSR is a need shared by the Congolese government, its people, and all of its economic, diplomatic and development partners. An overly

confrontational attitude on the part of the international community could cause an unhelpful political backlash – managing tensions will require astute and fleet-footed diplomacy, and a leading role to be played by African actors. But equally, no one should be under any illusion as to difficulties that will need to be faced – there is no magic bullet to security sector reform in the DRC. It needs sustained political commitment above all. There will be disagreements, with Congolese Government, and between elements of the international community. Such a push will need sustained, high-level political commitment, and must be backed by real conditions.

Coordinate and Communicate

32. Renewed coordination among all partners at both political and technical levels is an essential pre-requisite. A broad-based coalition of international partners will be vital, including African bilateral actors, regional organizations – notably SADC and the African Union – the DRC's key economic partners, and traditional donors. This would enable on-going information sharing and ensure complementarity of support, as well as ensuring coherent and concerted messaging. This could initially be generated by an expanded Great Lakes 'Contact Group', bringing together all players to agree to parameters of benchmarks and follow-up. This would need to be backed with active diplomacy by key donors – the US, EU, UK, France and Belgium – to bring in the most important African bilateral actors, China and multilateral organizations essential to managing political fall-out in Kinshasa.

33. Such a forum should launch a high-level political follow-up mechanism on SSR in the DRC, under the auspices of the AU and UN, and the joint leadership of the Congolese Government, that would bring together all parties, including donors and multilateral actors. It is also vital that it include representatives of Congolese civil society. Successful reform will depend on the input of the Congolese population, at all levels, and their views must be heard. The forum should meet quarterly, and provide for on-going oversight and a mechanism for the resolution of disputes or disagreement. It should also seek to address problems of policy incoherence, linking an on-going assessment of political conditions to decision making in multilateral bodies such as the IMF and World Bank.

34. Finally, a new working level cooperation mechanism on military reform should be launched in Kinshasa, again co-chaired by the Congolese government, with support or a permanent secretariat provided by MONUSCO, EUSEC or a mutually acceptable alternative. It would ensure harmonization, communication and effective burden-sharing. It would also map on-going and planned programs and interventions, maintain comprehensive project database, and act as a communication hub between donors, government and civil society.



FARDC troops assemble for inspection.

Benchmarking

35. Though a new partnership should be launched in a spirit of positive collaboration, it should also be backed by robust, binding benchmarks. These would need to be discussed and calibrated against a realistic assessment of what is achievable. They should center on two key areas. The first key benchmark should be rooted in the human rights performance of the Congolese security services. This is a metric that would reflect whether soldiers or police are violating human rights, whether war criminals in the military have been arrested or removed (through vetting and effective military justice), and would act as a proxy for improved internal discipline and the coherence of formal command structures. Information is already collated by the UN Joint Human Rights Office, and could be complimented by Congolese human rights organizations, international NGOs or ad hoc bodies such as those authorized by UN sanctions bodies. Progress should be reported on a quarterly basis to the political follow-up mechanism. The MONUSCO mandate should provide for increased resources to monitor progress on SSR.

36. The second should be the development and implementation of a practical path for FARDC reform. Legislation passed in 2010 and promulgated by the Congolese President in 2011 provides a framework, enshrining in law a long term vision for the security sector. A practical plan for its achievement is urgently necessary. Appropriate technical support should be made available via MONUSCO, EUSEC or an alternative.

Consequences

37. These conditions must be backed by real consequences in the event of continued failure or obstruction. This would not necessarily need to include hard conditionality on development spending or humanitarian aid, which would endanger the poorest and most vulnerable, and would risk a political backlash from Congolese actors that reduced rather than expanded the space available for reform. But there are many other avenues for international leverage, starting with sustained political and diplomatic pressure at the highest levels. These could include:

- A publicly available quarterly progress report discussed at each meeting of the high-level political follow-up mechanism;
- Explicit linkage of progressive MONUSCO draw-down with successful SSR, as measured by agreed criteria;
- A sliding-scale of suspension of financing, projects, grants and aid disbursements, with excess funding transferred to supporting civil society, Parliamentary oversight, humanitarian needs or governance mechanisms;
- A moratorium on non-essential inward and outward visits by senior officials and ministers, and the hosting of large-scale conferences and events in the DRC⁷⁵; and
- Extension of UN and EU targeted sanctions to military and political figures blocking security sector reform.



The rudimentary hospital in the camp provides basic medical services to military families.

Confidence-Building

38. Rather than looking immediately to long-term objectives, the high-level forum should, in the first instance, seek to elaborate achievable, realistic and high-impact short-term projects, to raise confidence and open space for reform. The first steps would need to be focused on minimizing the harm done by elements of the Congolese security apparatus to the civilians in their areas of deployment, and beginning to tackle the corruption and ill-discipline that undermine all other efforts. These would again need to be discussed and agreed, but could take three initial forms – the progressive demilitarization of the East, action on corruption, and prosecution of those guilty of the most serious human rights abuses.

39. Demilitarization would bring multiple benefits. The East of the DRC, particularly the Kivu, has seen large-scale deployments of Congolese military¹⁸. By moving troops to barracks, away from contact with civilians, it would remove one of the key sources of insecurity for the population. Having the majority of troops in barracks would allow salaries and support to be monitored, removing the need for income from illegal trade, predation or corruption. And it would allow structures to be mapped, training needs to be assessed, and discipline rebuilt. It would thus both protect civilians and simultaneously open space for reform. It would need to be progressive and carefully considered, so that the most vulnerable were not left open to attack by non-state armed groups, and MONUSCO would need to fill any resulting security vacuums. Necessary international support to the process would include provision of sufficient barracks, support to redeployed troops and dependents, and logistics. Such support could be coordinated by the UN through MONUSCO and the ISSSS, already engaged in similar projects in conflict affected regions.

40. The second would be to take on the entrenched corrupt networks that have undermined reform. This would be a necessary step in pursuing demilitarization – without the expectation of support, soldiers might refuse to deploy away from resource-rich areas, or simply prey on the population around barracks. It would also bring enormous long-term benefits in building formal command structures, discipline and capacity. This would be the key litmus test of high-level political will in Kinshasa – it is a truism in anti-corruption initiatives that enforcement mechanisms are ineffective in the absence of commitment at the highest levels. It would demand the clarification of senior command structures, the strengthening of central administrative control, and the appointment of capable personnel.

41. Third, significant steps should be taken to bring to justice those members of the security forces accused of the most serious human rights abuses, including those in the most senior ranks. Not only would this be of clear benefit in its own right, it would send a message that criminality on the part of members of the military or police would no longer be tolerated, and be a vital step to changing the ethos of the security services. This would demand significant support to the capacity of Congolese military and civilian justice systems.

42. These three goals interlock, and would constitute a significant test of Congolese political will. Once they were achieved, and the steps outlined above taken, longer-term necessities – such as reducing the number of personnel in both police and military, and conducting a thorough vetting of all personnel – could begin to be planned and implemented.

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Learn from successes - and failures

43. Finally, the international community should learn the lessons of the past. The implementation of MONUSCO's conditionality policy - whereby peacekeepers do not work with Congolese personnel guilty of human rights abuses - shows that perpetrators can be identified and held to account⁴⁹ if made a priority. Improved rates of arrest and trial for sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in the Kivu provinces, notably the prosecution of a Lieutenant Colonel for rape in 2011⁵⁰, show that justice is possible with the right combination of training, material support and political attention. That this landmark judgment was delivered by a 'mobile gender court' - a long-standing Congolese solution to delivering justice in remote areas - demonstrates the importance of working flexibly within Congolese realities. The court was supported by the American Bar Association, using funding from an international NGO, and worked with the Congolese judicial system, local government and civil society⁵¹.

44. Additionally, more than 30,000 children have successfully been demobilized from armed groups since 2006 through interventions executed in concert with the Congolese government, UN agencies and local Congolese organizations. Children and adolescents who join armed groups whether through force or ignorance have a difficult time returning to their homes and communities if they are demobilized. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs supported by UNICEF make a difference by reuniting some with their families and communities and supporting others in vocational training programs⁵².

45. The EUSEC project on reform of the Congolese military demonstrates that structural reform need not be expensive if support is correctly targeted. EUSEC was launched in 2005 and embedded small numbers of European officers at senior levels in both headquarters and with individual units. Designed to offer strategic advice and targeted support, its most significant initiatives have been working on the 'chain of payments' -



A soldier at home in his barracks, Katimbo Camp, Goma.

ensuring salaries reached individual soldiers - undertaking a census of FARDC personnel, developing a 'logistics doctrine' for the FARDC, and conducting administrative training. The census started in 2006, and has been able to offer a far more reliable idea of numbers of serving soldiers than was previously available⁵³. The strategic purpose of interventions matters more than their cost.

46. The positive performance of military units trained by the US, Belgium and South Africa demonstrate that improvements in conduct and discipline are possible. Many police units trained for the 2006 elections were reported to have functioned well. But once elections were past, support dropped away, and the trained units swiftly degraded, with equipment going missing, unit structures being broken up and discipline slipping⁵⁴. Training and equipment are vital, but attention also needs to be sustained.

ANNEX I – OECD statistics on spending in the DRC

Fig 1. OECD Development spending 2006-2010⁸⁵

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
Disbursed	2234.573	1448.157	1928.990	2548.207	5972.137	14,132.064
Committed	2175.442	1983.223	2224.644	3083.140	3732.631	13,199.1

This gives a headline total of more than \$13 billion in official development commitments to the DRC between 2006 and 2010, and more than \$14 billion in disbursements. This translates to an overall financial commitment of \$2.8 billion a year between 2006 and 2010.

However, debt relief for past projects causes a sharp spike in total disbursements in 2010 (see below for more detail on debt relief). Thus, though indicative of the level of financial support received by the DRC, it does not necessarily reflect actual year-on-year resource flows.

Fig 2. OECD development spending 2006-2010 (excluding debt)⁸⁶

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
Disbursed	1198.729	1156.323	1754.167	2338.246	2116.93	8,564.395
Committed	1183.808	1740.224	2099.748	2939.14	2282.966	10,254.651

Non-debt related development commitments totaled roughly \$10.2 billion between 2006 and 2010, with disbursements at \$8.5 billion, and an average commitment of just over \$2 billion a year. This spending was overwhelmingly on project aid. Official disbursed budget support was just \$474 million,

or 5.5%, largely from the IMF and EU in 2009 and 2010, as well as some 'emergency' budget support to assist the DRC to achieve HIPC completion point, and pay teachers' salaries, which was not necessarily included in OECD statistics⁸⁷.

Fig 3. OECD development spending on 'Conflict, Peace and Security' (disbursement only)⁸⁸

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total
'Conflict, Peace and Security'	99.99	73.96	89.4	124.83	142.32	530.51
'Security System Management and Reform'	1.05	8.02	19.64	21.48	35.60	85.79

Thus disbursed development spending on conflict peace and security between 2006 and 2010 is equivalent to 3.75% of the headline financial commitment to the DRC of \$14 billion and on security system management makes up 0.6%. If compared to total development spending excluding debt relief over the same

period, the equivalent figures are 6.19% and 1% respectively. By comparison, disbursements on humanitarian aid were \$1.875 billion over the same period, or 21.89% of total development spending, excluding debt.

Fig 4. MONUC/MONUSCO budget⁸⁹

2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	Total
1091.242	1112.739	1187.676	1346.584	1365	6099

The total operating budget for the UN peacekeeping mission totaled \$6.099 billion between July 2006 and July 2011. The US paid 27.14% of peacekeeping costs, or \$1.47 billion, over the same period, the UK paid 8.15%, or \$499 million, and France paid 7.55%, or \$463 million.

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Fig 5. Top ten OECD bilateral donors to DRC 2010 (disbursement, excluding debt⁹⁰)

Country	Total
USA	277.85
UK	187.77
Belgium	164.69
Japan	80
Germany	77.11
Sweden	71.48
Spain	32
Norway	28.30
Canada	26.52
Netherlands	19.59

These figures do not include peacekeeping (see above), bilateral military assistance or contributions via multilateral agencies. They do not include assistance provided by non-OECD members, such as China, Angola, and South Africa, for which no comprehensive set of spending data exists.

The largest multilateral agencies in the DRC over this period were the EU and International Development Agency (World Bank). The IDA disbursed a total of \$1.47 billion between 2006 and 2010 (excluding debt relief), and the EU disbursed \$1.2 billion in the same period.

Fig. 6 Development spending by Contact Group core members, 2006-2010 disbursements, excluding debt⁹¹)

US	UK	France	Belgium	The Netherlands	Total
970.544	849.058	130.457	758.833	199.155	2908.047

Again, these figures do not include contributions to multilateral agencies, to peacekeeping, or to bilateral military programs.

Fig. 7 DRC debt relief

Nominal debt relief (\$US millions)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Under enhanced HIPC	389.5	528.4	478.2	511.2	498.6
Under MDRI	4.5	14.8	16.8	18.9	19.8
Total	394	543.2	495	530.1	518.4

These numbers give the best estimate of the annual savings to the DRC through debt relief initiatives⁹². They also represent the annual cost to the creditors of agreeing this debt relief.

¹⁸ THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Taking a Stand On Security Sector Reform

ACRONYMS

ADF-NALU: Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation Uganda (ADF-NALU)

AU: African Union (AU)

CAR: Central African Republic (CAR)

CIAT: Comité International d'Appui à la Transition - The International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT)

CNDP: Congrès national pour la défense du peuple - National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)

DAC: Development Assistance Committee (DAC)

DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

ECF: Extended Credit Facility (ECF)

EU: European Union (EU)

EUPOL: EU Police Mission in DRC (EUPOL)

EUSEC: EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in DRC (EUSEC)

FARDC: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo - Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC)

FDLR: Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda - Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)

FNL: Forces for National Liberation (Burundian FNL)

GNi: Gross National Income (GNI)

HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)

ICC: International Criminal Court (ICC)

IDA: International Development Association (IDA)

IFI: International Financial Institutions (IFI)

IFRI: French Institute of International Relations (IFRI)

IMF: International Monetary Fund (IMF)

ISSSS: The International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS)

LRA: Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

MDRI: The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)

MLC: Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC)

MONUC: United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)

MONUSCO: The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)

ODA: Official Development Aid (ODA)

OECD: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

SADC: Southern African Development Community (SADC)

SGBV: Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV)

SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)

SSR: Security Sector Reform (SSR)

STAREC: Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC)

UK: United Kingdom (UK)

UN: United Nations (UN)

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)


US: United States (US)

ENDNOTES

- Figures from OECD-DAC. This includes all disbursed multi-lateral and bilateral official development aid (ODA), but excludes military assistance, peacekeeping, aid from non-members of the OECD and some budget support. See annex 1 for more details.
- According to official figures, the total Congolese budget for 2010 was \$5.9 billion, of which external receipts made up \$2.8 billion, or 46.47%, the vast majority of which was project financing. The 2011 budget anticipated total spending of \$7.3 billion, and total external receipts were expected to be \$3.3 billion, or 45.2%. Figures accessed at <http://www.ministerebudget.cd>.
- The annual MONUC/MONUSCO budget has increased slightly, from \$1.1 billion for 2006-2007 to \$1.3 billion for 2010-2011.
- The DRC reached completion point under the HIPC program in June 2010, unlocking 12.33 billion in debt relief. This is estimated to equate to roughly \$500 million per year in additional government revenues.
- A deal signed in 2007 will see some \$6 billion of investment in infrastructure exchanged for access to the DRC's mineral resources.
- UNDP Human Development Index 2011, accessed at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>
- GNI per capita is \$189 (2010). Accessed at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/congo-democratic-republic>
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, accessed at <http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpCountries%29/554559DA506C8588802570A7004A96C7?opendocument>
- 467,693 at January 2012 (UNHCR), accessed at <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a6c.html>
- "We are entirely exploitable" The lack of protection for civilians in eastern DRC, Oxfam Briefing Note, July 2011; 'Small Arms in Eastern Congo, A Survey on the Perception of Insecurity', GRIP, 2011.
- In June 2011, ex-PARECO Hutu commander, Colonel Kifarur Niragije allegedly led over 100 soldiers to engage in serious human rights violations of civilians in the Fizi area. Col Kifarur had apparently deserted from the military due to the reorganization of military command. See <http://reliefweb.int/node/421990>; <http://reliefweb.int/node/421945>
- See State Department 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (accessed at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/180453.pdf>) or 'Second joint report of seven United Nations experts on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', UN Human Rights Council, 10 March 2010.
- Figures for the amount spent on military assistance are not collated by the OECD, and no comprehensive database exists for past or on-going projects, itself indicative of poor coordination. See annex 1.
- See paragraph 13
- This included the private as well as public sectors - business confidence reportedly fell from 5.7% in November to -27% in December 2011 as a cause of uncertainty over elections ('No Confidence Vote from Companies', Africa Confidential, 20 January 2012.
- The DRC reached completion point under the World Bank HIPC program in June 2010. It has had access to an IMF Extended Credit Facility since 2009.
- See report at <http://gadebate.un.org/66/democratic-republic-congo>
- Confidential interviews by author with various policymakers, January 2012. See also, Radio Okapi: Police reform: General Bisengimana asks the international community for help, March 21, 2012 <http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/03/21/reforme-de-la-police-le-general-bisengimana-demande-l'aide-de-la-communaute-internationale/>
- 'DR Congo colonel Kibibi Mutware jailed for mass rape', RBC, 21 February 2011.
- Including the US, EU, UK, France, China, Angola, South Africa, Belgium, The Netherlands, the UN, AU and SAHRC.
- Accessed at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/congo-democratic-republic>
- UNDP Human Development Index 2011, accessed at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, accessed at <http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpCountries%29/554559DA506C8588802570A7004A96C7?opendocument>
- 467,693 at January 2012 (UNHCR), accessed at <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a6c.html>
- In 2011, more than 270 new cases of child recruitment were documented, while 5,403 children, including 1,915 girls, formerly associated with armed forces and groups who were released or escaped in 2011 or during previous years, were provided with reintegration. Interviews with UNICEF staff in March 2012 and see also http://www.child-soldiers.org/Child_Soldiers_Colition_DRC_shadow_Report_13Apr2011.pdf
- 'Small Arms in Eastern Congo, A Survey on the Perception of Insecurity', GRIP, 2011.
- Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 21 October 2011 (S/2011/636)
- 'Soldiers who rape, commanders who condone', Human Rights Watch, 2009.
- See, for instance, 'The complexity of resource governance in a context of state fragility: The case of eastern DRC', International Alert, 2010; "We are entirely exploitable" The lack of protection for civilians in eastern DRC, Oxfam Briefing Note, July 2011.
- 'The 'Governance Compact' was circulated to donors along with the first post-election budget in 2007, laying out the government's reform priorities. SSR was the first issue addressed. Accessed at <http://www.un.int/drcmp/archives/ContratdeGouvernance.pdf>
- See report at <http://gadebate.un.org/66/democratic-republic-congo>

- 32 United Nations Peacekeeping Security Sector Reform website: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/security.shtml>
- 33 It can also include, 'corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/security.shtml>
- 34 See paragraph 10.
- 35 The 'brassage' process was intended to create 18 new integrated brigades, with training conducted by international actors including Belgium, South Africa, Angola and the UN. Only 14 integrated brigades were formed by the end of the transition, and many tens of thousands of armed men remained outside formal structures. The failure of army integration during the transition was a direct cause of violence after 2006, which in turn undermined future SSR efforts.
- 36 The most immediate challenges were posed by the armed guard of Jean-Pierre Bemba, in central Kinshasa, and the CNDP of Laurent Nkunda in the East, as well as the FDLR and LRA, Congolese Mai Mai groups and sporadic inter-community violence.
- 37 The International Support Committee for the Transition - known by its French acronym CIAT - was an Ambassador-level committee that had a formal advisory position to the transitional authorities. It took a strong stance in disagreements with the transitional government, and was greatly resented by many Congolese actors as an infringement of their sovereignty.
- 38 The strong relationship between key donors - notably the UK, US and EU - and the governments of Rwanda and Uganda led to widespread suspicion among Congolese actors during the war and post-war years.
- 39 2011 budget allocation to the Justice Ministry was \$5.6 million, out of a projected total budget of more than \$7 billion - less than 0.1%. Figures from www.ministerebudget.cd
- 40 'Putting Complementarity into Practice: Domestic Justice for International Crimes in DRC, Uganda, and Kenya', Open Society Justice Initiative, 2011.
- 41 A 'Plan de Reforme de l'Armee', was developed in 2009, following an earlier blueprint 'Plan Directeur de la Reforme De L'Armee' - that was presented to the international community at a round-table in Kinshasa in 2008, and subsequently largely rejected. This was the successor to a 'National Strategic Plan for the Integration of the Armed Forces' released in August 2005.
- 42 The organic law on the 'Organisation and Functioning of the Congolese Armed Forces' sets out the structures, responsibilities and outlook of the FARDC, and reflects the vision initially set out in the Army Reform Plan of 2009. An organic law on the 'Organisation and Functioning of the Police' was promulgated at the same time.
- 43 See www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPressFiles/110711%20Fact%20sheet%20EUSEC%20DR%20Congo%20%28%2013%29.pdf
- 44 A 'Joint Committee for SSR' was established in 2005, but was ineffective - its defense sub-committee had to be chaired by a MONUC officer because 'no suitable Congolese was available'. This is indicative of the low political salience given to coordination by the Congolese government.
- 45 A 'logistics plan' was developed in conjunction with the EU EUSEC mission in early 2011, but has not been implemented.
- 46 The 'regimentation' was an ad hoc restructuring of military units in Eastern DRC undertaken during 2011. It involved the withdrawal of units from active deployment and their reallocation into new command structures, intended to disrupt parallel chains of command.
- 47 Salaries for rank and file in both police and army are around \$40 per month, moving up to \$60 for a general.
- 48 Bosco Ntaganda was indicted by the ICC for war crimes in 2006. He is a serving General in the Congolese armed forces.
- 49 See for instance Henri Boshoff, Devin Hendricksen, Sylvie Moree Clingendael, Thierry Vireooulon, Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place. An Analysis of the Donor Approach to Supporting Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Clingendael Paper, June 2010, and Sebastian Melnot, Candide au Congo : L'Echec annonce de la réforme du secteur de sécurité (RSS), Focus Stratégique No. 9, IFRI, September 2008.
- 50 The key actors with an interest in SSR are US, EU, AU, UK, China, Angola, Belgium, The Netherlands, South Africa and Japan. A partial list of activities includes military reform or training by the US, EU, Angola, South Africa, Belgium, France, China and the UN; police reform or training by France, the UK, EU and UN; and justice reform training and capacity building by the EU, the UN, US, and others.
- 51 Ideally a single bilateral actor would take responsibility for leading reform in the DRC, as the UK did in Sierra Leone or the US in Liberia. However, the scale of the challenge posed by the DRC and the political risk that any state would face in taking responsibility, mean that the emergence of a 'lead nation' is increasingly unlikely, even if it were accepted by the Congolese Government.
- 52 The Great Lakes Contact Group involved a broad range of the international community, including African states, multilateral organizations and key players such as China. In recent years its membership has been restricted to the traditional donors - US, EU, UN, UK, France, Belgium and The Netherlands.
- 53 See, for instance, Justaert, Arnout and Stephan Keukeleire. (2010). The EU's Security Sector Reform Policies in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In: Vanhoonaeker, Sophie, Hylke Dijkstra and Heidi Maurer (eds). Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy. European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special Issue 1, Vol. 14, <http://siop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-006a.htm>.
- 54 This does not include financing for military projects, as they are not collected by the OECD-DAC, and comprehensive figures are unavailable. Nor does it include projects run by bilateral actors that are not members of the DAC - notably South Africa, Angola and China - or actions undertaken directly by MONUC/MONUSCO.
- 55 The latest iteration of this has been seen in reporting in March 2012 of a new UN-supported offensive against the FDLR that observers have claimed could displace 100,000 - 'UN-backed Congolese army drive could displace 100,000 people, analysts warn', The Guardian, 16 March 2012.
- 56 The ad hoc integration of a new caseload of some 12,000 former rebels in 2009 is reported to have undone years of efforts to map numbers and deployments of the Congolese military, as well as further weakening unit cohesion and command structures.
- 57 'While there is broad agreement among international actors that security sector reform is a key issue, donors need to harmonise their support to the Government in developing a security sector reform strategy' Twenty-second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 21 September 2006, S/2006/759
- 58 MONUSCO SSR unit has been attempting to map programs for several years, but still has an incomplete record.
- 59 The most significant justice reform programs have been run by the EU, as well as the UN, NGOs and others. Where abuses were previously almost-completely unpunished, in 2008, 27 soldiers were convicted of crimes of sexual violence in the Kivu (HRW, 2009). The EUPOL mission of the EU is mandated to engage in central police reform, but though it had some successes, including helping draw-up a 15 year reform plan, it has since been assessed as 'struggling to fulfil its strategic level mandate' (House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, 7th Report 2010-11, p51) The UK launched an innovative multi-year program to build police accountability and performance in 2009 (<http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=115963>).
- 60 The MONUSCO SSR unit was launched in 2008. It had just 9 staff as of October 2011 (<http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3899>)
- 61 http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPressFiles/110711%20Fact%20sheet%20EUSEC%20DR%20Congo%20%28%2013%29.pdf
- 62 The International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) acts in support of the Democratic Republic of Congo's Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) launched in June 2009. It has undertaken a range of SSR-related activities in the East of the country, designed to increase security extend state authority, including training of police, reconstruction of training centers and barracks, demobilization and infrastructure projects. It is supported by 13 donors, and had spent roughly \$168 million from 2009 to 2011.
- 63 The US has been engaged in training Congolese light infantry since December 2009, with the first units graduating in September 2010, since deployed to the LRA-affected area. It was intended to create a 'model unit' to inform other programs. It included elements intended to make units self-sufficient, as well as 'training the trainer', human rights awareness and operational effectiveness. <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.aspx?art=3256>
- 64 These include, but are not limited to, a UK-funded program on police reform, police training by the UN, police reform through the EU EUPOL initiative, a variety of EU-funded support and capacity building programs for the justice sector, a UNDP-led joint initiative on military justice reform.
- 65 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 17 January 2011, S/2011/20. Training of specialist troops - demining, medical and so on - continues, as does officer training, both in-country and overseas conducted by France, Belgium, China and others. Unit-level training is conducted by MONUSCO, and work on strategic military reform is on-going through the EU EUSEC program, and by MONUSCO SSR unit.
- 66 There have been numerous reports of defections by military officers and men, frequently by former armed group members. For instance, a former CNDP battalion commander, Major Patrice Akiliman, was reported to have defected from the army in October 2010 with 28 men, and a former armed group officer, Col. Albert Kabasha was reported missing from his post with 30 men in January 2012. (www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/10/28-gens-defection-d%E2%99%99un-commandant-de-bataillon-des-fardc-a-alimbongo/; www.lepotentiel.cd/2012/01/nord-kivu-un-colonel-des-fardc-disparait-avec-30-de-ses-soldats-a-beni.html)
- 67 There are concerns over the sustainability of the transition of the CNDP from military to political actor given the de facto independence of former CNDP combatants, despite their integration into official structures, and continuing control over fiefdoms in North Kivu, including lucrative mining areas. Resentment is reported to have led to regrowth of informal armed groups, and risks a return to inter-communal violence. Remaining armed groups, both foreign and Congolese pose an acute threat to civilians.
- 68 'China and Congo: Friends in Need', Global Witness, March 2011
- 69 Most striking is the Grand Inga project, to develop the hydropower resources of the Congo River, being jointly developed by the DRC and South Africa, involving the South African national power company, Eskom, designed to meet South Africa's future energy needs. A new bilateral agreement was signed in November 2011. See <http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&aid=23176&tid=48818>

- 70 Confidential interviews by author with various policymakers, January 2012.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 The IMF provides finance to the DRC under an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) launched in 2009, worth about \$550 million over three years. It expires in June 2012. The previous IMF program had been completed in 2006. The IMF, World Bank, African Development Bank and European Union also provided budget support in 2009 and 2010 to help the DRC reach the HIPC completion point, and for emergency payment of teachers' salaries.
- 73 Estimates vary as to the number of armed men in the DRC at the beginning of the transition – according to figures provided by the belligerents themselves there were more than 300,000. More than 180,000 had passed through a demobilization process by December 2006. Figures from 'Completing the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the link to security sector reform of FARDC', Institute for Security Studies Situation Report, Henri Boshof, 23 November 2010.
- 74 The large scale, formed military units left over from the war and failed transitional integration – notably those loyal to war time rebel groups – that were present immediately after the 2006 elections have either largely disintegrated or been brought into official structures, however nominally. But a constellation of smaller groups remain, and there are no comprehensive estimates of the numbers available. Assessment is particularly difficult given the terrain, fluid nature of multiple militias, defections, re-recruitment and blurring between criminality and organized activity.
- 75 Between 2002 and early 2012, the UN repatriated more than 28,000 foreign fighters and dependents. The FDLR has seen its numbers drop tenfold from 20,000 in 2001 to some 2000 at present. The LRA has carried out horrific attacks on civilians in the DRC, as well as in the CAR and South Sudan, but is down to some 300 fighters scattered in small groups across a wide area. Other significant groups are the Uganda ADF-NALU, estimated to have 300 fighters, and the Burundian FNI.
- 76 See Radio Okapi: Police reform: General Bisengimana asks the international community for help, March 21, 2012 <http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/03/21/reforme-de-la-police-le-general-bisengimana-demande-laide-de-la-communaute-internationale/>
- 77 For instance, the 14th Summit of La Francophonie is due to take place in Kinshasa in late 2012.
- 78 There were an estimated 60,000 FARDC troops deployed in the Kivu provinces in late 2009. Latest estimates compiled by EUSEC are that the total number of men in the Congolese military is 105,000, meaning that nearly 60% of the FARDC are deployed in just two provinces. A census of police numbers is underway, with numbers estimated at around 100,000.
- 79 See Thirtieth report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 4 December 2009, s/2009/623.
- 80 Lt Col Kibibi Mutware was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for crimes against humanity, along with 3 officers and 5 men. 'DR Congo colonel Kibibi Mutware jailed for mass rape', BBC, 21 February 2011.
- 81 DRC Mobile Gender Courts Factsheet, accessed at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/publications/congo-mobile-20110719
- 82 Interviews with UNICEF staff in March 2012.
- 83 Latest estimates are of a total of approximately 105,000.
- 84 Confidential interviews by author with various policymakers, January 2012.
- 85 OECD-DAC, all figures in USD millions, current prices. Accessed on 20 March 2012.
- 86 Ibid.
- 87 See 'Budget Support and Fragile States: Mokoro Study for Oxfam Novib, Handout 3: Individualising the cases – Ethiopia and DRC' for further information, accessed at www.odi.org.uk/events/docs/4640.pdf
- 88 OECD-DAC, all figures in USD millions, current prices. Accessed on 20 March 2012.
- 89 Figures in USD millions, from UN Secretary General's reports, accessed at www.un.org
- 90 OECD-DAC, all figures in USD millions, current prices. Accessed on 20 March 2012.
- 91 Ibid.
- 92 'Democratic Republic of the Congo: Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries – Completion Point Document and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative Paper', IMF Country Report No. 10/36, December 2010.



For more information please contact
andrew.hudson@crisisaction.org

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

DECEMBER 19, 2012

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ

Secretary CHOLLET. U.S. forces used the same Afghanistan model of training and fighting alongside the host nation counterparts as the model when training and equipping the FARDC 391st battalion and this is the same model currently being used to train other African forces today in areas such as Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda, Burundi, etc. Also building on the Afghanistan model, when training partner forces, DOD works to develop a training plan that meets the host-nation's requirements, which in the case of DRC and our training of the 391st, was a base line internal security capability.

The geography and operational profile of Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are very different; and many lessons learned do not necessarily translate directly to DRC. However, experiences in Afghanistan have built capable and competent Special Forces operators who have the necessary skill sets to engage with foreign forces be successful in developing their capabilities. Also, lessons learned from efforts to build partner capacity (BPC) in Afghanistan are also being incorporated into U.S. doctrine and training for BPC, and the Department of Defense believes this will have a positive impact on global BPC efforts. [See page 28.]

Secretary CARSON. Border security in the region is almost non-existent. There is very little security along the borders. They are not clearly delineated. People move back and forth easily. Some of the areas are very mountainous. There are active volcanoes in and around Goma, and in both North Kivu and South Kivu. It is an enormous challenge also because of the enormous size of the country. This is a country that shares borders with nine other countries. As I said, geographically, it's as large as the eastern part of the United States, and certainly is twice as large as Western Europe. It also has several water borders. The Congo River divides the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the Republic of the Congo, known as Congo Brazzaville. And, there are several lakes that divide the country from its eastern neighbors.

In addition to the challenges posed by the size and terrain of the border, the DRC military does not have the manpower or the expertise to undertake effective border security. We continue to urge the DRC government to recommit and accelerate its security sector reform efforts. We have provided extensive training to the DRC military and are prepared to provide additional training; however, none of it is directly aimed at border security.

While border security is not one of the mandated tasks of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the UN Security Council recently took note of and voiced no objection to the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for MONUSCO's use. Rwanda, a member of the UN Security Council since January 2013, joined the consensus. While it is unclear who will supply the UAVs, they are expected to be used, in part, along the DRC/Rwanda border to help track armed groups and provide real-time intelligence. Imagery from the UAVs may also assist the work of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM), a regional body tasked with investigating allegations of cross-border support.

The UN is also weighing the option of integrating a regional peace enforcement brigade into MONUSCO. The force would consist of over 2,000 African troops and would have a mandate to pursue aggressively the armed groups in the DRC, including the M23. While border security would not be a specific component of the force's mandate, greater border security could potentially result from its operations. [See page 30.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Secretary CHOLLET. Some fiscal year (FY) 2013 budgets are still being determined. Assuming funding amounts remained the same, the U.S. Government planned to provide approximately \$6.5 million in military assistance to the Government of Rwanda in FY 2013.

The majority of these funds support HIV/AIDS prevention and Rwandan peacekeeping missions in Darfur and South Sudan. The Department of Defense (DOD)

portion of this assistance is approximately \$3.5 million, which includes Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding to renovate a school and community center and DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) funding to help counter the effects of HIV/AIDS within the Rwandan armed forces.

Regarding the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the U.S. Government plans to provide approximately \$21.7 million in security assistance in FY 2013. Approximately \$15 million of this assistance is peacekeeping operations funding to build DRC military capacity. The DOD portion of this assistance is approximately \$396 thousand in OHDACA funds to renovate hospitals in the DRC.

Regarding questions as to whether the assistance provided to these countries is adequate and how funding should be prioritized for these countries in light of future budget constraints, the needs in Africa are always significant and there is always a need for more funding as DOD works to build the capacity of partner forces on the continent. In particular, the DRC has a significant need for assistance, but the U.S. Government should closely monitor the DRC's ability to absorb additional assistance.

USAFRICOM's priorities remain to counter threats to the United States emanating from Africa and to be in a position to respond appropriately to areas of instability. [See page 12.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON

Secretary CARSON. Let me say, thank you very much for the question. There is no question that conflict minerals contribute to sustaining conflict in Africa. Groups are able to take control of mineral rich areas and then to smuggle those minerals out through neighboring states into the international market. And so it does play a role in sustaining these kinds of conflicts. And this is why legislation passed here by the Congress has been useful in putting a check and a control over what U.S. companies can buy in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Reducing the illegal trade in minerals and increasing conflict-free sourcing diminishes the revenue available to help sustain armed groups. Also, when there are jobs available to support conflict-free mining areas, the incentive to join a rebel group as a means of making a living is not as strong. Mineral smuggling also is one of the incentives for outside interference in the DRC. Smuggling by armed groups can benefit supporters of those groups by providing them with revenue or with the minerals themselves. We are working with our international and regional partners to increase conflict-free sourcing, counter mineral smuggling and address this contributing factor to the region's destabilization. [See page 22.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Secretary CARSON. Of the so-called "FARDC Five," senior officials of the Congolese military accused of raping women and girls in separate incidents in the eastern DRC between 2004 and 2006, three were subsequently arrested in response to U.S. and international lobbying efforts: Brigadier General Jerome Kakwavu, Lt. Col. Bebimobuli Engandela (a.k.a. Colonel 106), and Colonel Safari. The highest ranking officer of the FARDC Five, BG Kakwavu, remains on trial in Kinshasa for two counts of rape as a war crime. A second, broader file against Kakwavu, opened in May 2012, includes two acts of torture as a war crime, one act of murder as a war crime, and nine acts of murder as crimes against humanity. Charges are still pending against Lt. Col. Bebimobuli, who remains in prison in Kinshasa; proceedings have been delayed pending the transfer of his case to Bukavu and related logistical as well as security challenges. Bebimobuli's prosecution is also complicated by the ongoing insecurity in the eastern DRC, which has also prevented prosecutors/investigators/police from reaching witnesses. Colonel Safari was acquitted by a military court in October 2011. The remaining two officers of the "FARDC Five" were removed from their command positions—a significant step—but subsequently fled. One of those officers, Colonel Mosala, remains at large. While charges are still pending against Mosala, the case hinges on the willingness of the sole victim to press charges. The other, Major Pitchen, was reported dead in April 2012. The arrests of such high-ranking officers—including Kakwavu, the first general officer to be prosecuted for rape by a military tribunal—represent significant progress, but major challenges remain to ending impunity and protecting Congolese women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) at the hands of security forces. We remain engaged not only in pursuing the prosecutions of these individuals, but also in pressing the GDRC to continue to arrest any official implicated in human rights violations as part of comprehensive security sector reform. U.S. and UN assistance,

as well as that of other bilateral partners and non-governmental organizations, to the Congolese military justice system through prosecution support cells and other programs have helped provide the tools, expertise, and skills that prosecutors and judges need to adjudicate cases such as these. Our programs and our diplomatic engagement have also helped to begin generating and sustaining the political will to take on cases so as to end impunity for the perpetrators of SGBV, regardless of rank. We continue to monitor incidents of alleged sexual violence in conflict, wherever they occur. [See page 28.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

DECEMBER 19, 2012

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

Mr. GARAMENDI. What actions are being taken by the Department of Defense to address the trade of ivory within the Democratic Republic of the Congo and central Africa?

Secretary CHOLLET. The Obama administration strongly condemns poaching and other wildlife trafficking crimes. Not only do these activities affect natural resources, but they pose a real threat to security public health, and economic prosperity. Counter-poaching is largely a law enforcement matter that is typically undertaken by police forces, but USAFRICOM will look for opportunities to leverage their engagements with African militaries to support counter-poaching efforts where possible.

The presence of USAFRICOM enables greater engagement with African militaries in efforts to build their capacity for a broader range of military missions. Training on international legal norms is also a key component of USAFRICOM engagement. DOD believes the most effective way to reduce illegal activities is through African militaries that could, if so directed by their governments, contribute to counter-poaching efforts.

The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency for coordinating an interagency approach to address the increase in poaching and DOD participates in their efforts to build a whole-of-government approach to counter-poaching.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd Movement (M23) have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or in central Africa?

Secretary CHOLLET. The Department of Defense has not identified any conclusive evidence that M23 rebels are directly involved in the hunting and illegal killing of elephants. M23 operates in the highlands and too far south and east for ivory. M23 funds itself primarily through taxing the movement of goods and people through its territory. M23 also extorts labor and goods from locals.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd Movement (M23) have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or in central Africa?

Secretary CARSON. We have seen no specific reporting that would indicate that M23 is involved in poaching or, specifically, involved in the trade of ivory. At the same time, M23 does control large swaths of Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where there is a small elephant population, providing a limited possibility that M23 is directly or indirectly benefiting from the trade in ivory, or from other forms of wildlife poaching. We will continue to assess the situation and respond accordingly should we obtain information of M23's direct involvement in the ivory trade.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd Movement (M23) have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or in central Africa?

Dr. FRAZER. The M23 rebel group has a diverse strategy for generating revenue to finance its activities. In addition to allegations they have been extracting payments for goods entering at border crossings, M23 rebels have also been accused of smuggling gold and other minerals across the Democratic Republic of Congo's borders. However, at this time there is no direct evidence that demonstrates any involvement of the M23 group in the illegal ivory trade in central Africa.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd Movement (M23) have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or in central Africa?

Dr. CARAFANO. The ivory trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is widespread, specifically in Garamba National Park and the Okapi Reserve, located in the northeastern part of the country. International crime syndicates, rebel groups, militias, militaries from neighboring countries and even the DRC's own troops, have either participated in the poaching industry or have been complicit in such activity. The ivory trade is particularly useful to groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Rwandan Democratic Liberation Forces (FDLR) and

Janjaweed fighters from Sudan and Chad who lack steady sources of income. While M23 has only been in existence since last spring, its predecessor, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) (disbanded in March 2009) allegedly participated in poaching. Poaching is by no means limited to the DRC or Central Africa. Poaching is a threat to elephant and rhino populations across the continent—from Chad to Kenya to South Africa. The terrorist group, al-Shabaab in Somalia has reportedly sought to expand its income through the ivory trade in Kenya.

Mr. GARAMENDI. a) Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd Movement (M23) have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or in central Africa?

b) Does the Eastern Congo Initiative undertake any initiatives to address the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or central Africa?

c) Does the Eastern Congo Initiative have any recommendations as to initiatives that the Department of Defense and/or Department of State could undertake to address the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or central Africa?

Mr. AFFLECK. Eastern Congo Initiative is unable to determine whether or not M23 is involved in ivory trade. We know, however, that poaching remains a very serious problem in the region. It is a lucrative business fueled by high demand in international markets. In the past, ECI has partnered with ICCN at the Virunga National Park in North Kivu to help stem poaching and other activities that are detrimental to the ecosystem. For instance, we have funded economic development initiatives with the national park to provide new income opportunities for communities surrounding the park. ECI also operationally supported the national park during a critical time period when M23 took control of the vast majority of Virunga National Park. We have to view poaching and related activities in the context of the prevailing insecurity that plagues Congo, particularly in the eastern provinces. Just like militiamen seem to continuously elude DRC security forces, poachers are often better equipped and more motivated than law enforcement agents. Thus, the security of national parks and the protection of endangered species need to be part of security sector reform initiatives. The United States Government has in the past assisted Virunga National Park to stem poaching through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Department and the best way for the Department of Defense and the Department of State to help fight and stem poaching and ivory trade would be for them to lead international engagement in DRC security sector reform. Congo depends on international donors for nearly every critical function of the state. As one of DRC's top donors, the U.S. is well-positioned to encourage the government of Congo to focus efforts on this important aspect of the country's progress. Such international engagement would require substantial planning, logistical and training support from the U.S. and its allies and other partners. Without competent professional military and law enforcement institutions, DRC's territory will continue to provide safe haven to various armed groups, which prey on the civilian population and illegally exploit Congo's resources. In the absence of these critical institutions, poachers and their networks will also continue to thrive.

